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This monograph is printed in accordance with requiremens of the walter E. Russell
Chair in phiìósóphy ãnd Education. The holder of the chair presents one or more
public lecture, on ittu"s in education and/or philosophy'
Dr. Russell was the second principal of Westérn Maine Normal School at Gorham
(pgS-fg¿O) and a reacher at úråt insti^mtion for many years. The Univenþ of Southern
Maine is a successor institution'
v/inifred s. Russell, Dr. Russell's widow, endowed the chair in her will, stating
that the position is to be 'devoted to the teaching of sudects which wrre not 
only
ôi'nurJ"f r professional specialties, but the_passion of his life' and will perpetuate
his name on a campus whàre he served with unusual distinction and fidelity"''- 
l álstlnguished rôcord of service at USM and evidence of signific¡nt achievement
,.in-t"u"triñg and scholarly activity involving education and/or philosophy, service
to the univãrsity and public service" are the qualifications'
The terms of Mrs. Russell's will require that éach nvo yeaß a member.of the USM
fu"uft U" uppointed to hold the chaii for a period of two years. There is no limita-
tion oî the number of terms an individual may hold the chair; on the other hand,
a different individual might be appointed at each two-year interval'
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PREFACE
On March 26, 1997, a symposium designed to explore various aspects of thinking and its
application to the curriculum was held at the University of Southem Maine. The symposium,
organized under the broad title "What Socrates Began-An Examination of the Intellect,"
was conducted under the sponsorship of Walter E. Russell Endowed Chair in Philosophy
and Education. Faculty from many disciplines participated in a number of lively and en-
thusiastic sessions.
Many of the papers that were presented at the symposium are included in this monograph.
Critical thinking is a new kid on the block and there is considerable disagreement over how
to defìne it, whether it can be developed, and its place in the curriculum. The chapters in
this monograph present a variety of perspectives on the topic of thinking.
The lesson of Aladdin is not only that we must be cautious with genies, but also that we
should not exchange new lamps for old until we know the value of each. The symposium,
with the encouragement of the Russell Family, was an opportunity for the University com-
munity to pause, as we seldom do in our hectic academic lives, to examine the old lamps
and the new.
In reviewing some of the Russell family memorabilia, I was struck by the enormous con-
tribution that Walter E. Russell and his family have made to education-a combined total
of 400 years commitment to education. As one writer said of the Russell frmily, "probably
they have not a parallel in New England." The support and encouragement of the Russell
family is gratefully acknowledged.
I am also grateful to a number of other individuals. Alyce O'Brien, Mary Schools and
Frances Langford were invaluable in organizing the symposium. Rebecca Neidetcher, Sue
Donovan, and Karyn Swiger helped with many of the details of the planning for the sym-
posium. I appreciate the colleagueship and friendship of Barbara McGough, Toni Rees,
Jim Curry, Jo Anna Spruill, and Kathy Turlo. Julie Cameron and her staff have my deep
gratitude for their work on this monograph. My colleagues at the University of Southern
Maine who presented at the symposium have my deep thanks. Finally, Les and Seth were
always there to provide support, encouragement, and understanding.
Libby G. Cohen
lValter E. Russell Professor of
Philosophy and Education
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THINKING ABOUT THINKING: MEMES AND THEMES
Libby G. Cohen
I have heard this ever since I can remember, and ever since I have taught:
the teacher must teach the pupil to think (Frost, 1966, p.41).
How many times have we heard the admonition, "Think!"? Although this seems like good
advice, when queried would the admonisher be able to also give advice on how to think?
It certainly is easier to give the advice than to tell people how to do it. But perhaps this is
putting Socrates and "Descartes before des horse" (Mann, 1986, p. 149) Today., I want to
àiscuss several perspectives ofcritical thinking, to suggest components ofthinking, and to
reflect upon some of the current thinking about thinking.
What does it mean to think? The word "think' is used in a variety of ways.
Consider the following examples: 'tilhat do you think about X?' 'I think this
is the one I saw, but am not sure.' 'When I think about my childhood, I get
nostalgic.' 'I did not think about that.' 'One should think carefully before deciding
what to do (Nickerson, R.S., Perkings, D.N., & Smith, E'E'' 1985' p' 3).
In these examples, think means consider, believe, remember, ponder, and reflect.
What do we mean when we talk about critical thinking? Which of the following list of stu-
dent activities focuses on the development of critical thinking (O'Rielly' 1985):
L students produce a slide tape on women's rights issues (problem solving).
2. Students discuss ways that the United States could have dealt with the Depression (divergent
thinking).
3. Students memorize various United Nations agencies (memorization).
4. Students assess an argument on McCarthyism (evaluation)'
The study of thinking is not unique to the 1980s @ransford, Sherwood, vye & Rieser, 1986).
At least since the rise of the Greek city-state, the use of the mind has been valued. Plato,
arguing for the need for mental discipline, wrote that "arithmetic stirs up him who is by
nature sleepy and dull, and makes him quick to leam, retentive and shrewd. He makes pro-
gress quite beyond his powers" (Mann (1979) cited by Bransford, Sherwood, Vye & Rieser,
tSt6, p. 1078). "socrates' 'Know thyself,' Aristotle's All men by Nature desire to know, and
Descartes' 'I think: therefore I am' provide epigraphs that frame an entire civilization' (Gard-
ner, 1983, pp. 5-6).
Numerous writers (Sternberg, 986a; Dewey, 933; McPeck, 981) have defined and discussed
critical thinking. The problem is not that we lack a definition, but that there are so many
definitions and terms and few writers can agree on any one. To illustrate, I want to develop
an analogy using Douglas Hofstadter's (1985) concept of viral sentences and memes (meme
rhymes with themes and schemes).
Viral sentences are similiar to viruses. These are "small objects, getting the hosts by hook
or by crook to carry out a complex sequence of replicating operations" (Hofstadter, 1985,
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p. 49). These sentences are selfish-they grab the space of ideas, make copies of themselves
and over take the space of ideas. Hofstadter (1985) has theorized that there is a competition
from other sentences and that all sentences are engaged in an evolutionary struggle for sur-
vival. If a sentence succeeds it has a niche in space-it is an ideosphere.
ln 1976, the biologist Richard Dawkins published The Selfish Gene. Dawkins called the unit
of replication and selection in the ideosphete a "meme." Examples of memes arc ideas, tunes,
and catch-phrases. Memes propogate themselves by leaping from brain to brain via imita-
tion. Hoßtadter wrote, "When I muse about memes, I often find myself picturing an ephemeral
flickering pattern of sparks leaping from brain to brain, screaming Me, me!!" (Hoßtadter,
1985, p. 52). Examples of little memes, which are humorous in themselves, are: "If you
copy me, I'll grant you three wishes" and "Say me or I'll put a curse on you!" (Hofstadter,
1985, p. 52-53). Dawkins wrote that "Socrates may or may not have a gene or two alive
today but the meme complexes of Socrates, Leonardo, Copernicus and Marconi are still go-
ing strong" (Dawkins, 1981, p. 144).
The meme complexes of Dewey, Sternberg, Gardner, and other theorists in the area of critical
thinking are rampant. Their memes are competing for space in our ideospheres. Some of
these theorists have examined philosophies of logic and reasoning; others have examined
the epistemology ofspecific subject domains; several have synthesized various perspectives
and derived their constructs from the syntheses; and finally, a fourth group have proposed
their own defrnitions and lists of associated skills (Quellmalz, 1984).
A frequently cited definition of critical thinking is fuund in John Dewey's book Ht¡w we Think.
Dewey wrote that reflective thought is the "active, persistent, and careful consideration of
any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the
further conclusions to which it tends" (p. 9). Thinking is triggered by some perplexity or
doubt. The next step is to form a tentative plan that will account for the doubt. According
to De\¡/ey, the sources of a solution to a problem are found in past experience and acquired
kncnvledge. An act of searching, hunting, and inquiring is necessary in order to find the solution
to ttre perplexity. B. Othanel Smith (1953) associated critical thinking with language and logic.
He believed that critical thinking is manifested in observable behavior and is "a form ofpro-
blem solving in which the purpose is to decide whether or not what is said is dependable"
(p. 130).
Arguing that critical thinking consists of more than raising questions, McPeck (1981) wrote
that it involves the "appropriate use of reflective scepticism within the problem area under
consideration" (p. 7). Knowing when and how to use reflective scepticism depends on the
subject area. Thinking skills are not transferable, according to McPeck, but are dependent
on the specific subject area in which the skills are to be used and on the disposition to use
these skills. McPeck wrote that "the criteria for the judicious use of scepticism are supplied
by the norms and standards of the held under consideration" (McPeck, 1981, pp. 7-8).
The teaching of logic to improve critical thinking has been called the philosopher's fallacy
(Johnson, 1987). Equating critical thinking with formal logic may be rigid and narrow because,
according to McPeck (1981), critical thinking rests on the field dependent epistemology, e.g.,
knowledge of the belief systems of a discipline. He wrote, that when a person suspends judg-
ment for the purpose of using epistemic understanding of an issue, then that person is a critical
thinker. (McPeck, 1981).
Both Nickerson (1986) and Johnson-Laird (1985) recognized ftat knowledge of the rules of
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logic alone are insufficient for thinking but Nickerson (1986) has hypothesized that one re-
quisite of critical thinking is "procedural knowledge" or the ability to evaluate informal
arguments. Although considerable work has been done on studying the use of formal logic
in-evaluating arguments, almost no studies have been conducted that examine the ability to
evaluate informal arguments.
A contrasting position has been presented by Matthew Lipman (1984), the developer of the
"Philosophyfor Children" program. Defining philosophy as "thinking that devotes itself
to the improvement of thinking" (Lipmann, 1984, p. 51), Lipmann has advocated the teaching
of philosòphy as the best method of developing reasoning skills in children in order to analyræ
thé "logical, epistemological, ethical, or aesthetic aspects of the problems under discus-
sion" (p. 56.). Thus, Lipman believes, unlike McPeck and some others, that thinking skills
are generalizable.
Robert Ennis (1985), like Lipman, considers thinking skills to be generalizable and has defined
critical thinking as "reasonable, reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe
or do" (Ennis, 1985, p. 54). Robert Sternberg (1986a) has written that "critical thinking com-
prises the mental processes, strategies, and representations people use to solve problems,
make decisions and learn new concepts" (p'46.).
These preceding conceptualizations of critical thinking have several common threads including
a disposition to be reflective, the use of analysis, judgment, pragmatic and formal reason-
ing, and the use of evaluation. Many other definitions and conceptualizations of critical think-
ing have been offered. Most of these definitions, aside from Sternberg's have either de-
emphasized or neglected to include the use of strategies that are used to plan and monitor
thinking processes. "In order to reach a successful verdict in a trial or to complete an analysis
or knowledge as design, one must combine a complex set of processes in a way that may
not lead to anything concrete" (Sternberg, l9ï7, p. 253). These strategies have been widely
written about as metacognitive strategies. Nickerson, Perkins, and Smith (1985) have defin-
ed metacognitive knowledge as:
knowledge about knowledge and knowing, including knowledge about the
capabilities and limitations of human thought processes, about what human
belngs in general might be expected to know, and about the characteristics of
specific people-and especially oneself-as knowing and thinking individuals.
Metacognitive skills may be thought of as cognitive skills that are necessary
or helpful, 1o the acquisition, use, and cóntrol ofknowledge and other cognitive
skills. They include the ability to plan and regulate the effective use of one's
own cognitive resources" (Nickerson, Perkins & Smith, 1985' p. 101).
A definition of critical thinking must include an emphasis on mental processes and
metacognitive strategies that arc used to identiÛ and solve problems, evaluate decisions,
make judgments and use reasoning.
When examining any ddrnition of critical thinking, we should also be inærested in the assump-
tions of that definition. Does the definition assume that critical thinking and critical think-
ing skills are the same? Is critical thinking discipline specific? Are some skills transferable
to other disciplines? What are the assumptions about the age at which critical thinking
develops? What assumptions are made about the biological bases of thinking? Most of the
current conceptualizations of critical thinking are hypothetical and there is little agreement
on any one or on their underlying assumptions. Empirical investigation of the conceptualiza-
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tions of critical thinking, their assumptions and implications is urgently needed (Quellmalz,
p. t92).
Why is Critical Thinking Importønt?
Why is critical thinking important? A recent ÍÌont page article in Education lteek (1986)
stressed that instruction in all areas of the curriculum was deficient in higher-order skills.
McTighe and Schollenberger (1985) believe that the characteristics of present and future
societies demand that students' thinking skills be developed. MalcolrnKnowles (Myers, 1986)
wrote that the increasingly complex demands of our society require that teachers emphasize
the skills and attitudes necessary for self-directed inquiry. Siegel (1980) stressed that teaching
students how to think critically should be an educational ideal because students have a right
to ask challenging questions, because they should be assisted in becoming competent adults
and be empowered with the ability to think critically, and because students should be helped
to understand and appreciate the role ofreason in rational endeavors. Paul (1984) has argued
that critical thinking is basic to education in a free society. Finatly, McPeck has written,
'Among people who bother tro think about education at all, reflective parents, theorists, radical
reformers and traditionalists alike, there is a prevailing opinion that the ability trc think critically
is a desirable human trait, and that for this reason it should be taught in our schools whenever
possible" (McPeck, 1981, p. 1).
There has been an unusual consensus on the importance ofcritical thinking. Several educa-
tional organizations, including the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, The Na-
tional Council of Teachers of English, the National Council for the Social Studies, and
the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development have called for the nurtur-
ing ofcritical thinking in students. These groups consider the teaching ofcritical thinking
skills to be of the highest importance and that "educators need to take renewed action
to bring about qualitative improvements in student thinking" (McTighe and Schollenberger,
1985). The state college and university system of California requires that every student
enroll in a course in critical thinking before graduation (Myers, 1986). Alverno College
in Wisconsin has received recognition for its innovative curriculum which emphasizes critical
thinking in various disciplines (Myers, 1986).
Critic al Thinking Skills
What is the difference between critical thinking and critical thinking skills? Dewey (1933)
proposed a five-step process that critical thinkers use which includes: 1) identification of
a problem; 2) analyzing the problem; 3) suggesting possible solutions; 4) testing consequences;
and 5) judging the selected solution (Quellmalz, 1984). While emphasizing the judgmental
dimensions of critical thinking, B.O. Smith "limited their application to problems of logical
reasoning presented to the student, i.e., 'what a statement means and whether to accept or
reject it"' (Smith, 1953). Ennis elaborated Smith's view by delineating twelve skills involv-
ed in the torrect assessment of statements' (Ennis, 1962). Quellrnalz, (1984) has suggested
that "Throughout these conceptualizations of critical thinking run some common skills. These
include: 1) an attitudinal component, suggesting an awareness, a disposition to be reflec-
t\ve; 2) an analytical component involving the identification of relevant information; 3) a
component for weighhg evidence; 4) a component involving knowledge of pragmatic and
formal methods of reasoning; and 5) the act of evaluation" (Quellmalz, 1984, p. 192).
Critical thinking skills can be grouped into two different categories or components,
metacognitive processes and cognitive processes. The category of cognitive processes in-
cludes the skills of analysis, comparison, inference, interpretation, and evaluation.
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Metacognitive processes include the planning, monitoring, reviewing, and revising of pro-
blems or tasks (Quellmalz, l9U).
Adopting a skills approach to critical ttrinking is similiar to the basic skills approach to reading.
But ieadìng cannoi be reduced to a few mechanical skills (Johnson, 1987). Reading is a com-
plex proceis and researchers in critical thinking may need to revise their conceptualizations
õf thà proc".. used in critical thinking. A skills approach may be too simplistic.
Sherlock Holmes is recognized as having superb thinking skills.l In order to test your own
reasoning skills consider the following excerpts from Arthur Conan Doyle's The Adventure
of the Gotden Pince Nez (Doyle, 1930) in which Inspector Stanþ Hopkins related the
.tuUUing of Willoughby Smith. Sherlock Holmes' solution to the mystery will be related at
the end of these remarks.
A maid has just entered the professor's study and discovered the body of
Willoughby Smith and "at first the maid thought that young Smith was already
dead, but on pouring some water from the carafe over his forehead he opened
his eyes for an instant. 'The professor,' he murmured, 'it was she"' (Doyle,
1930, p. 610).
"The housekeeper hurried to the professor's room. He was sitting up in bed'
honibly agiøted, for he had heard enough to convince him that something terri-
ble had oòcurred" (Doyle, 1930, p' 610). The housekeeper related that "the
professor was still in his night-clothes. .. He can give no explanation of the young
man's last words, 'The professor-it was she,' but imagines that they were the
outcome of a delirium" (Doyle, 1930 p' 610).
The Inspector then showed Sherlock Holmes an important piece of evidence-a
golden pince-nez. The Inspector said, "Willoughby Smith had- excellent
iighf '...t'There can be no question that ttris was snatched from the frce or the
pJrson ofthe assassin" (Doyle, 1930 p. 612)' Finally, the Inspector produced










Dcryle, AC. (1930). "The Adventure
of the Golden Pince-nez." In the
The Complete Sherlock Holmes.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday
and Company, Inc., p. 610.
rI am indebted to Johnson-Laird (1985) for the idea for this example
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Requisites of Thinking
As you continue to ponder the solution io the Mystery of the pince-Nez, you will be using
cognitive processes and metacognitive processes. But are there other requirements ofcritical
thinking? What were the requisite components of thinking that Sherlock Holmes needed in
order to solve this problem? Stemberg (19s/), writing that "there is more to being a good
thinker thanjust having the right thought processes" (p.253), has suggested that there are
elements that are necessary for good thinking. Nickerson (1986), rather than viewing these
elements as prerequisites believes that "our ability to reason is constrained somewhat by
natural limitations" (p. 358). Although we have yet to conduct a "factor analysis (that) would
provide a periodic table to the mind" (særnberg, 1987), the literature suggests that there
are several other requirements of critical thinking.
Knowledge about a particular subject that has been acquired by the thinker is a requisite
of critical thinking. Thinking does not occur in the absence ofknowledge; the thinker must
have something to think about. Nickerson (1986) has written, "the more one knows about
a subject, the more effectivel¡ other things being equal, will one be able to reason about
that subject. when two equally intelligent people are engaged in a dispute and one of them
is much more knowledgeable about the topic of the dispute than the other, there can be little
question that the less knowledgeable person is at a significant disadvantage,' (p. 359).
Another requisite of thinking is the ability to construct a model of the topic that is being
thought about. In one study, Perkins (Perkins, 1982 cited by Nickerson, 1986) found that
the difficulties people have with informal reasoning were "problems of inadequate model
building, that is, failures to elaborate a model ofthe situation under consideration" Q.{icker-
son, 1986, p. 359). sternberg (1987) has said that mental models also include dialogical
thinking-the ability to see problems from different points of view. Johnson-Laird (1985)
believes that the ability to construct metal models of situations "is a process that occurs in
most of the ordinary comprehension of discourse" (p. 316).
Even if sherlock Holmes had the right thinking processes, he would not be able to solve
the mystery if he were not motivated to do so. Motivation is an essential requisite of critical
thinking. Alfred North whitehead wrote, "There can be no mental development without
interest. Interest is the sin¿ qua non for attention and apprehension. You may endeavor to
excite interest by means of birch rods, or you may coax it by the incitement of pleasurable
activity. But without interest there will be no progress (whitehead cited by Myers, 19gÇ
p. 40). Særnberg (1986) described the results of¡ro studies that were designed to train students
in learning how to learn. Although there were several differences between the studies, he
concluded that "it was clear from the start that one difference overshadowed all the others-
motivation on the part of the students and on the part of the teachers" (p. 380).
O¡e of the most important objectives in teaching critical thinking processes is the nurturing
of positive attitudes (Nickerson, 1986). The encouragement of the development of critical
thinking processes and the monitoring of their use should be a major instructional objective
(Sternberg, 1987). Instructional programs like the Philosophy for Children program (Lip-
man, 1980) and the Instrumental Enrichment Program (Feuerstein, 1980) were constructed
to promote the development of positive attitudes toward ttrinking. There has been little research
on the preferred ways of promoting and maintaining motivation. Nickerson (1986) wrote:
"How to instill such attitudes in students? I do not believe we know the answer to that ques-
tion" (p. 369).
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Dilemmøs for the Future
Jeremy Bernstein (1987) described an imagined mental affliction that he thought he had call-
ed ,giasshopper mind." As a young child he was an eager reader of comic books and in
ttre Uact of óne of the comic books was a classified ad which showed an unhappy man with
a cartoon balloon attached to his head. Inside the balloon was a potpourri ofthoughts which
Bernstein described:
The man was suffering from this terrible grasshopper mind. I was sure I also
had it, since I seemed to be so unfocussed. It was radios one day, skis the next,
and Harriet Dorsey, a next-door neighbor with whom I had rigged a bedroom-
to-bedroom telegraph system, the third. You could send away for a treatment
for grasshopper minã, but for me it was prohibitively expensive. I-simPlY rtsign-
ed 
-myseHìô suffering from it-probably forever (Bernstein, 1987. p- 42).
Thinking about thinking can be a little like having "grasshopper mind." Although we know
a great dial about criticìl thinking, much work remains to be done. But, unlike Bernstein,
I arn not resigned to this malady forever. Gertrude Stein, on her death bed, is said to have
asked, ..what is the answer?" Hearing no answer she said, "In that case, what is the ques-
tion?" (Toklas (1963) cited by Sternberg, 1985, p. ll11). As I read and think about critical
thinking a number of questions were raised for me.
How do the hypothesized skills of critical thinking compare with *¡u¡ ¡su¡oscientists, com-
puter scientisii, and others have discovered about the functioning ofthe brain? Ifthere are
iour, five, or ten critical thinking skills can we assume that there are selective neurons for
them? During the past 20 years, the physical functioning of the brain has been extensively
investigated. Therè are more nerve cells in one human brain than the entire population on
the earth and these nerve cells can communicate with each other in a thousandth of a second
(Lance 1987 p. l0). We are challenged to describe how current theories of critical thinking
relate to whai we know about the structures of mental organization. As Lance said, 'And
that's what brains are for" (Lance, t987, p. l0).
Israel Scheffler (1985), in his book, Of Human Potential, identified three myths: the myth
of fixed potentials; the myth of harmonious potentials; and, the myth of uniformly valuable
potentiais. If we agree with Scheffler, then critical thinking skills and their requisite com-
pon"ntr are not equally useful and valuable, and they are not unalterable. Scheffler wrote:
If potentials are not fixed but unalterable, we need to reflect how our own ef-
forts might strengthen or weaken, alter or sustain them. If they conflict, we
face the need to discriminate among them' If mixed in value, we need to choose
which to promote, which to reduce' (Scheffler, 1985, p.92).
Any curriculum materials that are used to promote critical thinking "must make plain that
specific value choices are involved and not simply a maximal development of students' talents,
and independently understood" (Scheffler, 1985, p. 95). The assessment and teaching of
critical thinking is not free of assumptions and values.
One of the challenges in nurturing critical thinking in students will be to obtain a happy mar-
riage between cognition and instruction. How can we achieve this marriage-without it en-
ding in divorce (Sternberg 1986b)? Before implementing a program designed to promote
critical thinking, theories about cognition, instruction, motivation, learning, mental pro-
cessing, and student ability will have to be examined. While I have argued that it is better
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to be prudent rather "than to wait until a later postmortem that seeks to discover just what
went wrong" (Sternberg, 1986, p. 382), I believe that we have to get on with it. Assumptions
about critical thinking can be made, tentative definitions formed, and programs irnplemented.
But empirical testing of our assumptions and hypotheses about the nature of critical think-
ing should not be neglected.
I hope that this book will be an opportunity to review what we know, what we do not know,
and what we would like to know about critical thinking. In the meme's evolutionary struggle
for survival, there is space for the evolution and maturation of ideas about critical thinking.
We need ideas about critical thinking that can grab us and say, "Create me!" "Try mel"
Walter E. Russell has been described as a "man of vision, steadfast in his purposes and ideals,
a guide, a philosopher and a friend." Dr. Russell and the Russell family have nurtured a
tradition of commitment to education and thinking. As you read the chapters in this book,
you will be following in this tradition, I want to end with an excerpt by Jorges Luis Borges:
To discover the unknown is not a prerogative of Sinbad, of Eric the Red, or
of Copemicus. Each and every [hu]man is a discoverer. He begins by discovering
bitterness, saltiness, concavity, smoothness, harshness, the seven colors ofthe
rainbow and the diversity-some letters ofthe alphabet; he goes on to discover
maps, animals and stars. He ends with doubt, or with faith, and the almost
total certainty of his own ignorance @orges, 1984, pp. 7-8).
Solution to the Sherlock Holmes Mystery
The murderer could not have walked along the garden path without making a ftlse step because
the dying man had the pince-nez and Sherlock Holmes had discounted the possiblity that
the murderer had a second pair of glasses. It seemed that the murdere¡ had entered the pro-
fessor's room since there was no other exit. Thus, the professor knew who the murderer
was and that she was hiding in the professor's bedroom.
Libby G. Cohen
Walter E. Russell Professor of Philosophy and Educatíon
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CRITICAL THINKING IN THE COLLEGE
CURRTCULUM: SOMEV/HERE OR NOV/HERE?
Craig Dietrich
This paper discusses some of the difficulties of developing college curricula which foster
the teaching of critical thinking. Such an effort must negotiate the uneasy relationship be-
tween, on the one hand, the research ofphilosophers, psychologists, and education specialists
and, on the other, the practical matter of what and how to teach, and in which courses. These
complexities are compounded by the frct that it is very difficult to get agreement among
academics on a definition of critical thinking. In all this confusion, we must endeavor to
work out a reasonably acceptable notion ofwhat critical thinking is, and then to find ways
to nurture that in our curriculum.
At USM we have recently been working on this problem as part of a more general effort
to review the Core curriculum. Of the study groups we assembled, one was a task force to
examine our "Skills of Analysis/Philosophy" requirement. (At the outset, this term, "skills
of analysis," requires some comment. In our curriculum it has not consistently carried the
restricted meaning that the word "analysis" might impl¡ but rather seems to be taken to
mean good or effective thinking. In this paper I will use "skills of analysis" interchangeably
with "critical thinking.")
In our core, "Skills of Analysis/Philosophy" has been grouped with English composition,
and 'quantitative decision making" as a "skill" or "competency." Thus, we assert that students
must sharpen their basic "skills" in thinking, just as lhey must develop their abilities in writing
and using numbers. These three "competencies," as we call them, should presumably be
developed before the student takes too many other courses. "First learn how to write, com-
pute, and think," we seem to be saying.
Now for this prescription to be legitimate there must exist some general thinking skills (or
"skills of Analysis") which can be imparted in a course (usually in an introductory philosophy
course) and then transferred to other areas. This was the assumption in 1982. At that time
the University's Core Council drew up a set of criteria by which "Skills of
Analysis/Philosophy" courses would be approved. There were seven:
A course in Skills of Analysis should: (l) demonstrate the distinction between
the dynamic process of analysis and the form of logical argument; (2) com-
pare and contrast analysis to other cognitive processes such as remembering,
describing, and reconstructing; (3) establish that analysis is an idiosyncratic
and creative process; (4) teach the principles and processes of analysis which
include the definition of the problem, the development and maintenance of an
integrated approach, the discovery of acceptable premises, and the attainment
oftentative conclusions; (5) present the study ofdeductive and inductive logic
as the main support for good analysis; (6) help the student critique an argu-
ment; to distinguish between sound and unsound arguments; to identify non-
arguments; and to analyze reasons, conclusions, and argument connectives;
(7) diflerentiate between arguments based on value and arguments based on frct.
Now, when the Skills of Analysis Thsk Force first assembled in the fall of 1986, some of
its members expected that we could simply discuss these criteria. Our job would be to amend
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these criteria as seemed wise and perhaps even identify ways to assess student abilities in
this area. Unfortunately, those expectations turned out to be naive.
The initial reaction to these desiderata on the part ofthose who had been teaching the courses
was, "Where did they come from anyway? Why have we never seen them?" Here was an
instructive revelation that a wide gap can exist between written declarations and the actual
functioning of the curriculum; official rhetoric can exist in isolation from what professors
actually do.
But that was only the beginning of the questions about these criteria. For example, it was
asked: what exactly does the statement "should establish that analysis is an idiosyncratic
and creative process" (criterion 3) mean? It was not at all obvious. And there was the objec-
tion that these criteria mainly describe argumentation (see points 1, 5, 6,7). Should "skills
of analysis," or "critical thinking," be conceived of as argumentation? Some of us felt that
this was indeed appropriate. In this view, teaching students about sound and unsound argu-
ment, is, if not a sufficient goal of general education, at least a necessary one. Instruction
in this skill can be inco¡porated in an introductory philosophy course, and the students who
receive it should be able to read, think, and argue better-which should please everyone.
We werc accepting the original notion that you can incolporate a component of generic "think-
ing" (here meaning argumentation) into the curriculum.
Two kinds of objections surfaced. One sort was "technical," e.g., that integrating argumen-
tation into an introductory philosophy course necessarily cuts down on the philosophical
content that can be imparted. Moreover some participants considered the formal terminology
of argumentation (post hoc ergo propter hoc, slippery slope, etc.) to be jargon and held that
argumentation skills can be nurtured more intuitively in the process of examining the posi-
tions of important thinkers.
Another, more fundamental, kind of objection was that other sorts of thinking are equally
or perhaps even more important than argumentation and deserve the name, "critical think-
ing." This led us into the swamp of definitions. The following are offered as a sampling of
the diverse approaches to this question.
Montclair Tþachers College, in its Philosophy for Children program, lists thirty thinking
skills. They include: formulating concepts precisely, making appropriate generalizations,
formulating cause-effect relationships, making immediate inferences from two premises,
knowing elementary ru1es of standardization, knowing the rules governing ordinal and rela-
tional logic, etc. (Lipman 1985).
The editor of a 1986 report on assessing thinking skills presents a list of higher order think-
ing skills which includes: comparing and contrasting, making inferences, analyzing events,
synthesizing information, drawing conclusions, identifying the problem, analyzing the pro-
b1em, and other terms totalling 41 in all (Kearney, et al. 1986). We note that both this list
and the Philosophy for Children list are unstructured; the order of items has no significance.
Then there are taxonomies. One thinks of Benjamin Bloom's "taxonomy of educational ob-
jectives" and its hierachy of six items: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis,
synthesis, and evaluation. There is also Barbara P¡esseisen's brief review ofthe field in which
it is argued that there are four categories of "cognitive processes": namely, essential cognitive
processes, higher order cognitive processes, epistemic cognitive processes (that is to say,
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those related to particular subject areas), and metacognitive processes (those somehow
transcending particular subject areas) (Presseisen, 1986). Both the Bloom and the Presseisen
hierarchies move from simpler to more complex thinking.
According to the faculty of Alverno College, critical thinking consists of: analytic thinking
and communicating, synthesis, judgment, reflection, collaborative thinking and com-
municating, articulating ideas, awareness of values in making choices, asking signifrcant
questions, problem solving, organizing, openness to contradictory ideas, evaluation of self
and others (Mentkowski and Cromwell, 1985).
But before getting too comfortable with the problem posed in this way, we must confront
still another complication. A debate is currently raging over how deeply critical thinking
is imbedded in specifrc disciplines or subject matter areas. One school of ttrought, which
is strong and seems to be growing stronget argues that critical thinking is always thinking
about something. To quote the bolder language of John McPeck (1981), "Purporting to teach
critical thinking in the abstract, in isolation from specific fields or problems areas, is muddled
nonsense.. ." On this view, the attempt to inculcate transferable generic critical thinking would
be a serious mistake. And when we look at some of the literature on "problem solving"
and novice vs. expert behavior, it also seems that expertise is quite specific to a certain sub-
ject matter: the nuclear arms negotiator is likely to be quite inexpert at nearly everything
else from fixing the ca¡ to scanning verse, to programming computers. The obvious casuality
ofthis discipline-specific view ofcritical thinking would be those parß ofa curriculum (such
as we have) which aim to teach generic critical thinking.
On the other hand, those who cut their academic teeth on Piaget's "formal operations" con-
cept cannot have fled the battlefield entirely. The Philosophy for Children program cited
above describes thinking in generic terms that cut across specific domains. A theoretical
discussion that needs to be noted here is Donald Davidson's (1984) article which argues that
it is very difficult to sustain the view that there exist completely separate conceptual schemes.
Davidson concludes with a dilemma: "...we have found no intelligible basis on which it can
be said that schemes are different. . . þutl neither can we intelligibly say that they are one."
Or to cite one further example of unwillingnes to go all the way with McPeck, we have Chet
Meyers (1986) first asserting, "Recent studies have suggested that there is little carry over
between the understanding of the skills of logic and the application of good critical skills
in other disciplines" and then a few pages later admitting, "...logic and problem solving
do provide useful points of departure for more specific approaches to critical thinking. After
all, critical thinking in all disciplines does incorporate basic elements of logical reasoning. . . ."
Now if the exclusionary school of thought is correct, then clearly we should revamp our
curriculum because you can't teach generic critical thinking and expect it to transfer from
one subject area to another. But are they really right? Do we not run the risk of riding the
latest wave in educational theory only to have to reverse course later? The problem becomes
all the more ticklish when we take into account the heavy costs of major curricular overhaul.
So what do we do? I must confess that at times I felt that our task force resembled nothing
so much as a neryous flock of birds in an orchard. As a practical mattet the flock must at
some time come to rest on some particular tree, even if it cannot be sure that this is the best
tree. But no sooner do one or two birds alight than they all take flight again. Like the birds,
we can't remain uncommitted indefinitely, and it may be hoped that we won't simply go back
to the old branch where we have been roosting for some time.
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If I had my way, we would proceed as follows. We would attempt to agree on some taxonomy
ofcritical thinking. My preference would be for one that is not as general as Alverno's, yet
not limited to skills of logic and argumentation. A good candidate might be Prcsseisen's hierar-
chy, mentioned previously, of (1) essential cognitive processes, (2) higher order cognitive
processes, (3) epistemic cognitive processes, and (4) meta-cognitive processes. Having em-
braced a theory, we would then attempt, through study of literature and our own pragmatic
inquiry, to establish which of these kinds of thinking seem to be in some sense generic and
which seem to be more imbedded in particular disciplines. We would then have criteria for
determining how to apportion responsibility for developing these skills: some in what we
now call "Skills of Analysis/Philosophy" courses, some within specific subject domains.
I am inclined to think that what Presseisen calls "essential cognitive processes" include broad
skills of logical reasoning and argumentation (classiffing, inferring, working with analogies,
induction, deduction, etc.) that can be transferred to many contexts. Given that many
undergraduates are grossly deficient in these things, teaching them a vocabularly for these
processes is a good thing.
Going further, it seems to me that within majors, very explicit attention should be paid to
problem solving, creative thinking, and othe¡ processes that mark competence and exper-
tise in the field. I mean that this should not remain implicit and unexamined, but should
be explicitly fostered as part of the training in each major. This would relate to categories
(2) and (3) in Presseisen's hierarchy.
Finally, there is Presseisen's fourth category. I'm not sure that everyone means the same thing
by the "meta" in metacognitive. In this discussion, I would think the term must include the
recognition that there are various fields of discourse, each possessing its own vocabularly,
procedures, priorities, etc. It is something the anthropologists have helped us understand
by comparing disciplines to neighborhoods. It calls our attention to the notion that each
neighborhood has its characteristic ways of thinking and expressing itself, but that we can
move from neighborhood to neighborhood. The trick is to recognize that to do so one must
talk and act like the people on the new street.
Another view of metacognitive may be found in Glaser (1984), who says that metacognitive
abilities include "knowing what one knows and does not know, predicting the outcome of
one's performance, planning ahead, efficiently apportioning time and cognitive resources,
and monitoring and editing one's efforts to solve a problem or to leam." Metacognitive, under
Glaser's or my own definition, clearly incorporates a set of skills that are not limited to a
specific discipline, but they would seem to be skills that cannot be acquired until some
discipline-specific expertise has been gained.
Where should metacognitive skills be taught? This is not an easy question to be resolved
by developing a course or two. One context that suggests itself immediately is USM's inter-
disciplinary requirement. But whether that is suffìcient may be doubted, and perhaps this
too must in paft be the task of the discipline-related trainings. Glaser suggests "teaching
specific knowledge domains in interactive, interrogative ways so that general self-regulatory
skills are exercised in the course of acquiring domain-related knowledge."
Finally, I would urge that, since we do not have anything like a universally accepted core
curriculum model to draw upon and since theoretical approaches are liable to change over
time, teaching thinking must remain continuously under discussion and review. Nothing is
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more important in this endeavor than a systematic and sustained attempt to ascertain just
what the level of attainment of our students is. Here the word "assessment" enters the
discourse. Assessment has recently attracted wide interest under the leadership of a few in-
stitutions which have sought to use assessment instruments as feedback for the continuous
evaluation and improvement of academic programs. Whether or not assessment may have
been oversold as a panacea, the fact remains that, unless we wish to proceed in the dark,
we must become more systematic about clearly speciffing just what "skills" we intend to
impart to our students and about veriffing to what degree they really are acquiring these skills.
Cmig Dietrích
Hístory Depaftment, College of Arts and Sciences
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This work is dedicated to my mother-inJaw Cynthia Warick Kemper who has
becn and continues Io be an inspiration.
The ability to think logically, i.e., to reason, is essential to being human. The quest for
understanding the process of reasoning is an ancient human pursuit, the results of which
are accounted for in logic. The inevitable question as to whether or not reasoning is
mechanizable, i.e. , is there a machine executable procedure for reasoning, was not address-
ed however until the seventeenth century when Leibnitz (1646-1716) set forlh the goal of ob-
taining such a procedure, calling it calculus ratiocinator. Leibnitz's idea sparked a concerted
effort to formulate a mechanizable reasoning procedure. Many discoveries followed, and
by the end of the nineteenth century there was a widespread belief that Leibnitz's goal was
within reach. The state of affairs at that time was especially well articulated by the great
mathematician David Hilbert in his now famous address to the International Congress of
mathematicians i¡ Paris 1900. The effort to discover a mechanizable reasoning procedure
was particularly intensive in the years that followed Hilbert's address, and, at times, it seemed
that the solution was just around the corner, but it was not until 1931 that the question was
finally resolved. That year a young logician named Kurt Goedel (1906-1Ø8) published an
astounding paper from which it became apparent that a mechanizable reasoning procedure
does not exist, i.e. , reasoning is not mechanizable. Disappointing as it was (for some, anyway)
this result, now known as Goedel's incompleteness theorem, has been recognized by many
as one of the most significant scientific discoveries ever. The mechanization of reasoning
did not becorne, however, a completely lost cause, because there was still the possibility
ofobtaining a satisfactory partial solution. Such a solution was in fact apparent in Goedel's
doctoral dissertation, submitted to Vienna University only the previous year. In it, Goedel
demonstrated that reasoning in a somewhat narrower but certainly not trivial sense, which
is detailed later in this paper, is mechanizable. This result is now referred to as the com-
pleteness theorem. A procedure for such reasoning, according to the completeness theorem,
would, in effect, call for the systematic generation of all prooß until one with the characteristics
specified by the goal ofreasoning is obtained. Goedel's completeness theorem is ofa great
value for mathematics, for it characterizes the deductive power of the axiomatic proof method
that is used by mathematicians. For the purposes of mechanized reasoning, howeve¡ the
procedure implied by that result leaves, from a practical point of view, a lot to be desired
because the systematic generation of all proofs quickly leads to combinatorially explosive
(mechanically intolerable) situation. At around the same time, young Jacques Herbrand
(1908-1931), while unaware of Goedel's result, obtained in his doctoral dissertation* at the
Sorbonne a theorem which, when combined with the completeness theorem, yields
reasoning procedures which are significantly more efticient then those implied by the com-
pleteness theorem alone. Roughly, the improvement is in requiring, in general, the genera-
tion of only some proofs, and not necessarily all, as the completeness theorem does.
Herbrand's theorem has an enormous practical value, which today remains unsurpassed.
For a long time, horever, it was not fully appreciated because in practice, the various reasoning
* the paper was dated April 14, 1929,but the defense did not take place until June 11, 1930
because Herbrand was drafted for Service by the French Army.
26
procedures which are implied by the theorem seemed to require a machine with speed and
memory (capacity for storing intermediate results) significantly exceeding what was then
æchnically feasible. Modern computers have alleviated these problems to a great degree and
the term programmable (on a computer) has replaced the term mechanizable. In addition,
many efficient implementations of Herbrand's theorem were obtained, especially in the last
twenty-five years. A notable implementation among these is Robinson's resolution-based pro-
cedure. These developments have promoted a new discipline in computer science,
called logic programming, which is for studying the issues of implementing reasoning pro-
cedures on a computer (where they are referred to as reasoning programs). One of the out-
comes of logic programming is the formulation of the so-called declarative programming
languages, such as PROLOG. Roughly, a declarative program specifies wå¿¡ is the task of
the program (the problem), whereas, in the more traditional imperative programming
languages, a program specifies how the problem is to be solved (giving an algorithm for
obtaining the solution). To execute a declarative program is to execute a reasoning program
with the declarative program (the "what" part of a task) as its input. Thus, in programming
declaratively the programmer can concentrate on describing a problem, and then leave it
up to the computer, via a reasoning program, to calculate the solutions to the problem. The
advantages of programming declaratively can be illustrated with the following øsk, called
"The Billiard Balls and Baiance Scale Puzzle": There are twelve billiard balls, eleven of
which are identical in weight. The remaining ball, the odd one, has a different weight. Find
which ball is the odd ball, and also whether it is lighter or heavier than the others in three
weighings using a balance scale.
With cerøin syntactic modifications to accommodate any particular declarative programm-
ing language, the above described task becomes a program in that language. This program
can then be submitted as input to the reasoning program associated with that language in
order to obtain all possible (if any) solutions. According to Wos et al. [12], the execution
of such a program on an IBM 3033 generated all 40 nontrivially distinct solutions in 22
seconds.
Not surprisingly, declarative programming has found a wide reception in the field of ar-
tificial intelligence, especially for developing the so-called expert systems. At the founda-
tion of such applications are, of course, the above-mentioned discoveries of Goedel and Her-
brand. In this pape¡ the statement and the proof of a result which is now regarded as the
fundamental theorem of logic programming will be outlined. This theorem is essentially
a combination of Goedel's completeness and Herbrand's theorems, and is often referred to
in the literature as the Skolem-Herbrand-Goedel theorem to also recognize Thoralf Skolem,
who came close to proving the completeness theorem in 1922, while actually aiming in a
different direction. The methods which he then introduced are now widely used to produce
new proofs of Herbrand's and Goedel's theorems.
Reøsoning and Language
On the surface, thinking is a mental process which is perceived by the thinker as the forma-
tion of expressions (thoughts) in the symbolism of some medium for communication, such
as English (written, spoken), art, music, etc. The expressions are regarded as encodings
(denotations) ofthe thinker's perceptions ofthe universe and are referred to as (empirical)
truths. The subject matter of any particular thinking is (what the thinking is about) the set
of all perceptions encoded in that thinking. The encoding, i.e., the interpretation, is assum-
ed to be consistent, which is to say it is independent of context (and of course, of time, as
it is a part of the context).
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Reasoning, or logical thinking, is thinking about thinking. The expressions of reasoning are
referred to as prooß (of statements which are incorporated in the expressions) and are percep-
tions of a (mental) phenomenon called logical truth. Reasoning involves the use of two media:
one to do the thinking with, and the other for thinking about. Such media are referred to
as the metalanguage and the object-language, respectively. As it happens, in everyday reason-
ing these two languages are regarded as one and the same, the natural language, by which
we mean a1l means for communication, including written, spoken and other forms of any
and all particular languages, such as English, that are known to the thinker. Such dual use
of a language is called amalgamation. The amalgamation of the natural language, however,
can lead to a confusion (paradoxal situation) as demonstrated by the so called Russell's paradox
(named after Bertrand Russell who drew attention to it in 1902). There are several well-known
variations to this paradox! which in is general form defines a set, say S, to be the one which
consists of all sets and only such sets, which do not contain themselves as members**. The
confusion arises from the question of whether or not S belongs to itself. Indeed, if S were
to contain itself, then according to its definition, it does not, and vice versa. The cause of
the confusion here is the imposition of a single meaning of the three occurrences of the word
"set" in the definition of S. Properly, the meaning of the frrst occurrence should be accord-
ding to the meta-language, while that of the second and the third should be according to the
object-language. But it is obviously impossible for an expression ofa language (rere, a word)
to have two different meanings in the same reasoning expression, assuming, of course,
the consistency of the interpretation of the language. Apparently, it is the unrestricted use
of the natural language here as the object language of reasoning that causes the confusion.
Indeed, the confusion would have been avoided, by having caused the question in the paradox
to become meaningless (bad English), if the expression "all sets, and only such sets, which
do not contain themselves as members" was considered as either being meaningless (first
approach) or else, denoting something essentially similar, but actually different then whatever
is denoted by "set," say "new type ofset" (second approach). Following the first approach
would lead to a (grammatical) restriction of the natural language referred to as the first-order
language. If the second approach were taken without any further restrictions, however,
Russell's paradox can be phased again, this time the role of "set," being played by the "new
type of set" which now leads, via the first approach, to a restriction referred to as the second-
order language. Both restrictions obviously avoid Russell's paradox. The second-order
language however, is clearly more expressive (i.e. it has larger subject matter). Third (and
higher)-order languages, each successively more expressive and each avoiding Russell's
paradox, are obtained by repeatedly taking the second approach, whereby introducing newer
"new type of set," and finally taking the first approach with respect to the so-obtained last
"new type of set."
Apparently, without any loss of expressiveness, for each order language various more
economical sublanguages, classified as being ofthe same orde¡ can be obtained by excluding
words which can be defined in terms of remaining ones. Such sublanguages offer, so to say
different basic perspectives, and ttrey are grouped together accordingly into logics (or calculi)
such as predicate (or functional) logic (with perspective on properties and functions), com-
*a librarian is asked to compile a bibliography of all bibliographies which do not list
themselves. The paradox arises at the point when a decision must be made as to whether
or not such a bibliography must contain itself.
*+an example of a set containing itself is the set of all sets. The set of all apples on the other
hand, is not an apple and thus is does not contain itself.
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binatory logic (with perspective on functions only), temporal logic (with perspective on time),
modal logic (with perspective on necessþ), fuzzry logic (with perspective on probability), etc.
Lønguages oÍ the First-Order Predicøte Calculus
Goedel's incompleteness theorem shows that in general, reasoning about second and higher-
order languages is not programmable. His completeness theorem on the other hand indicates
that reasoning about first-order languages is programmable. Herbrand's theorem also con-
cerns first-order languages and goes a step further than Goedel's by giving methods which
lead to more efficient reasoning procedures. The combinations of the completeness and Her-
brand's theorems, as we mentioned earlier, is often referred to as the Skolem-Herbrand-Goedel
theorem and is fundamental to the implementation of reasoning procedures. This result and
is proof will be outlined in the case when the object language of reasoning is from a certain
class of grammatically similar first-order languages, which are commonly referred to as first-
order predicate calculus. while the first-order predicate calculus is, in the sense here, a part
of the natural language, it is not the same as the common natural language, both in sym-
bolism and in grarnmar. The introduction of new symbolism is for brevity, while the introduc-
tion of new grammar is to avoid having to deal with the intricacies of that of the common
language.
Certain symbols are present in each one of these languages and will be referred to them as
logical. The logical symbols are divided into propositional connectives and quantifiers. The
propositional connectives are: the negation('l ), the disjunction( v ), the conjunction(n ), and
the implication(à): The quantifiers are: the existential(A ) and the universal(V). The non-
logical symbols of each language will vary with the language (i.e., each set of non-logical
symbols corresponds uniquely to a language and vice versa), and for each language they
are divided according to the context in which they will occur in the expressions of that language
(i.e., their use) into constants, variables, predicates, and functions. The predicates and the
functions are further divided according to (the number of their) arity, and in general þ
n-ary, where n ) I, we will mean that the arity is n. In a first-order language, the set of the
non-logical symbols of any kind may be empty, or finite, or infinte. The expressions of each
language are classified (according to how they are formed) into terms and well-formed for-
mulas (or simply formulas) according to the following rules, which for future reference speci$r
other syntactic notions as well:
l. Each constant and each variable of the language is a term.
2 . If f is n-ary function and each t1,. . . ,tn are all terms then the application of f to
t1,...,tn is a term, and we will graphically represent it by f(,,...,t")*.
3. If P is n-ary predicate and t1,...,tn are all terms then the application of P to tr,...,tn
is a formula, in this case atomic, graphically represented by P(t,,...,t).
4a. If A is a formula then the negation of A, graphically represented by (l A), is also
a formula and the set of its parts consists of A and the parts of A.
4b. If A and B are formulas then so are the disjunction, the conjunction and the im-
plications of A and B, graphically represented by (A V B), (A 
^ 
B), and (AàB),
respectively, and for each one the set of its parts consists of A, B, the parts of
A and the parts of B.
*The symbols (,) and, are used as punctuation marks (delineators) for the graphical
representation of terms and formulas.
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If Q and x are respectively quantifier ( 3 or V ) and a variable, and A is a fomula.
then the quantification (existential or universal) of A on x is also a formula,
graphically represented by (QxA), and the set of its parts consists of A and the
parts of A.
cleally, each part of a formula is a formula, and furthermore, every formula has finitely
many parts. This completes the grammar (the syntax) of the languages in the first-order
predicate calculus. A reasoning procedure for any of these languages can now be given. In-
deed, such a reasoning procedure, by virtue of being programmable, must concern itself
only with syntactic notions (as opposed to semantic ones which pertain to the understanding
of a language), and the above outline of these languages provide the necessary syntactiõ
material. In order to state and prove Skolem-Herbrand-Goedel theorem for these languages,
however, we must discuss how we intend these languages to be used, i.e., the sernantics,
which is our next task. The constants and the variables are intended to serve as names of
entities. The functions are intended to serve as names of a certain kind of relations between
entities-the kind which designates uniquely an entity in such a relation, when the rest of
the entities in the relation are given. The predicates are intended to serve as names of rela-
tions involving entities in general (functions are thus special kinds of predicates) . The atomic
formulas are intended to express (individual) perceptions, i.e., empirical truths. The exact
nature of the perceptions is not intended to be communicable, for it is presumed to vary from
individual to individual, and even to vary with each individual over a period of time (e.g.,
the perception of a color, the sense of temperature, the taste of any food, etc.) What is in-
tended for communication between individuals (and also to oneself.¡, are certain combina-
tions of perceptions that are recognizable as such, regardless of the nature of the percep-
tions, and will serve as denotations of logical truth. For each language of the firsforder
predicate calculus, the formulas denoting logical truth will be called valid. The valid for-
mulas will serve as the expressions of reasoning, so that the formation of a valid formula
is what the thinker perceives as reasoning. The value of any reasoning is thus its corn-
municability, which is to say, that the valid formulas are recognized by thinkers, regardless
of the individual experience (e.g., regardless of how one perceives each colo¡ the taste of
any food, etc.). As the systematic foundation of all formulas in a given language of the first
order predicate calculus is programmable, the programmability of reasoning in that language
would follow if the determination of validity is also programmable. The definition of validi-
ty is complex and for it to be concise requires the introduction of more terminology which
is our next task.
By domain (also called universe of discourse), we mean a set. Every domain D determines
uniquely a frame (also called subject matter) which consists of:
1. All relations of all arities in D, where by a relation in D of arity n we mean a subset of
the set of all n-tuples (i.e., sequences of n many) elements of D.
2. All functions of all arities in D, whereby a function in D of arity n, we mean a
specific designation, whereby to every n-tuple in D (the arguments) a single element
in D (the value) is designated.
By interpretation of a language L within a frame F we mean an interpretation of the non-
logical symbol of L according to which:
l. Each constant and each variable denotes an element ofthe domain ofF.
2.Each n-ary predicate denotes as n-ary relation in F.
3. Each n-ary function symbol of L denotes an n-ary function of F.
If I is an interpretation within a frame F then by domain of I we mean the domain of F.
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Every interpretation I ofa language L divides the terms ofL into sets, each one designated
by an element of the domain of I and also divides the formulas of L into two sets, designated
by, say T and R as follows from the following rules:
1. Each variable and each constant is in the set designated by its denotation according
to I.
2 . If tl, . . . ,tn are terms that are in the sets designated by say a1,. ,an respectively, and f is
n-ary function of L then f(tr,...,t") is in the set which is designated by the value of
the denotation of f according to I for the arguments al,'.4n.
3. If tl,. . ,tn are terms that are in the sets designated by say al, . . ,an respectively and P is
an n-ary predicate then P(tr,..,tn) is in the set designated by T if the relation denoted
by P is true of a1,..,an (i.e. the n-tuple a1,..,an belongs to it), else P(tr,..,t") is in the
set designated by F.
4. Formulas of the kind (lA), (A v B), (A À B) and (A+ B) are classified depen-
ding on the classification of A and B according to the following table:
5. If a formula is of the kind (3 xA), then it is in the set designated by T, if A is in that
set for at least one interpretation of L which may differ from I only in the denotation
of x, else it is in the set designated by F.
6. If a formula is of the kind (VxA) then it is in the set designated by T is A is in that
set for every interpretation of L which may differ from I only in the denotation of x,
else it is in the set designated by F.
With regard to the above, we note for future reference that determining the designation of
a formula from that of is parts is clearly programmable, if the formula is of the kind covered
by 4. If a formula is however quantified (5 and 6) it is required explicitly that a certain con-
dition be met with regard to possibly infinítely many interpretations, and such a task is not
necessarily programmable.
Given an interpretation I of a language L, we say that according to I a term t of L denotes
x if t is in the set designated by x, and we say that according to I a formula A of I- is true
(false) if A is in the set designated by T(F).
ForaninterpretationlofalanguageLandaformulaAofLwesaythatAissatisfiedby
I if A is true according to I. By A is valid in L we mean that A is satisfied by every inter-
pretåtion of L. Thus, A is valid in L if A is true according to every interpretation of L, and
A is unsatisfiable in L if A is false according to every interpretation of L.
A B
.IA AvB AnB A-> B
T T F T T T
T F F T F F
F T T T F T
F F T F F T
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Detennining ValiditY
Clearly, if A is valid as a f,¡rmula of one language, then A is also valid as a fonnula of any
other language. Thus, to determine the validity of a formula A for an arbitrary language,
it suffices to consider only the interpretation of the smallest language of which A is a for-
mula, which we will refer to as the language of A. Nevertheless, the task of determining
that an arbitrary formula is valid appears to be of enoffnous magnitude, perhaps even irn-
possible! Indeed, pursuing it in a straight forward manner, it would seem that one has to
consider one at a time all possible domains and their frames (finite and infrnite) and, for
eaclì one, all possible interpretations, even when they are infinitely many as is the case with
infìnite frames. This approach certainly does not suggest a progammable procedure, for there
is no way for a computer to perform infinitely many tasks at one point, before going on to
the next one.
The determination of validity of a formula, however, is a relatively easily programmable
for a certain class of formulas, called the propositional formulas, which were first formulated
by George Boole, Emst Schroeder and others during the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, preceding the formulation of the first (and higher)-order languages. By propositional
formula we mean (in a slightly more general sense then Boole and Schroeder) a formula
without any quantifiers or functions, i.e., its non-logical symbols arc either constants, variables
or predicates. Apparently, in order to determine the validity of a propositional formula A
there is no need to consider domains at all (as one might suspect from the observation that
being without quantifiers and functions A cannot express any property of a possible domain).
Indeed, every interpretation of A determines uniquely a division of a the atomic parts of
A into two sets according to their designation under the interpretation (as either T or F),
the furthermore, there are finitely many such divisions, for A has finitely many parts. From
the assumption that no function symbols occur in A follows that for every division of its
atomic parts there is an interpretation of the language of A which designates that atomic parts
of A according to the division. From the above two observations it follows that to determine
the validity of A, it is necessary and sufficient to consider all divisions of the atomic parts
of A. Now, the designation of A from the designation of its atomic parts is, according to
an earlier remark, programmable, and from having finitely many divisions to consider, it
follows that determining the validity for propositional formulas is programmable.
The propositional formulas, however, are not altogether sufficiently expressive, for it can
be shown here that there are valid formulas which are not propositional. This justifies the
need for a general solution. As we observed earlier, this appears to be a task of enormous
proportions requiring, so it seems, the ability to consider at some point infinitely many dif-
ferent cases (in a finite amount of time) before proceeding to the next point. It is thus quite
a surprise that, according to the Skolem-Herbrand-Goedel theorem, there is a way to pro-
gram the determination of validity (in a sense, the theorem puts a lid on one's imagination
for different interp¡etations). The staternent of the theorem, as it might be expected, is quite
complex and requires, for it to be concise, the introduction of mo¡e terminology, which is
our next task.
A formula A is prenex if it is obtained from successively quantifying a quantifierless for-
mula, referred to as the matrix of A (graphically, all of the quantifier of A, if any, are to
the left of any of its predicates, and the matrix of A is the part which is quantified by the
right most quantifier). By scope of an occurrence of a quantifier in a formula we mean the
part of the formula which is quantified by the occurrence of the quantifier. We say that an
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occurrence of a variable in a formula is free if it is not in the scope of an occurrence of a
quantifier on that variable. We say that an occurrence of a variable in a formula is bound
by an occurrence of a quantifier on that variable if it is free in its scope.
The Herbrand universe of a formula is the set of all terms in the language of the formula.
By a Herbrand interyretation of a formula A we mean an interpretation of the language of
A which satisfies the following:
a) The domain of the interpretation is the Herbrand universe of A.
b) If f is an n-ary function symbol then it is interpreted as the function which has the
term f(tl,..,tn) as the value for the arguments tl,..,tn.
By Herbrand base of a formula we mean the set of all atomic formulas in the language of
the formula. Clearly, every Herbrand interpretation of a formula divides the Herbrand base
according to the designation of its elements and, vice versa, every division of the Herbrand
base determines uniquely a Herbrand interpretation of the formula.
We say that a B is a variant of a formula A if B can be obtained from A by successively
performing any of the transformations outlined below:
Replace in a formula all occurrences ofa variable bound by an occurrence of
a quantifier either with a symbol which is not of the language of the formula,
or with a variable of that language, provided that it does not occur bound in
the scope of the occurrence of the quantifier, and change the quantifier to quan-
tifu on the replacing symbol.
It is easy to see that if B is a variant of a formula A then B is also a formula, and further-
more, A is a variant of B. Apparently, there is a programmable procedure which when ap-
plied to a formula A would generate exhaustively a list of all variants of A in a language
whose variables can be listed exhaustively by a programmable procedures.
We say that B is a prenex form of a formula A if B is prenex and its graphical representation
can be obtained by successively performing on the graphical representation of A any com-
bination of transformations among those that are outlined below:
a) Replace a part by a variant.
b) Replaceapart 1(QxC)by (Q'x'1C), whereQ'is J if Qis V, andQ'isV
ifQis3.
c) Replace a part ((QxC) V D) by (Qx(C v D)), provided that x does not occur
free in D.
d) Replace a part (C v (QxD) by (Qx(C v D)), provided that x does not occur
free in C.
e) Replace a part ((QxC) +D) by (Q 'x(C,1 D)), where Q ' is as in (b), provided
that x does not occur free in D.
Ð Replace a part (C + (QxD)) by (Qx(C ÐD)), provided that x does not occur
free in C.
g) Replace a part (QxC) er D) by (Qx(C ¡ D)), provided that x does not occur
free in D.
h) Replace a part (C z1 (QxD)) by (Qx(C 4 D)), provided that x does not occur free
in C.
Clearly, each of the transformations under b) through h) "pushes" an ocurrence of a quan-
tifier to the left, and furthermore, the applicability of at least one is insured by transforma-
J-1
tion a) as long as the result is not prenex. Thus, every formula has a prenex form. An irnpor-
tant observation is that a formula is valid if and only if any of its prenex forms is valid. This
follows immediately from the relevant definitions and we will not elaborate any further. Ap-
parently, there is a programmable procedure which for any formula will obtain a prenex form.
We say that B is a Skolenl form of A if B is existential and its graphical rcpresentation can
be obtained from the graphical representation of a prcnex fornt ol A by repeatedly perftrrrn-
ing the following transformation:
Given a fomula, remove the first (from left) occurrence olthe universal quan-
tifier and the variable which follows it immediately, and then replace every oc-
currence of that variable (if any) with a constant which is not a symbol in the
language of the formula if the removed quantifier was the first quantifier in
the formula, or else f(x,,..,xn), where f is not a symbol ol the language of the
formula and x1,..,x,, are all of the variables (in any order) which occur to the
left of the removed quantifer.
The above tranformation clearly reduces the number ofthe ocurrenccs olthe universal quan-
tilier in a formula and, furthermore, results in a fomtula. Thus, beginning with the graphical
reptesentation of a prenex fbrmula, repeated application of the transformation wo¡lld even-
tually result in the graphical representation of an existential fbrmula. It follows that every
formula has a Skoler-r"r form. It is also in-rportant to obseÍve that the transfonnation results
in a valid formula if and only if it is applied to a valid formula. Thus, a formula is valid
if ancl only if any of its Skolem forms are valid. Apparently, there is a programmable pro-
cedure which for any formula obtains a Skolem form.
By Herbrand language of a formula A we mean the language whose constants are the terms
of the atomic formulas in A, the predicates are the predicates in A and has no ftlnctions or
variables. It is a stunning observation that a quantifierless formula in any language is also
a formula in ils Herbrand language and, furthermore, since it does not contain any func-
tions, it is propositional and thus its validity can be determined by a programmable procedure.
It is this observation, together with an earlier mentioned one, namely, that there is a pro-
grammable procedure which obtains a Skolem form for any fomrula, that indicate the ex-
istence of sound and complete programmable procedure for determining validity from the
following statement of Skolem-Herbrand-Goedel theorem:
A formula is valid if and only if some disjunction of instances of the matrix
of some Skolem form of the formula is valid in its Herbrand language.
The proof of the theorem can be divided into two parts as follows. The goal of the first part
is to arrive at the conclusion that an existential formula is valid if and only if it is satisfied
by every Herbrand interpretation. The "only if ' part of the above statement (i.e., in direc-
tion ) is obvious. To see the "il' part, assume that there is an interpretation I which does
not satisfy the formula, which we will refer to as A. Let I'be the Herbrand interpretation
of the language of A which interprets an n-ary predicate P as the relation according to which
then n-tuple t,,...,tn belongs to it ifand only ifP (tr,..,t") is true according to I. The con-
clusion that A is not satisfied by I'is immediate in every case of A except when it begins
with existential quantifier (A is existential). We observe that is this case A is also not satisliecl
by I' because the collection of all terms designated according to I' (by the domain of I,, is
a subset of the collection of all terms designated according to I (by the domain of I), i.e.
I'is more inclusive than I, and this completes the first part of the proof.
f-Þ.-
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Now, the "il' part of the statement of the theorem follows immediately. We begin the proof
of the "only if ' part of the theorem with the observation that every Herbrand interpretation
of a formula, say A, corresponds uniquely to a division of the Herbrand base of A according
to the designation of its member into two sets: the set of the true atomic formulas, and the
set of the false atomic formulas. If an existential A is satisfied by a Herbrand interpretation
I, then according to the definition of satisfiability (case 5 applied as many times as there
are quantifiers in A), there is an instance of the matrix of A, say M, which is also satisfied
by I. We will refer to the atomic formulas of such an instance as terminals. Clearly, A above
may have more than one set of terminals, perhaps even infinitely many, and certainly not
necessarily disjoint. Each terminal set, howeve¡ is finite. From the above considerations
follows that if A is satisfied by all Herbrand interpretations (i.e. all divisions of the Her-
brand base of A), which according to the first part of the proof of the theorem is equivalent
to A being valid, then there exist a collection of sets of terminals S, where each set corresponds
to an interpretation and vice versa. Let U denote the set of all atomic formulas which are
in the sets in S. Obviously, U is either finite or inlìnite, and we will consider both cases
separately. If U is finite then the set of all instances of the matrix of A from which S is ob-
tained, say H, must also be finite because from a finite set of atomic formulas one cannot
obtain with the propositional connectives an infinite set of f,ormulas. Each Herbrand inter-
pretation satisfies an element of H. and thus the disjunction of the elements of H is satisfied
by every Herbrand interpretation. Being without any quantifiers, this disjunction is valid
in the Herbrand language of A and thus we reached the conclusion of the theorem in the
case when U is finite. We now argue that U cannot be infinite and this will complete the
proof of the theorem. Indeed, assume U is inlinite, and let a1,a2... be a complete listing of
the Herbrand base of A. Vy'e note that if K is a set of all Herbrand interpretations which
categorize a,through an identically, no matter how K determines, via the set of terminals
for each interpretation, an infinite subset of U, then K is divided into two sets according
to how an*1 is categorized, and furthermore, one of these two sets determines an infrnite
subset ol U, for if both determine a finite subset of U, their K, being their union would also
determine a finite subset olU. We obtain a Herbrand interpretation of A, which we will denote
by I', by successively categorizing (as true or false) the above â1,â2.., so that having
categorized every one before a', a¡ is categorized as true ifthe set ofall Herbrand interpreta-
tions which categorized the elements before a¡ the same way as I'determines an infinite
subset of U, and a¡ is categorized as false if it determines a finite subset of U*. From the
preceding remark, it follows that for every ai, the set of all Herbrand interpretations which
calegor\ze the elements preceding a¡ the same way as I' determines an infinite subset of U.
But, then I' cannot have any terminals, because if it does, there being infinitely many, they
all must appear before say a.¡ for sufficiently large j and, thus, the set of all Herbrand inter-
pretations coinciding with I'on a1 through a.; determines only a finite subset of U. Thus,
I'doesn't have terminals, which is impossible by assumption. Hence, U must be finite, and
this completes the proof of the theorem.
* A moment's reflection would indicate that the definition of I'is not constructive in the
sense that it does not imply that there is a programmable procedure for deciding how to classiff
each of the elements of the Herbrand base of A, for these are infinitely many conditions
to be checked for each one. Such non-constructive definitions have been challenged by the
followers of the so called intuitionistic logic. In this case, the argument for accepting the
definition of I' rests on the so called Axiom of Choice (a similar use of this axiom is in a
result known as Koenig's lemma) which was first formulated in 1904 by Ernst Zermelo, and
whose validity according to the metalanguage of our reasoning has puzzled many until finally
resolved by Paul Cohen in 1964.
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As we indicated earlier, the theorem implies the existence of a programmable procedure for
deterrnining validity in any language of the first-order predicate calculus and thus, reason-
ing in a given language of the lìrst order predicate calculus is programmable. To be sure,
however, that this result is not misunderstood, we note that it does not imply, for example,
that there is a programmable procedure for determining non-validity. In fact, Alonzo Church
proved in 1936 that such a procedure does not even exist. One ol the practical outcomes
of Church's theorem is that any complete t'easoning procedure may take an arbitrarily long
to execute (say in number of steps), for otherwise non-validity would follow. Therefore, a
programmer cannot impose a limit on the length of execution of any reasoning program without
con-rpromising its completeness.
Peter N. Gabrovsþ
Deparîment of Computer Science, School of Applied Science
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SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND SCIENTIFIC




Science, or more coffectly the scientific method, is conceived to be a mode of critical think-
ing. According to this vieq scientific method provides formal techniques, procedures, and
rules for proceeding from observations to generalizations about nature and the universe. When
this conception of science leaks down to the pedagogical level, science may be characteriz-
ed as "objective in being freed from personal idiosyncracies. The need for scientific fact
to be demonstrable to all persons anywhere and at any time underlies scientific method"
(Cowan and Puck, 1984).
Attention to contemporary work in the philosophy, the history and the sociology of science
suggests that conventional approaches to the teaching of science based upon such a concep-
tion of scientific method may be naively constructed. Moreover, this reified scientific method
may constrain, rather than promote, critical thinking. In this paper, I argue that a reformula-
tion of the pedagogic conception of science and scientific method must be carried out in
relation to careful definitions of the terms "scientific reasoning," and "critical thinking."
Such a reformulation may go far in speaking to a perception that science pedagogy inade-
quately prepares students for living and decision making in a culture for which science, and
related technologies make substantial contributions to both the problems and the solutions
of our civilization. The educator Paul DeHart Hurd (1985) has written of this central con-
cern about the quality of public education in the United States:
The goal most frequently named by the national studies for the teaching of
science is scientific and technological literacy. Literacy is conceived to be the
intellectual skills and knowledge essential for one to make responsible deci-
sions or take cognitive action in situations that require an understanding of
science or technology ...(p.88).
I shall further argue that a functional distinction must be drawn between scientific reason-
ing and "scientific literacy" prior to the design and implementation of any teaching curriculum
which hopes to aim at the latter ofthese goals. A hermeneutic approach is proposed as an
alternative to the traditional science curriculum; such an approach treaß science as an historical
process. Through such an approach, it may be possible for the student to gain a perspective
on scientific progress and process such that judgments and decisions might rationally be
made about both.
II. Deftning the Problem
Critical thinking is defined herein as synonymous with what John Dewey (1981) called
"inquiry":
the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one
that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert
the elements of the original situation into a unified whole (p. 226).
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According to such a definition, critical thinking is problem specific; that is, the process by
which the "indeterminate situation" is Íansformed into one that is "determinate" proceeds
according to criteria that are specific ûo the problem itself because, to continue with Dewey's
analysis of inquiry, "logical forms accrue to subject matter when the latter is subjected to
controlled inquiry" (p.223). According to such a view, it may be argued, each instance of
critical thinking will be an example of "reinventing the wheel" unless the transfer of logical
forms from one problem to another can be made whenever it is shown that one problem
is like another. So doing gives rise to disciplines. Thus, disciplines owe their existence to
analogical or metaphorical relations between subject matter (p. ZZÐ.
which analogies and metaphors are appropriate to a discipline, and which not? And what
are the bounds of the subject matter to which the logical forms tranferred through the analogy
or metaphor accrue? These are questions that can rarely be settled by continuing to apply
the analogy. Instead, inquiry must begin afresh to settle these questions (Toulmin, 1982;
Stepan, 1986).
Scientific reasoning, according to this view, is the application of logical forms which, hav-
ing accrued to an instance of subject matter, are assumed to be equivalently applicable to
other analagous subject matter. As will be argued below, this assumption comes only with
the prolonged training of the perceptions of the scientist. Thus, the outcome of scientific
reasoning will appear to the non-scientist as underdetermined by the techniques, procedures,
and rules of scientific method unless the metaphor or analogy is somehow taken on faith.
Moreover, according to Masterman (190), analogies and metaphors are applied in science
as unproblematic (see also Stepan, 1986, pp. 276-nT.
Scientific literacy differs from scientific reasoning in the following way: in its usual con-
notation, "literacy" is a condition for growth; its meaning suggests an ability to read and
to write. In the humanities, it also suggests an ability to recognize such techniques as metaphor
and analogy for what they are. The "literate" reader of a text, such as a novel, a poem, or
an essay, may then measure the analogy or metaphor fo¡ its "fit" or correspondence. As
such, literacy is open-ended and open-textured. It permits criticism and may suggest new
and better analogies and metaphors. But what of "scientific' literacy? Hurd (1985), in a critique
of science education, has said of scientific literacy that it
has meaning and can be taught only in situations where science or technology
interacts with personal or social events. Literacy refers to a level ofunderstand-
ing science that makes it possible for us to use what we have learned to think
critically on relevant issues or for interpreting natural events in the world around
us (p. 88).
This suggests that science must but viewed in a fuller (interdisciplinary or nondisciplinary
but "problematic") cultural matrix, where analogies and metaphors appear as analogies and
metaphors, as a prerequisite for scientific literacy. But this is what the science teacher, unlike
the teacher of literature, art, music, or history, is not prepared to do:
In literature, according to Warren Shibles, striking metaphors just come, "like
rain" [Shibles, 1971]. In science, however, metaphors arc not arbitrary not mere-
ly personal. Not just any metaphors will do. In fact, it is their lack of perceiv-
ed "arbitrariness" that makes particular metaphors or analogies acceptable as
science (Sæpan, p.267, 1986).
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Because the metaphors and analogies are not perceived as "arbitrary," ttrey may not be perceiv-
ed at all (Gavin, 1986). Hence, the problem with science teaching: the teacher does not
recognize analogies or metaphors for what they are, and relies upon training or on faith to
close the gap between underdetermining evidence and observation, on the one hand, and
conclusions and generalizations on the other. The thoughtful, critical student, meanwhile,
may recognize the conclusions and generalizations as underdetermined by evidence; but the
search for that elusive "something" which would complete the argument is not available.
Thus, the student has a series ofchoices to make, unguided; to accept or reject the science
"on faith"; to continue searching for determining evidence (a dead end); or to make a com-
mitment to leaming science, a commitrnent through which the underdetermination will even-
tually seem to dissolve. ln the next section, I discuss the outcome ofthe last ofthese choices.
III. Science Education, the Textbook, and Thcit Knowledge
Thomas S. Kuhn's provocative and controversial book, The Stucture of Scientffic Revolu-
tlons, describes within its pages the reigning theory ofscience education. Kuhn recognizes
two central means of transmission of scientific knowledge-the textbook and the cultivation
of tacit knowledge. After making Kuhn's theory explicit I will argue that such an educational
method, however appropriate it may be for training scientists, is utterly inappropriate for
educating individuals who will pursue their work and their lives outside of established scientific
¡esearch traditions.
Although much of Kuhn's theory of science is problematic, the recognition that the scientist
is trained to accept a given "worldview," to perceive the world through a "conceptual
framework" sanctioned by the scientific community in which she or he is trained and will
subsequently work, is difficult to refute. Throughout Kuhn's work, two avenues of educa-
tion or training are continually emphasized. The first of these avenues is the importance
of the textbook to science, for it is through the textbook that facts, laws, and theories of the
conceptual framework are transmitted to the student (Kuhn, 1970). It must be underscored
that when Kuhn refers to "the textbook," he means the textbook-a univocal source for the
science which is either the primary source of the facts, laws, and theories or (more often)
a secondary compilation of primary sources in which little or no disagreement exists about
the foundations ofthe science. Thus, the textbook constrains criticism ofthe science inasmuch
as it rarely, ifever, presents alternative interpretations. Moreover, this univocality and con-
straint carries over into the history of the science presented in the textbook.
For reasons that are both obvious and highly functional, science textbooks (and
too many of the older histories of science) refer only to that part of the work
of past scientists that can easily be viewed as contributions to the statement
and solution of the text's paradigm problems (p. 138).
Kuhn (197) argues that "the misdirection supplied by science texts is both systematic and
functional," adding that "it is by no means clear that a more accurate image of the scientific
processes would enhance the research efficiency of physical scientists"
(p. 186n).
Information about how that knowledge was acquired (discovery) and about why
it was accepted by the profession (confirmation) would at best be excess bag-
gage. Though including that inþrmation would almost cenainly increase the
"humanistic" values of the text and might breed morefletible and creatíve scien-
tísts, it wouW inevitably detract from the ecse of leaming the contemporary
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scieúirtc hngunge. Tb date only the last objective has been taken seriously
by most writers of textbooks in the natural sciences (p. 186, my emphasis)'
If Kuhn is correct that "more than any other single aspect of science,- that pedagogic form
iitre textbookl has determined our image of the nature of science and of the role of discovery
ånd invention in its advance," then it is already clear why scientific literacy eludes educators,
for the univocality ofthe textbook reduces debate to simplistic categories: the student either
"gets it" or does not; either accepts the science as presented or rejects it.
But the problem lies much deeper than this, because the beginning student is not only un-
or.pur.d for scientific literacy; he or she cannot even engage in scientific reasoning. Accord-
àing to fuhn, the student learns scientific reasoning "by doing science rather than by ac-
ouiiing rules for doing it." As a label for such learning, Kuhn borrows Michael Polanyi's
pttrur. "tu.it knowledge." Thcit knowledge, according to Kuhn, is the essence of scientific
iraining, the end of which is the ability to "see," analogically, in the same way that other
members of the specialized group "see'" It is to share a gestalt.
The resultant ability to see a variety of situations as like each other.. ' is, I think
the main thing a student acquires by doing exemplary problems.. ' After he has
completed a certain number, which may vary widely from one individual to
the next, he views the situations that confront him as a scientist in the same
gestalt as other members of his specialists' group.. .He has. . .assimilated a time-
tested and group-licensed way of seeing (p.189).
A very troubling aspect of tacit knowledge, for the educator no more than for the student,
is that it cannot be forced. Polanyi (1962) explains that
...personal knowledge in science is not made but discovered, and as such it
claìms to establish contact with reality beyond the clues on which it relies. It
commits us, passionately and far beyond our comprehension, to a vision of
reality. Of this responsibility we cannot divest ourselves by setting up objec-
tive criteria of verifiability-or falsifiability, or testability, or what you will.
For we live in it as in the garment of our own skin (p' 64).
Such an analysis of "tacit" or "personal knowledge" leads naturally to a very troubling ques-
tion: how much is needed? How many textbook problems must the student solve, how many
laboratory experiences must she have, before she gains it? To such a question there is no
simple answei; this area requires extensive study. What is importånt is to see that one simp-
ly cãnnot get a clear sense ofscience in the short period oftime available to the non-scientist-
which usùaily consists of two or three courses in high school and a single semester at the
college level. This is an insufficient period of time to train perception. It is for. this reason
that science education is pared back to the memorization of facts, an activity which so many
thoughtful people deplore.
To repeat my argument: scientific reasoning, through the use of scientiflc method, leads to
an ouìcome ia law, theory, interpretation or description) which, though it is not undetermin-
ed by evidence, experiment, and observation, is underdetermined by these factors (see, e.g. '
Rudïick, 1935, pp. 455456). Moreover, such an outcome appears as underdetermined to
the thoughtful stùãent. Some crucial piece of information seems to be missing, and the stu-
dent doe-s not "get it." The instructoi's tacit knowledge or faith, meanwhile, ob.scures the
underdeterminaiion. A student may aspire to such tacit knowledge and so withhold judg-
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ment, but if she or he attempts to engage in critical thinking, or inquiry, to transform the
indeterminate situation (the underdetermined fact, theory 1aw, or interpretation) into one
that is determinate, his or her efforts may be systematically frustrated.
what is needed, then, is some kind of shortcut-some way either to grasp the analogies and
metaphors of a given science tacitly, or to stand away from them and to seê them as méøphor
and analogy. or one may abandon the entire game, and engage in a form of nature study
through which the student may gain an appreciation for some of the subject matter of sciencè.
But it is important, I think, to understand that this last option is not science, should not be
called science, and has nothing whatever to do with teaching scientific reasoning or literacy.
IV Developing a Hermeneutic Approach
It is frequently claimed that a "hands on," experiment-oriented method makes for an effec-
tive model for teaching science. Judy Hickman (1984) has correctly observed that:
Most teachers are not concerned with adding new facts to the science they teach,
in formulating new hypotheses, or in veriffing existing ones. Instead, they are
concerned with what is known. This attitude discourages students from deriv-
ing vital and personal learning experiences. The classroom teacher needs to
be concerned with the ways in which science may become part of a learning
experience and then to determine a method of teaching that properly directs
the students' growth (p. 184).
Hickman's ûechnique is an application of John Dewey's pedagogy to science. As such, it does
not recognize the significance of analogy and metaphor in science. Hickman (19g4) writes
of Dewey's testing of the theory that:
A "test-and-see" attitude prevailed in the Laboratory School, as this is the
ultimate teaching method of pragmatism. Students were given a wide range
of methodological freedom. . . .Students will attain higher levels of leaming when
permitted to select the methods. Actions must be modified and given direction
by the interrelations of observation andjudgment (p. lSa).
If þ "a wide range of methodological freedom" Hickman means freedom in keeping with
a given analogy or metaphor, she does not say so. But it does not matter; because she does
not display an awareness of analogies and metaphors in science, Hickman's proposed method
can lead to one of two difficulties: either (1) there are analogies through which ì'actions must
be modified and given direction," but of which neither teacher nor ihe student is aware of;
(2) there is no analogy, meaning that the modifìcation and direction given is itself unmodified
and undirected except as the teacher sees fit, but in contradistinction to scientific practices
except as naively understood. In the latter instance, a naive realism on the part of the teacher
can- easily lead (for example) to a Baconian picture of scientific activity which virtually all
philosophers of science recognize as untenable.
such a Deweyan approach to activity in the classroom is, however, at least an improvement
on the standard approach of using experiments in teaching. This approach, althõugh itself
an improvement on mere memorization of material, is nevertheless flawed to the extent that
it is used without an awareness of the analogies or metaphors which inform the particular
experiments.
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To understand why, we must briefly adopt Kuhn's term "exemplar" as a replacement for
"analogies and metaphors" (Kuhn, 1570, 187-l9l). Kuhn argues that exemplars are not cor-
rigible by the experiments by which they are, in part, constituted. Conversely, the results
of experiments must be interpreted univocally through the logical structure of the exemplar
and have, therefore, a tautological relationship to the concepts they demonstrate. Put another
way, the replication of an experiment for teaching purposes is little more than propaganda
for the exemplar, which is i¡refutable without a concommitant understanding of the exemplar
as exemplar. Nothing in the experimental approach as such leads to such an understanding;
the understanding must be grafted on.
It will be seen, then, that neither the strictly Deweyan model, nor the "experimental" model,
aim at scientific literacy as it has been defined in this paper. The Kuhnian model of science
pedagogy has been shown also specifically to eschew scientific literacy as an aim. A fourth
model proposed by David Stenhouse, which assumes Kuhn's position as a starting point,
is worth looking at (Stenhouse, 1986). In this model, the conceptual shifts through which
children pass as they grow are compared to the Gestalt switches of scientific revolutions
described by Kuhn. The author generalizes this observation in such a way that the entire
teaching effort in the science classroom becomes a movement from the Piagetian stage of
"children's science" (the paradigm held by the child) to "teacher's science." Such an ap-
proach, though it does have useful elements, fails on two counts. First, there is no attempt
to deal reflectively with the conceptual shift from children's science to teacher's science;
ifthe parallel between the conceptual shifts of science and those ofchildren are close enough
in kind to be useful for a teaching model, surely they are close enough that children should
be made aware of having accomplished what has been hailed as the most rational process
our species has developed. Second, "teacher's science," as an end of the process seems
premature. Teacher's science, to the extent that it is knowledge ofthe facts, laws, and theories
ofsciences, is not science. The model emphasizes closure at the level of "teacher's science"
and is therefore not a model for developing scientific literacy.
Perhaps there are several models which may aim at such a literacy; I shall propose one that
may take several forms. The model begins with John Dewey's (1986) belief that:
It would be much better to have fewer facts and truths in instruction-that is,
fewer things supposedly accepted-if a small number of situations could be
intellectually wo¡ked out to the point where conviction meant something real-
some identification of the self with the type of conduct demanded by facts and
foresight of results. The most permanent bad results of undue complication
of school subjects and congestions of school studies and lessons are not the
worry, nervous strain, and superficial acquaintance that follow. .but the ñilure
to make clear what is involved in really knowing and believing a thing (p. 178).
In the Deweyan exposition of method, such a "making clear" leads to an attitude of "in-
tellectual thoroughness" through which the student takes responsibility for knoving and believ-
ing. Both John Dewey and Thomas Kuhn tell us that to know and believe a thing involves
a serpentine path through a changing field ofbeliefs and knowns; we have evidence that the
changes in beliefs and knowns is a process which the student can understand through self-
reflection upon conceptual shifts that are native to the student's own growing process. Thus,
Dewey's (1966) belief in intellectual self-awareness can be met in principle if a method be
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developed by the teacher with intellectual selÊawareness as an aim. To begin with science
in its current form is to abandon such an aim; Dewey wrote that:
To the non-expert...this perfected form [ofscience] is a stumbling block. Just
because the material is stated with reference to the furtherance of knowledge
as an end in itself, its connections with the material of everyday life are hidden
(p.220).
The atom, whether it is understood today as a theoretical entit¡ a social construct, or as
the fundamental "real," has a long and circuitous history. Its currency as a conception is
a response to questions about its form raised in response to questions about the adequacy
of the mechanistic conception of atoms; the latter was a response to questions about the
ultimate, indivisible form that matter may take-a question that first appears in a logically
coherent form with the atomiss in pre-socratic philosophy. In short, the atom has a human
history. As it did for the pre-Socratics, the question of ultimate particles of matter may arise
from the experience of the learner whether stated crudely or concisely.
Only by making use of the experience of the student and by allowing the conceptual shifts
of childhood to modiSr that experience, and in the process making the student aware of the
shift can the actual ethos of science become a part of the habits the child gains through for-
mal education. Only when this is accomplished can the student be called scientifically literate,
for the habits become open-ended and open-textured; they do not fail utterly when faced
with novel situations, or lead inevitably to error due to unrecognized novelty. This is what
Dewey (1966) meant when he wrote that:
An experience, a very humble experience, is capable of generating and carry-
ing any amount of theory (or intellectual content), but a theory apart from an
experience cannot be definitely be grasped as a theory. It tends to be a verbal
formula, a set of catchwords used to render thinking, or genuine theorizing,
unnecessary or impossible (p. Ea).
where does that experience begin? Dewey (1966) speaks briefly in Democracy and kluca-
tion of a "chronological method" that "begins with the experience ofthe learner and develops
from that the proper modes of scientific treatment."
.. .by following, in connection with problems selected from the material of or-
dinary acquaintance, the methods by which scientific ment have reached their
perfected knorvledge, [the pupil] gains independentpower to deal with material
within his range, and avoids the mental confusion and intellectual distaste at-
tendant upon studying matter whose meaning is onty symbolic (pp.220-221).
The "methods by which scientific men have reached their perfected knowledge," we have
seen, is more complicated that Dewey supposé¿. sut this does not refute D"*ä;r method;
it enriches it. what will be proposed below is a process pedagogy: the presentation of old
truths and new truths in a chronological sequence such that the student mist ,.inquire" and,
in the resolution of doubt reconstruct-"discover'r-the facts, laws, and theories of science
for her or himself.
Let us begin where the student is, þ examining what the student's conception of the universe
has in common with science at any point in its history. If the child spontaneously asks: .,can
the position of an electron and its speed be measured simultaneously and witir certainty,"
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this shall be our beginning, and we will save considerable time. But this is unlikely. For very
young children, an Aristotelian picture may coincide with the child's conception; students
may be prepared to start earlie¡ in myth or latet depending upon the understanding they
bring with them. Clearly, the starting point for teaching science is difficult to determine and
may be the most substantial problem the teacher will attempt to solve. Until experience has
settled the question, such starting points may have in them elements of arbitrariness. But
having selected a beginning point, the teacher asks herself: what is the paradigm? What
metaphors are used in the paradigm? What counts as evidence, and what does not? What
genuine experiences can my students have in a contracted period of time such that they may
apply the paradigm? What discussions of the historical context of the paradigm will be useful
in making the paradigm meaningful and clear? Finally, how far afield of the actual history
of science does the teacher go in allowing for the proposal of new paradigms and the accep-
tance of a new one? Having answered these questions, the teacher prepares a syllabus com-
bining reading, field and laboratory experience, discussion, lectures concerning concepts,
and lectures concerning context. This proposal calls for the teacher to be something õf a
scholar, working in a number of disciplines. He or she must be part sociologist, part historian,
part philosopher, part scientist. Each part is fallible. Taken together the possibilities for er-
ror are enormous; thus, the teacher must give up a1l pretense of being the final arbiter of
truth in the long run, though she or he may feign commitments to truth which will change
throughout the course. That earth, air, fire, and water are the four elements of which the
world is composed will be presented as a true statement, not as 'bnce believed but now known
to be false."
If determining the starting point is the most diffrcult part of the progftÌm, ttris explicit ållibilism
is a close second; strategies must be worked out to permit the student to "play the game."
so contrary to regular practice is the method that without such a strategy the student may
react pathologically. With that caveat acknowledged, it may be stated that the teacher takes
on the mantle not of truth but of exemplars in a historical, or chronological sequence. As
the sequence is played out, anomalies accrue (with or without the teacher's intervention)
leading to crisis, proposal of new analogies and metaphors, revolution, resolution, and a
new exemplar. Interventions by the teacher should be made only as needed to direct students
toward more sophisticatred, aesthetic, and comprehensive analogies and metaphors, although
this will vary in the degree that the teacher uses actual historical examples through which
to 'tolor" the contexts of paradigms.
such is the hypothesis. The thoughtful critic of such a program may find the program flaw-
ed or promising in principle; it remains to be seen whether it can or will work in practice.
Postscript
A course in science as proposed above was attempted by the author at Mt. Ararat School,
SAD 75, in Topsham, Maine, through the spring 1987 semester. In this course, entitled
"Theories of the Earth," students confronted problems about time (trow much time is there?
Is time real, or a social construction?); classification (does classification tell us about things-
nature-or about ourselves as classifiers?); and difficulties in distinguishing the "real" con-
stituents of science from a science's "heuristics." These were a1l presented as part ofan overall
question: how old is the earth, and how can we know?
It is too early for a comprehensive evaluation of this course, which is still being taught to
two sections of high school juniors and seniors as this paper goes to press. In addition, a
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series of variables will make evaluation difficult. But preliminary interviews with students
suggest that such a program of teaching is possible. as lòng as the ãxpectations of the teacher
are clearly and carefully delineated. As may be the case with many critical thinking pro-
grams (see Grzelkowski and Hineline, 1987), the goal-orientation of "good" students must
be taken into consideration when designing a course curriculum aiming at scientific literacy.
Mark Hineline
Sadent, Philosophy Department, College of Arts and Sciences
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The request for papers for the Russell Chair Symposium, "What Soc¡ates Began: An Ex-
amination of the Intellect," offered some suggested topics as examples of the kind of inquiry
appropriate to an exploration of thinking. Insofar as my adult professional life has largely
consisted of str,rdying and teaching art, making art, learning about children and their art,
and training prospective art educators, it is not surprising that one of the suggested topics
which caught my eye was titled, "How do the arts influence thinking?" But it was actually
the wording of this particular question which intrigued me. "How do the arts influence think-
ing?" The syntax was puzzl\ng because I recognized that I did not conceive of the arts and
thinking in precisely the way that the question seemed to relate them. "Thinking," on the
one hand, seemed to be separate from a field of study or discipline-'the arts." The arts seemed
to be given a capacity to exert power over the action of producing thoughts-thinking. This
unfamiliar combination, "How do the arts influence thinking?" has prompted numerous
ruminations because, like much of what spurs us to action, something felt wrong.The pro-
blem for me was located in what seemed to be a rather disembodied notion of thinking, which
was not itself imbedded in a form of thought or discipline.
This paper argues for a conception of art-making and thinking as inextricably intertwined
in ways that are often unnoticed, ignored, or even deprecated. I hope this examination serves
to expand our understanding of what participation in the arts entails cognitively. I believe
it also will help to enrich our perspectives on thinking and what it is. I am of the persuasion
that thinking is akin to knowing, and knowing is the dense, inevitable purpose of our lives.
Who are we and where are we and what do we come from and where are we goirg? Our
lives, and indeed our schools and education, are dedicated ultimately to the exploration and
understanding of those questions. We know that through the arts, people have searched and
researched some of the most vital responses to these profound queries. It seems important
to recognize that the arts have represented an important kind of thinking in human history.
At present, it is also significant to make some effort towards "physicalizing" the process
of thinking, removing it as the sole province of linguistic analysis, psychology, and sometimes
even philosophy and logic, all fields which have a tendenq, to overlook the body. Making
art and the kinds ofthinking generated þ participation in the artistic process are first reminders
of the sentient aspects of our existence. The senses-tactile, visual, aural, and kinesthetic-are
at the heart of both thinking and art-making.
ln 1926, the British philosopher R.G. Collingwood described art-making as an act of think-
ing itself. "To be an artist is to create for oneself a world of imaginary objecs whose func-
tion is to express to oneself one's own mind" (p.195). This paper explores the value of art
as an activity in education. Like Collingwood, the education I am describing is not the training
ofprofessional artists but rather the general education of children and adults, the education
of novices in the arts. What is the intrinsic benefit of art activities for an individual, and
for a community of individuals? In what ways are we thinking while we are making art? At
this particular time in educational history, what are the special burdens of exploring these
ideas? What might this exploration suggest about what we are doing when we make or do
something artistic? In what ways should the study of the arts focus on the process of making
art? What, particularly, do we learn ÍÌom the artistic process which is unavailable from other
educational endeavors?
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Assertions have abounded in this century especially in American education, about the im-
portance ofthe arts for learners. The legacy from the progressive education movement fifty
years ago, and perhaps a misreading, or even non-reading, ofJohn Dewey, has placed ill-
defined notions of "creativity" and the arts, at the center of "learning by doing." Educators,
using the model of the artist for the student, have since stressed studio art activity as the
cont€nt of art education, but have also simultaneously embraced a rather nonintellectual view
ofthat artistic process. This view ofthe child-as-artist has not been a particularly successful
rationale for strengthening school art programs. Art, at present, is not a major part of American
schooling. In recent decades, art advocates have perpetuated the exhortations of'hll the arts
for all the children" but have not provided an explanation ofthe particular contribution of
studio programs for children which went beyond the progressive educators' 'treativity" ra-
tionales. More recently, educators, museum, and foundation officials-especially the John
Paul Getty Trust (1985)-have been highly critical of exclusively studio-based art classes
in schools. They have urged instead the study of art criticism and art history, primarily to
strengthen the "intellectual" component of art study. while it is not the province of this paper
to debate the relative merits of the content of art programs, it seems useful and timely to
reflect on the tenacity of the artist-model for art education, and to examine any value that
model may have so as to inform our fufure art curricular choices more potently.
Doing, making, constructing-the physical activities of the hands, of the body, have been
undervalued in education. The inheritance of a Platonic and Cartesian view of knowledge
has prejudiced us that abstract reasoning is a "higher" form of knowing than that available
from direct, perceptual purview. vernon Howard (1982) suggests that even piaget, with stage
theories that go "from concrete to formal operations" further confuse our understanding
of the role of action or activity in learning. These ideas perpetuate a myth of a separation
of mind and body. Not only do these views have a tendency to minimize the value of art ac-
tivities in education, but they wrongly narrow our vision of ideas as imbedded, wedded,
interacting with, from, and towards actual physical experience. John Dewey's keen understand-
ing of the interrelationship of inquiry and activity is well summarized by Howard (1982) when
he states that for Dewey, "Quite literally, ideas are plans of action" (p. 133).
Both John Dewey and William James, like their Pragmatist colleagues, shared a view of reality
which is rich with incident and stimulation, at a given physical place and point in time, a
"booming, buzzing confusion" out of which we as individuals strive to make some sense.
In his 1907 Pragmatism, William James captured the human capacity for reflection and selec-
tion at a given moment in time. "Every hour brings is new precepts, its own facts of sensa-
tion and relation, to be truly taken account of; but the whole of our past dealings with such
facts is already funded in the previous truths" (p.109). The view of the person in James's
work takes on a creative or inventive dimension which is not unlike the actual work of ar-
tists. He suggests that we make truth and reality out of ourselves and the very experiences
we undergo. The person at the center of James's conception of human consciousness is a
creature interacting with the environment in a {ynamic manneÈ'No reception witlìout reac-
tion, no impression without correlative expression" (James, 1901, p.22). James described
a person not only engaged in mere activity and response, but also as a thoughtful decision-
make¡. In an aesthetics notebook (n.d.), James wrote that the "analogy between art and life
is that þ both, results are reached only by selection and elimination." It is of course no ac-
cident that William James began his career as a painter and his works are rich with the sen-
sibilities that came from the art-making process he intimately experienced.
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But all the while, the world we feel and live in, will be that which our ancestors
and we, by slowly cumulative strokes of choice, have extricated out of this,
as the sculptor extracts his statue by simply rejecting the other portions of the
stone. Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone! Other minds, other
worlds from the same chaos (James, 1983, p. 5l)!
John Dewey was also explicit about the parallels between art and life and said in An as Ex-
perience (1934):
There is another matter that is common to the substance of all works of art.
Space and time-or rather space-time-are found in the matter of every art pro-
duct. In the arts, they are neither the empty containers nor the formal relations
that schools ofphilosophy have sometimes represented them to be. They are
substantial; they are properties of every kind of material employed in artistic
expression and esthetic realization (p. 206).
Then later, in discussing William James, Dewey added:
As with other properties of substance of which we have spoken, the fine arts
seek out and elicit this quality of all the things we experience and express it
more energetically and clearly than do the things from which they extract it.
As science takes qualitative space and time and reduces them to relations that
enter into equations, so art makes them abound in their own sense as signifi-
cant values of the very substance of all things (p.2Ül).
If our mentors be Collingwood, Dewey, and James, it is important to add some present-day
voices as well.
The colleagues at Harvard Proj ect Zero at the Harvard Graduate School of Education have,
since 1962 pursued basic research in arts education under the leadership ofphilosopher Nelson
Goodman. Goodman, in a special March 1983 edition of An Hucation devoted Ûo 'Art and
the Mind," recommended to all who are interested in the arts and cognition, said:
...cognition includes learning, knowing, gaining insight and understanding,
by all available means. Developing sensory discrimination is as cognitive as
inventing complex numerical concepts or proving theorems. Mastering a motor
skill involves subtle kinesthetic distinctions and connections. Coming to under-
stand a painting or a symphony in an unfamiliar style, to recognize the work
of an artist or school, to see or hear in new ways, is as cognitive an achieve-
ment as learning to read or write or add. Even the emotions function cognitively:
in organizing a world, felt contrasts and kinships, both subtle and salient, are
no less important than those seen or heard or inferred (p. 34).
I refer you to Howard Gardner's Frames of Mind (1983) for a new definition of human in-
telligence(s) or to David Perkins' The Mind's Best Work (1981) for a fascinating exploration
of the ways that creative thinkers in all the arts work. We should also not neglect Rudolf
Amheim, whose life's work has been dedicated to looking at the ways that "Perceiving, Think-
ing, and Forming" (1933, p. 9) are interdependent. Arnheim's work has a keen sense of the
tactile. Andrew Harrison is a British philosopher who has wntten Making and Thinking (19$,
a study of intelligent activities which looks at length at the arts.
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The special challenge today, though, is how to articulate the nature and possible benefit of
studio art activities in education and avoid the perils ofthe past. Care must be taken to avoid
overly romantic views of the artist. We must escape a confusion of activity and merit-just
because we make something does not mean that it is good-and not neglect qualitative
judgments about the products of our endeavors. We ne€d to capture an authenticity about
the artistic process: its spontaneity and rigor, its risks and benefits, its experimentation and
craft. We need to examine ways to encourage students to pay attention to their personal in-
sights and feelings through art, but avoid a cult of the individual as "self-expression." We
must seek ways to capture a reliable essence of 'treativity" without surrendering our in-
tellectual capacity to analyze and understand human experience and expression. We must
relinquish our exclusive claim on "creativity" as artists, and share notions of that human
quality with our colleagues in the sciences and humanities, but remain clear about the precise
role of the arts in the educational enterprise.
In this paper, I have in mind examples from the visual arts, but with a supposition that, for
the most part, comparable points might be made using music, dance, writing, or theater as
studio activities designed for learners. I will focus on only four aspects of artistic activity
which are particularly relevant to education: l) physical or temporal engagement; 2) away
of thinking; 3) innovative intimacy; 4) the social dimension of an audience or standards.
Other important aspects could be included-motivation or learner-interest, for example-
but for this discussion I will concentrate on these four.
The doing or making of art usually involves a physical activity in time and space. This alone
could not quali$ an endeavor as necessarily artistic, but it is interesting to note how few
aspects of schools truly challenge a student's physical being. Art-making does require an
engagement of perception and attention which connects and binds the artist with materials
and with a shaping process. The making of art insists that at some point we concentrate,
focus, and study. Dewey (1934) was correct in proposing that an aesthetic experience is the
prototype of a complete human experience. It may also be that an art-making experience
is a prototype of a complete human learning incident. The commiûnent of body/mind/feel-
ings in a particular manner at a distinct time and place, the necessity for involvement, the
judgments, guesses, reflections, trials and errors, the practice, the action and the interaction
which are described by Vernon Howard (1982) in his book on Arristry, convincingly reveal
the remarkable similarities between the artistic and the learning processes. Even though not
all art-making involves a "physical artifact," the art process necessitates an acute temporal
awareness, a "present-ness" which is vital ûo understanding or making something new It
is especially at work in making things well. Art-making may be a way to experience and
practice genuine engagement in the present.
Collingwood (1926) suggested the viøl connection between the experience of art-making
and the "birth of thought itself':
The thought that before utterance lies obscure and unrealised in the dark places
of the soul, in the 'thaos of preordination and the night of its forebeing" comes
into living existence in the act ofexpressing it: a person who has not, somehow
and in some kind of language, said what he means, does not yet know what
he means, and strictly cannot be said to have a meaning (p. 196).
The practice of art gives us the opportunity to think in a particular way. It is a distinctive
method of understanding which necessarily results in evidence of that understanding. Our
systems of education purportedly are designed to help students develop their knowledge of
the world. We construct our knonledge of the world through the forms of thought or languages
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which our culture shares with us. Art provides a way to give form to experience as it shapes
our understanding of experience itself. The structure of understanding which is available
from an art-making experience enriches our capacity to think, to know, and to experience
life more fully. David Best, whose recent book F¿ eling and Reason in the Ans (1985) shows
a clear understanding of the role of artistic languages in developing thought, showed how
practice in the arts gives us the opportunities to extend our potential for human expression:
But a person with only trite forms of expression is a person who is capable
of only trite experiences.. The crucial educational point here is that if people
succumb to the pressure to limit themselves to the circulating library of cliche
forms ofexpression, then their capacity for individual thought and emotional
experience is commensurately limited @.n).
The Gulbenkian Foundation in Britain, asserted in a 1982 publication, The Arts in Schools,
"The arts are not only for communicating ideas. They are ways of having ideas, of creating
ideas, or exploring experience in particular ways and fashioning our understanding of it into
new forms" (p.22). Schools should be a place where students can practice the arts as a way
of thinking.
Another contribution of art as an activity has to do with the fact that the studio process is
a personal or intimate experience. It necessarily involves an individual, participating in a
process ofmaking. In peak examples, an artist exercises control over materials, demonstrates
competence with artistic form, but primarily shares his or her own particular personal vi-
sion,or thought through the act of making. In the process of doing art, we define our limita-
tions and boundaries. While it is important to avoid a narcissistic preoccupation with ego
or self, it is an unmistakable fact that, in a drawing for instance, the artist makes the line
on the piece ofpaper. The artist thereby exercises a special kind ofcontrol or influence on
the wo¡ld which in contemporary terms mightbe called "empowering." Vernon Hovard (1985)
has said, "Not until the task becomes mine does it come alive in thought and action" (p. 14).
If we left the discussion here, we would have ignored some essential accents to the personal
experience of making art which are critical: the disciplines of the art forms themselves, and
an important element of innovation. David Best (1985) said it well:
In the arts, language and many other aspects of human life the possibility of
individual development in thought and experience, so far from being restricted
by, actually depends upon, the learning of disciplines (p. 73).
In describing the arts as forms of thought, it also follows that there are traditions, examples,
and standards which are the peak models from which to learn. Even novices must have a
glimpse ofpublic exemplars to assist in the appropriation ofa new language, however per-
sonal the expressions might be. The relative merit of the results of the novice's artistic pro-
cess can certainly be assessed by seeking a comparison with the peak examples in the
discipline, but it seems more useful to concentrate on some of the ways in which the pro-
ducts are original for the maker, in relation to the maker's peers, as well as to a larger frame
of reference.
The philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1967) appreciated that invention is always part of the learning
process and it is no accident that he here uses the example of an artist to illustrate his point:
The poet composes a sonnet, taking care to adhere to the regulation 14 lines,
to the regulation rhyming scheme, to the regulation metrical pattern, or else
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perhaps to one of the several permitted patterns-yet, nonetheless his sonnet
is a new one. No one has ever composed it before. His teacher who taught him
how to compose sonnets had not and could not have made him compose this
sonnet, else it would be the teacher's and not the pupil's sonnet (p. 114).
Ryle captures the dual qualities of innovation and intimacy which seem a part of both learn-
ing and creativity. when we ascribe the word "creative" to a human activity, we mean to
highlight a "newness" to the event or example. The languages of the arts provide oppor-
tunities to practice innovation in a personal way, to try making or shaping something for
the first time, to find particular expressions which bear the personal mark of the maker. Studio
art activities provide the occasion for a rare innovative intimacy in schools. Invention is part
of art and thinking.
The final and perhaps the most important reason to consider art-making as a worthwhile
activity in schools has to do with the fact that (at least from age six on) the creator of a work
begins to take into account an intended audience for that work. The artist begins to adopt
the role of critic as well as maker in the process. Art-making is indeed a proceis which en-
courages selÊawareness. But as the artist explores ways to become more articulate and gain
understanding, he or she also begins to consider the audience who will interpret the evidõnce
of that understanding. Thus, the artistic process, through the art work itself, has the poten-
tial to move the artist from a personal dimension to a social or shared one. If the iesults
of our work are to be of value, we must seek the standards for that merit in the public sphere.
Ultimately, we look for ways to offer our works for public critique. The process is strikingly
social. In a school situation, the potential benefits of these shared aspects cannot be
underestimated. Dewey (1934) helps us to retum full circle to the physical experience of mak-
ing, when he discusses the artist's frnal decisions:
Until the artist is satisfied in perception with what he is doing, he continues
shaping and reshaping. The making comes to an end when iß result is experienc-
ed as good-and that experience comes not þ mere intellectual and outside
judgment but in direct perception (p. 49).
students can be encouraged-and this is where good teaching is essential-to be rigorous
in their self-critique so as to form something really well. The student learns a paradigm of
objective, qualitative form in good studio activity, which actually encouragès a kind of
thoughtful detachment. This seems the very opposite of self-indulgence.
Art-making gives us the chance to try, to play, to work at shaping a vision. In the context
ofthe school environment, it gives students the chance to see the multiple responses by othen
to artistic problems and activities. Art-making encourages diverse solutions to common pro-
blems, a dual notion of the one and the many, simultaneously. Dewey (1934) allowed that,
"Expression strikes below the barriers that qeparate human beings from one another"
(p. 2al. The rich world of art offers glimpses of ourselves, of others, and of the world. It
can help to show us that we are not alone and that there are many paths to the truth. Art-
making gives us a way to be part of the past, the future, and most decidedly the present.
These statements about the particular benefits of studio are activity for novices do not mean
to deprecate the rich knowledge which is available from the study of art worls through the
methods of art history and criticism. It could be that art historical inquiries would be even
more vital if in their analysis they attended more to the actions of the artist in actually con-
structing a work of art.
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The practice of art in schools offers the students the potential for an uncommon physical
una i"¡¡po.ut engagement. Art activity is also a way of thinking and can address the rights
of .hild."n to have access to a vafiety of forms of thinking. Art-making can prompt a response
*t i.tt i, both intimate and innovative. The artistic process includes a social dimension, too,
.À¡odi"d in concepts of audience and standards. Art-making as a thoughtful enterprise
ultimately involves excellence. Most of all, art as an activity may be the very model of human
;learning, doing, and thinking." To quote Eisner (1983) when he summarized Bronowski's
point of view in The Ascent of Man, "The hand is the cutting edge of the mind" (p'24)'
The character of thought available from an imaginative art-making experience for students
is exemplified in the visual evidence offered here. I am grateful to Jamie Johnston, furniture-
maker, 
-for 
permission to describe his creative, problem-solving art lesson. During a special
craft workshop for high school students at the Haystack Mountain School of Crafts in Maine,
Jamie gave each student in his workshop a piere of wood measuring 2" ry 6" by 48." Students
were tñen asked to design and construct an object suitable for sitting-a chail a bench, a
stool. The students had little or no previous woodworking experience. Jamie offered instruction
in fundamentals of construction, tool use, and basic woodworking techniques' In the three-
day workshop, each student then produced an original, handcrafted work. A sampling of
thé resul6 pictured here shares the rich connection between working with the hands, the
mind, and ihe imagination. From intelligent teaching, through attentive learning, the stu-
dent experiences art-making and thinking as a fusion of thoughtful activity.
Jo-Anna Moore
Art Depanment, College of Arts and Sciences
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Figure 1. Designed by Leif Ekholm, Lincoln Academy.
Photo by Sheila Bohlin
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Figure 2. Designed by Elizabeth Berry Lincoln Academy.
Photo by Sheila Bohlin
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Figure 3. Designed by Christine prosser, Skowhegan High School
Photo by Sheila Bohlin
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The process of thinking is the process of defining identity.
Ayn Rand
The Hasidim tell a story. once upon a time, in a faraway village, there lived a rabbi. Foryears this rabbi had been the teacher and leader of his pêople,'and for yeaÀ he would in_
tervene at times of crisis in-order for the crisis to pass anà his people to be saved. Whenever
a crisis approached, be it famine, plague, or an enemy, ne *oul¿ go to a speciar place in
the forest thar lay outside the village. when he reached-this place, hã *oulJiieht a fire and
say a prayer. This ritual was always sufficient. The crisis ùould pass.
when the rabbi died, one of his sons, who was also a rabbi, fook his place. tn times of calamity,
l:, t"q' would go to the foresr and light a fire, bur he did not r.ti"* tt 
" 
piuy* uttered byhis father. s-o, upon lighting the fire, he wourd rerurn to the village. Thil,ó;, was suffi-
cient. The impending crisis passed.
And the day came when this man died and his son became the village rabbi. when his peo_
ple were threatened he would go to the special place in the foresî. But he neither lit thefire nor said the prayer. Still it was sufficient. Tie crisis passed.
Finally, time passed and alourth rabbi, the great-grandson of the first rabbi, became the
town's spiritual leader. And_ when his people were threatened, he did not ,uy ih" pruy", o,
light the.fire or even go into the forest to theìacred place. He simply remainø Éorne, gathered
his family and the people from the village u.ouìd hi-, ano^ót¿ rh" ;bt-; his great_
grandfathe¡ and grandfather, and father. This was sufficient. rhe crisis pãssed.
The story was sufficient. The last rabbi knew this. He knew the power that telling a story
had. He knew that thinking,. along with hjs family and village, ab'out thei6t u."o purt unä
expressing this would in itself be a powerful act. He and his feople could deirne and defend
themselves through recalling their past, and their various threáts, and thl rituJs t¡at trac
always saved them.
In the broadest sense of the term, the fourth rabbi was an autobiographer. He created a mir_
ror in which he reflected his own past, his own heritage, as well a--s that of those with whom
he shared this history. As the riterary critic.Georges-dusdorf suggesir, ln 
"r"uting 
,u"1, umirror in which an individual reflects his ovn imagelone in act engigäin un uutoU-iog*prri.af
act (Gusdorf, 1980).
It jhe.99nt9r-of autobiography is rhe Greek word "bios," meaning life. More exactly, however,"bios" is defined as the course of a life, or lifetime. But this imrnøiateþ rãi-s'Js some in-
teresting and difficult questions. about autobiography. If ..bios" is the corirse oi iir., un¿ ir
this course is already spent and^past, ttrel .n9w ii ii going to be made p.er"ni-aguint cunit be recaptured, and if so, how? can that which is past ãnd ño longer livini ¡" Ár,oLo ,o rir.r
Altobiography is an individual's attempt to answer these questions, to raise them to the level
oJconscious thought and discourse, and to redeem "bios" for trró p.ererrt.-rt"iàrore, it is
the. th-esis of this paper that autobiography, the act of drawing u ,"ti-po.truit *iih words, is
a vitally important method of facilitating and enhancing both'the proôesses ãf ¡uman t¡int-ing and of defining human identity.
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Autobiographical acts enable individuals to think about themselves and their world in three
differeniwâys. I call these the remembered self, the ordered self, and the imagined self.
The Remembered Self
The form of thinking that is most associated with autobiography is that of reflection upon
the past. While it is true that autobiography does attempt to remember påst ei/ents, human
memory is a complex phenomenon and represents much more than recollection and reten-
tion. It has been said that memory is a continuum ranging from vague, dim shadows to the
brightest, most vivid totality (Myerhoff, 1980; Olney, 1980). It may offer opportunity not
..."1y to recall the past but to relive it, in all of is original freshness, unaltered by interven-
ing ctranges and reflections. Such moments can be pinpoints of the greatest intensity, when
a sense of the past which has never been truly lost is experienced. With this kind of memory,
according to ihe anthropologist Barbara Myerhoff, the diffuseness of life is transcended,
the sensJof duration ovèrcome, and all of one's self and one's memories are felt to be valid
(Myerhoff, 1980).
If ,.bios" is a process, then it possesses a certain shape, and we might say that memory is
the thread that àescribes that shape. The thread usually remains hidden, unconscious, unkncnvn
to the individual until the time when it rises to consciousness, after the fact, to present itself
to the individual as recollections. Thus, he can trace back with a kind of Ariadne's thread,
to discover the shape that was all the time gradually and unconsciously forming itself. In
this way, the memóry of the autobiographer provides him with what James olney calls a
"conscious consciousness" (Olney, 1980, p. 252).
Myerhoff uses the þrm "re-membering" (Myerhoff, 1p80, p.74:77)' bracketing it b/ a hyphen
to distinguish it from ordinary recollection. Re-membering is the aggregation of one's
memberq the hgures and events that properly belong to one's life story. It brings together
one's prior selvel and the significant others without which the story cannot be completely
told. In this way, the fourth rabbi re-membered himself in the context of his three predecessors.
Such re-membering is a purposive and significant unification, different from the passive,
continuous, fragmJnøry flickerings of images and feelings that accompany other activities
in the normal flow of consciousness (Myerhoff, 1980).
Memories and present reality bear a continuing, reciprocal relationship, influencing and deter-
mining one anãther ceaselessly. Memories are shaped by the present moment and by the
specifii psychic impress of the remembering individual, just as the present moment is shaped
by memòries. The "now" of consciousness is as it is because of the interrelationship bet-
ween past events and memories of those events. Following his observation that memories
are an intrinsic part of the actuality in which they emerge, Erik Erikson goes on.to say that
memories serve as a connector of meaning between what happened once and what is hap-
pening now (Erikson, 1966).
Within this context, we might look upon autobiography as a second reading of human ex-
perience. And, as Gusdorf has said, "it is truer than the first because it adds to experience
itself consciousness of it" (Gusdorf, 1930, p. 38). In ttre immediate moment of an experience,
the agitation of things ordinarily surrounds me too much for me to be able to see it in its
entirãty. Memory gives me a certain perspective and allows me to consider the meaning of
lived evens and tLeir particular context in time and space. As an aerial view sometimes reveals
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roads and paths invisible to someone on the ground, so the remembering of my past reveals
!h9 ¡najor lines that I may have failed to notice, the demands of the dãepest"vãlues that I
hold, the contours of the decisions that have brought me to where I am.
Autobiography is not simply the writing out, from memory of the details of one's past. It
is not an act of mere repetition. ft b9st, the autobiographer äraws out little more thanghost-ly images of the colors and details of that time which ijforever gone. Even more, this-image
will be distorted by the fact that the autobiographer has not, foi a long time, beén the same
perso-n who actually lived those recalled events. A new mode of beìng økes shape in the
act of memory. The truth of the self begins to be revealed-that is, iiwhat Hegôl said is
true, that "consciousness of self is the birthplace of truth" (Gusdorf, 19g0, p. 3g)ì The past
that I recall in autobiography has lost its flesh-and-bone structure, but it has wona new and
more intimate relationship to my life. Now, after being long dispersed throughout the course
gf my !ve{ time, my "bios," I can discover myself aãd draw myself togethãr in the presenr
time (Gusdorf, 1980).
The Ordered Self
w_hile autobiography serves the task of human thinking by helping to remember, it does more.
Through autobiography, humans can build and order their p.ôs"Àt uy way of thé remembered
past. This is what the ancient Greek philosopher, Heráclitur, ."ant when he said that
autobiography is, at its very essence, a cosmology, i.e., an act ofbringing order to the universe.
Human experience cries out for understanding and interpretation. In attempting to look back
and to interpret the events from our personalhistory, we try to construct orderãnd meaning.
The focused unification prwided by remembering is requisite to sense and order. Throug=h
it'.humanlife is given shape that extends back into the pasi and forward into the future. Often,
this is a shortened, simplified tale, where completenèss in the story may be sacrificed for
moral-and aesthetic purposes. when this happens, history provokei artj myth, and ritual,
as in the story of the rabbis. Perhaps this is why Mnemosyne, the godáess of memory, is
the mother of the muses. without memory, we iose our hiitory and-place. without teliing
our, story past remains past, remains sequence, and can never be brought into simultaneit!
with our present time.
The order that humans seek is never static and 'out there, but always going on within us and
coming into being. To use another Heraclitian metaphor, a p"rrón õu*ãt step twice into
the same stream. The human self is always in a statè of flui and is impossiblä to capture
once and for all' But, as Olney (1912) has suggested, there is an essential oneness to the self,
an integrity and internal harmony that holds together the multiplicity and continual transfor-
mations of being.-In every individual, to the degree that he islndividual, the whole princi-
ple and essence of order is present, so that in his integrity the whole harmãny of the universe
is entirely and, as it were, uniquely existent.
In her magnificent autobiography which she entitled rhe Measure of My Days, the novelist
and short story writer, Florida Scott-Maxwell, speaks of her gr.ut rt-ggl" tó achieve order
from the chaos of modern living. In fact, she took up her .nõtebook,, ñut i, th. writing of
her autobiography, precisely to face this dragon and wrestle it into some sort of appeãse-
ment. "what frightens me," says scott-Maxwell, "is modern man's preference for the arid.
H3.clgns to understand, yet knorvs himself so little he dares dispel mystery, deny the depths
of the human psyche, and prefers to bypass the soul. It is ineviøble ttrãt ne lrives in a desert
without values" (Scott-Maxwell, 1g79, p. l1'2).
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As a student of Carl Jung, Florida Scott-Maxwell saw the need to explore her own 
psyche
in oø"r to make ,.nre of h.. life. At one point in her autobiography, she speaks of modern
iii" U.ing the precise reverse of psychoanalysis' "Instead of gathering oneself together, it
i, ã ¿irñ*"f åf oneself' (Scott-Maxwell, 1q¡19, p.56). And then, in a passionate phrase
ihat summarizes the zest and intensity that remained in this 85-year-old woman 
when she
lrote her last book, the autobiographer says, "you need only claim the events of your life
ó .ut" yourself yours. When yãuìruly possess all you have been and done, which may
iuLe sornê time, you arc fierce with reality" (Scott-Maxwell' 1979' p' 42)'
Autobiography assumes the task of reconstructing the unity of a life across time. This lived
""iiy "fift"i,girt, 
and feeling, and action is not received from the outside. It is certainly true
ttrui'*""t. in"fluence us. So-inetimes, they determine us and almost always limit us' But the
essential themes, the structural designs that impose themselves on the complex array of ex-
i..io. A.t , are the constituent elemens of the human person. Modern psychology has taught
us that human teings, far from being subject to ready-made, completed situations.given from
the outside, are the essential ageñt in bringing about the situations in which they find
iternr"tu"r ptuced. It is humanTnterventionlhat structures the terrain where life is lived'
We hold theïrush that forms the colors and shapes, so that the landscape is truly, in Amiel's
phrase, "a state of the soul."
Autobiography is an important means to self-knowledge because it enables the person to
,*"Áp"i"ä"á interpret his or her life into a kind of wholeness. An examination of my thoughs
unJ f"åf ingr which is limited to the present moment will give me only a fragmentary cutting
iro,,' *y p"ersonal being. In .".ounìing my history, the measure of my days, I take a longer
path, and this path thaigoes round my lifð leads me more surely to myself. The recapitula-
iion of ages of existencé, of landscapes and encounters, obliges me to situate who I am in
p".rp..tiu" to who I have been. Myindividual unity, the mysterious essence of my being,
is that which is achieved (Gusdorf' 1980).
.,Man tries to make for himself in the fashion that suits him best," writes one of the greatest
cosmographers of the twentieth century, Albert Einstein. And he continues: 'A simplified
unJ ini"ffgiUf. picture of the world; he then tries to some extent to substitute this cosmos
of his for tñe woild of experience, and thus to overcome it. This is what the painter, the poet,
the speculative philosopher, and the natur¿l scie¡tist do, each in his own fashion..Each makes
this õosmos and its construction the pivot of his emotional life, in order to find in this way
tfr. p"*" and security which he cannõt find in the narrow whirlpool of personal experience"
(Einstein, 1962, P. 225).
And it must be, from the nature of this picture, that the construct we develop will appeal
nã, onty to our intellect, but to our emotions and our whole self. Does it satisff my feeling
unO Ái n""O for order? This seems to be the final question we can and must ask, not only
from tie painting or the poem, but also from the theological doctrine, or philosophy, or
pry.hologì.d theãry. As Emst iassirer says in his "Essay on Man," "in language, in religion,
in art, inicience, man can do no more than to build up his own universe-a symbolic universe
that enables him to understand and interpret, to articulate and organize, to synthesize and
universalize his human experience" (Cassirer, 1944' p' 221)'
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In "Four Quartets," what many believe to be T. s. Eliot's supreme autobiographical state-
ment, the poet summarizes this need for recapitulation and discovery anaïró creation of
a personal cosmology in his own unique voice:
What we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from ...
A people without history
Is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern
Of timeless moments . ..
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
(Eliot, 190, pp. 2UI-2OB)
The Imagined Self
I have spoken thus far of the powe4 of memory to trace, with its spindling thread, the shape
or form of a human life, the journey of the "bios." And in the tìacing,-in the recalling of
one's own story a cosmology takes place, one which can enable inægration and the deveiop-
ment of a sense of wholeness. The great Irish poet, william Butlei yeats, in fact did this
through his poems, and plays, and letters, and finally in three books which constitute his
autobiography. In a letter to his father, yeats said, 'bne goes from year to year gradually
getting the disorder of one's mind in order and this is thé real impúlse to create. Till one
has_expressed a thing it is like an untidy, unswept, undusted corner õf a room" (wade, 1955,
p.6n).
The impulse to create. And in the autobiographical act, what one creates is the self.
The neo-Platonist Roman philosopher, plotinus, theorized that every person has two souls,
a lowe¡ and a higher, and that each of these possessed a unique form oi memory. He argued
that a lower soul recalls the details of one's iife, one's relatiónships and events, those tÀ-ings
that "we retain with emotion." But a higher soul "must desire to come to a irappy forgel-
fulness of all that has reached it through the lower ... In this sense we may truly-say t-hat
the good.soul is forgetful. It flee-s multiplicity; it seeks to escape the unbounäed uy aräwing
all to unity, for only thus is it free from entanglement" (Enneads, Tracts 3l-32).
If Plotinus was right, then w. B. yeats was a good soul indeed, forhe was capable of forget-
ting most of the things that the lower man "ieøins with emoiion,', as well äs myriad fãcts
that even a lower man could scarcely get emotional about. yeats had a miserably bad memory
for names, dates, specific events, and facts, which might lead many to concluäe that he was
poorly qualified to be an autobiographer. After all, isft an autobiographer not utterly depen-
dent on memory for both the shape and details of the recitationl pèrhaps not.
"Faces and names are vague to me," Yeats admits in "The Trembling of the veil," the se-
cond volume ofhis autobiography- (yeats, 1953, p. 153). But there isio sense of regret on
Yeats' part, nor concern for his ability as an autobiographer. What he is interested in is cõupling
a weak factual memory with a strong creative forgetfulness. while he was forgetting names
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and frces, his creative spirit was busy recalling the ideas and truths lying behind those names
and faces. What he could not, or chose not to remembe¡ he invented. And his inventions
reflected the deeper realities, his perceived archetypes, of those whom he loved and with
whom he worked. Yeats himself called this the memory for eternal things (Olney, 1980).
It is not proper, nor may it be constructive, to maintain a view of autobiography as an objec-
tive accounting. Every autobiography is a work of art, and at the same time, a work of
enlightenment. It does not show us the person from outside in his visible actions, but the
person in his inner privacy; not as he was, not as he is, but as he believes and wishes himself
to be and have been.
According to Gusdorf (1980) and other theorists, what is in question with autobiography
is a revaluation of individual destiny. It is the act of a creator to construct and give meaning
to experience, one's own mythic tale. The author, who is at the same time the hero of the
tale, wants to elucidate the past in order to draw out the structure of his being in time. Thus,
the author exercises imagination, creating images and metaphors in the development of the
narrative, and in so doing, "adds himself to himselfl' (Gusdorf, 1980 p. 45). Through im-
agination, the autobiographer creates the past by inspiring facts and events with interpreta-
tion, direction, suggestiveness, and ultimately, human meaning. So, like our story of the
rabbis, the present is rooted in the past. But the obverse is also true'
The past is recreated and springs to life in the telling of the story in the present. lmagination
is as much an essential ingredient in autobiography as is memory. Some, like Yeats, would
argue that imagination is more essential. Another poet, for a short while a contemporary
of Yeats (although they lived 3000 miles apart and never met each other), praises the power
of the mind (and the soul) to invent:
To make a prairie it takes a clover and one bee,
One clover, and a bee,
And revery.
The revery alone will do,
If bees are few.
(Emily Dickinson, Poem No. 1755)
In his autobiography entitled Report to Greco, The celebrated Greek novelist Nikos Kazant-
zakis employs an ample portion of revery. In fact, somewhat like Plotinus, he claims there
are two types of truths for him-the truth of historical fact and the truth of imagination. He
discovered the latter in writing his autogiography, and this discovery brought him great joy
and lightened his burden. "The truth which had been storing up anguish in my breast for
such a long time was the the real truth; the real truth was this newborn creature of imagina-
tion. By means of imagination I had oblitereated reality, and I felt relieved" (Kazantzakis,
1961, p. rl7).
And so from all this we can say that the act of autobiography is essentially an act of metaphor.
In a recent article i¡ Harper's, Cynthis Ozick speaks of metaphor as that which relies upon
experience, that which transforms the strange into the familiar. Homer's "wine dark sea"
for example-if you know wine, you will know the sea. "Metaphor uses what we already
possess and reduces strangeness ... Metaphor belongs to clarification and humane conduct"
(Ozick, 1986, p. 68). So more than saying what the world is, or is like, the metaphors of
self that are autobiography tell me who I am, and am like. And perhaps more-who I am
becoming. And in the end, it connects me more nearly with the deep reaches of myself and
with the world of my experience.
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Autobiographicøl Acts and Educøtion
The self, St. Augustine said in his confessions, is a field in which people labor with much
sweat and little knowledge. what Augustine attempted to do in his Confessions, which most
critics consider to be the frnt important autobiography in Westem civilization, was to discover
the truth about himself (st. Augustine, 1969). In this search for self-knowledge, Augustine's
confessions illuminate the relationship between truth, time and the selr liloyo, teg6¡.
It is my view that autobiography has an important role to play in modern education. If education
is essentially the seeking after knowledge and the pursuit of truth, can we, without terrible
risk, sidestep self-knowledge as we make our way and lead others along the way on this no-
ble journey? One might argue that there can be no abstract knowing without peisonal know-
ing; that our own expression of the world "out there" is inevitably determined by our view
of ourselves. Since we put various pieces of information together and order our experience
according to our own deeply felt needs and desires, our knowledge of the world cannot be
separated from selÊknowledge (Porter and Wolf, lg3).
It.is also important to note thaf the intellect is not a separate faculty. It is an activity of the
whole human organism, an activity which begins in the senses with direct experiences of
the world. It is an experience that involves the emotions. I hope educators have iong dispell-
ed the notion that learning and human development are disconnected, and that tñowtèage
and those who are seeking it are essentially unrelated. But sometimes, as I survey the teachiig
and learning-processes operating in my own area ofeducation, i.e., the university, I havã
my sincere doubts.
In my experience as both a learner and a teacher, I have known the benefits of thinking
autobiographically and of employing autobiography, defined broadly, in formal education.
There are numerous possibilities for engaging oneself and others in autobiographical acts
without taking on a full recounting of one's life. Journal writing, life reviews of sélecæd events,
oral histories, and various artistic endeavors can be employed in education to help people
think about their identity, about their relationship with the world, and about the act ofthink-
ing itself. For the remainder of this paper, I shall explore the use of one of these techniques,
that of journal writing.
I am now in my eighteenth year as a journal writer. I began in college, at the suggestion
of a professor who himself was a Journalist,' and have kept up the aciivity, increaüng my
fervor about it as the years have progressed. I have known the trace ofthe thread aróunâ
the edges of memory as well as ovid's suggestion that "it is a pleasure, too, to remember."
I have known how the pen has helped to turn chaos into some semblance of structure. And
then upon further thought, and facing that which somehow remained an abyss, the slow blen-
ding into order. And revery Emily Dickinson's lovely revery-that, too have I known. I dread
who I might have become without this revery those many pens, those acts of implosion into
myself.
In a thoughtful article about the use of journals in education, Abell (1986) suggests there
are four outcomes students often experience by way of engaging in such autobiographical
acts: (l) it provides a connection between what students know from their ovn life e*periences
and the ideas that are presented in class; (2) it encourages students to 'gain a voice' of their
own; (3) it provides a personal context for learning; and, (4) it allows students to evaluate
changes in their own thinking over time.
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As a teacher who often encourages the keeping of a journal as part of formal course re-
quirements or as elective projects, I can affirm this list ofoutcomes as real and achievable
ón the part of many college students. But as this papef has argued, the issue at stake is more
than the eståblishment of context or the tracing of progress. The issue at stake is thinking
and identity.
If we do not know the self, what can we know? If we cannot think upon our own lived ex-
periences, about what can we think? An act of autobiography is among the most natural acts
we perform as human beings. It is an act which recalls the self, and makes an accounting
of ii, and trusts it enough to respect it as both the subject and object of our thought and
discourse. Do such acts not belong in the very cent€r ofour attempt to help others arìd ourselves
think, and learn, and develop as human beings?
And when the calamities of modern life approach us, the inevitable alienation and distress,
the savage competitiveness and fierce materialism, the threat of personal and global annihila-
tion, what shall be our recourse? What shall save us? What, if not the telling of our own
story, will prove to be sufficient?
E. Michael BradY
Human Resource Development Department, College of Flucation
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THE PERSON, THE POLITICS OF THINKING, AND
THE FUTURE OF HUMANKIND
Willard D. Callender, Jr.
During the 1986-87 academic year, Will callender wrote a book entitled rhe Adult Muca-
tion Class while on sabbatical leave as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University's Philosophy
ofEducation Research center, a component ofthe Graduate school ofEducation. The book,
written in dialogue form, purports to be a philosophy of education for adults, as if adults
and their education count, as if it is their responsibility rather than the task of children to
confront and seek solutions to the problems ofthe world, as ifthinking and discussing ideas
is more important that fighting over them. In Will's vieq thinking and self-educaiton, citizen-
ship and democracy, are finally inseparable, the first two furnishing the necessary condi-
tions for the second pair.
will plays himself in the eleven-person cast of the,4d¿¿lt fulucation c/¿ss. As its authoç he
is undoubtedly to be found as well in all ten ofthe other characters as they collectively search
for a substantial, universal .meaning of adult education. Here, we print a snatch of cor-
respondence between will and Emerson Hall, a fictitious graduate student from Harvard,
who as a student intern is the tenth student member of the class. The correspondence con-
veys a position about education, the educational politics ofthinking, and the stakes involved
for the future of humankind.
February 14, lgtl
Dear Will
You asked in your recent letter for a summary of my interests as they might pertain to the
course I will be auditing with you, which I believe you call "Introduction to Ádult Educa-
tion." Also, you wanted me to say a little bit about the internship, what I am interested in
and what I aspire to do. I have appended an overly long statement for the former pulpose,
which you can share with the class. It will at least acquaint them with my work. I hopó they
won't think me too opinionated. I have taken the habit, since I saw you last, of at least stating
what I really think-and pleasing myself with a certain flourish, E's own style if you will-
and trying to get beyond this overrated, misunderstood virtue of objectivity. Underneath it
all, I am of course the same uncertain, confused student-now pilgrim-that I always was.
By the-way, don't you think pilgrim a better word than student for someone over thirty? I
mean for people like you and I?
As to the internship, I can't get to Gorham until the first of March or so, nor can I even then
attend all the classes. I do request that you mail all course materials to me. I promise on
my part to read everything and even send occasional comments on my reactions, which you
certainly have my permission to distribute to the whole class, if that would be useful. when
I am able to attend, I will be glad to lead a discussion, if that is requested, do gopher work
for the class, or help evaluate class accomplishments. Did I tell youihat I am taking a course
down here in organizational intervention? Evaluation science is part of the work and I would
welcome some experience in evaluation, if that can be worked in.
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^' ^f rhis is a little tenuous I know. My 
major commitment, to be clear, is to complete a
Ï^'j,ä;"; ãiìtt. ,"ui*, ¿escribed in thê attached abstract. I really want to work with
i"TËä;ã;y sixth sense tells me that you can 
be a big help to me on it'






The Death of Education





Ás far as I can see, education is now dead. Was it homicide or suicide? I don't know; 
let
the coroner decide. It was murder nonetheless and the murderers are 
legion' And it all hap-
;;;;;;;;il"*ly and in tutl public view. Of course, educational 'problems' and'issues''Ñ;;l*"yr existed; real educatìon is difficult under the best of circumstances' So we are




of reading and writing, higir absenteeand dropout rates, substance abuse,
uìà.in nOing, low SAT scoäs, and horie/sðhool squabbles, particularly around the so call-
.J;t""*f ity"q"estions." I woildn't minimize thesJconcerns in the least; that's paft of what
i;*tdki;g uLout u, well. iet, the very idea that these problems are b^eing addressed and
*ofu.¿-tnã idea that a signifióant refo-rm is going on-is the biggest farce-of all' What's
the illusion? It is that the-improved generic 'bducutot" sønding in front of us, after par-
ii*iui ,.fo.rnr, is a real eduäator. Ñhat I see instead is something like the portrait of the
,oÀUi" in a hoiror movie; he looks just like us but his soul has been stolen and his body
ã."upi.¿ by an alien from another pianet. Yet, considerable interaction and observation 
is
required to discover the alien. By then, it is too late'
One reason this zombie analogy works is that the murderers of education 
are so well-meaning
and friendly; rhey are ,...i;!ty benign. The death is like that rype of euthanasia in which
u .àn...nø Amiy member sñortens tte inevitable suffering of a loved one. The^elder wants
to save the young from going through all that! All that? save them from what? Thinking'
if,utt *frut, ttt. ittt" ptõ¡..iof thin-king for oneself. At the very least I can identiff some
oiitr" t"aíy big killers in the cast of plotters' Let's start with Brutus'
1. The Quantity of Available Knowledge
iiu* u-f.i"n¿, ä historian, who is fond ãf saying that when it comes to ideas about man
th"r" ur. no new ones sinceÎ¡ancis Bacon. Eh-gads, Bacon died in 1626. She thought 
every
iã;ri".. was some straightforward combination of foundation ideas available by the time
oi t i, J"uttt. If she is righl it might comfort some. As for me, I am overwhelmed whenever
i *utt tt .ougt, these inðredible libraries here at Harvard and through the Coop and the other
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bookstores in Harvard Square. I can feel the weight of knowledge laying on top of me. My
intuitive bias is toward Tofflerlike propositions, or perhaps ones from Kenneth Boulding.
For example, I find myself saying that more knowledge must have been made available in
the last five years than in all previous history. And I am talking about books. It is the age
of the computer, right! The knowledge that really disturbs me is the fact there are more good
books available directly on any topic I am studying than I could in fact read or use. Who
minds large libraries if a good literature search actually identifies a definitive, comprehen-
sible body of literature. That libraries contain more information than I can use is actually
a comforting thought; the corollary being that people of other talents and interests are likewise
finding what they need. But soon, the idea of a quality literature search will be superceded
on objective grounds, there being too much good, directly relevant, thought available to the
solitary human searcher. And who is to say that my friend's argument won't soon be true,
if it isn't already. Perhaps all she need do is use the ploy of predecessors whose prophecies
have failed: change the reference from Bacon to Sarte, or to Michael Foucault. My arguments,
I sadly suspect, have already been made better than I could make them, and worse, by some-
one I may never even get to read.
What I am getting at here is what you, Will, used to call-following Simmel and Cassirer-
the "tragedy of culture," the paradox that man is essentially an inventor of culture, but that
this, his greatest power, burdens and weakens him, the sheer increase in its quantity coming
ûo exceed ever more certainly the capacity of the newly born to learn, comprehend, and use
it. It will be easier for them to stop trying and have fun instead, off on a Florida beach or
in some bar watching the super bowl, smug with the knowledge that they are products of
a great civilization which produced great thinkers.
2. The Ignorant Expert
And now for Cassius. As you well know, we have dealt with the problem of the quantity
of knowledge by increasing the division of labor and by coronating specialist, professional
classes as the official knowers of sectors of knowledge and practice. Four things strike me
as important about these elite classes. First, that they really do know enormous amounts,
more than any generalist or common citizen could know about their subject. Second, that
their knowledge replaces the obligation of the citizen to know what they know. Yet, they
hold the power over the curriculum that young and new students must study. Tlpically this
curriculum is a 'shorr' or 'shadow' curriculum; insubstantial, arcane, and void of human-
ness in its own right, this curriculumconsists of gymnastic test items whose passage qualifies
the student for laûer entrance into the real curriculum when admitted to professional studies.
Third, professional specialists are usually both enemies of general human knowledge and
ignorant themselves of what human knowing can mean. Finall¡ the above described situa-
tion is getting worse every day. Indeed, the fantastic specialization going on inside the pro-
fessional and scientific communities is so extensive as to prevent the generalist professional
from mastering his profession, the sub-specialties becoming arcane coÍrmunities in their
own right. In the old humanities of philosophy, mathematics, and literature, as well as in
the disciplines founded in the nineteenth century an incredible ossification begins to set in.
People start writing for a presumed audience of other specialists within the main profes-
sion; there is hardly even the pretense that knowledge is for the public anymore. Suddenly,
there is more written on Melville, Joyce, or the James brothers than scholars can profitably
read, yet the attempt to do so outcompetes efforts to acquaint the public directly with the
thinker's actual work and thought.
Most of what I am concerned about is evident in this plain talk from the writings of Ortega
Y Gasset, as respresented by Mortimer Adler in his book 'A Guidebook to Learning."
69
"[The scientist who] is only acquainted with one science' and 
even of that one
;it kt;. the smail cornór in which he is an active investigator' "even pro-
ãiuír, i u, a virtue that he takes no cognisance.of what lies outside the narrow
;;;iaty specially "ulti*t"d 
by himsel-f, and gives the name of "dilettantism"
io uny óuiiourity for the general scheme of knowledge'
Anyone who wishes can observe the stupidity of thought' 
judgment' and ac-
iioí snown to¿uy in påüti"t, art, religion, and the general problems of life and
the world by thé 
,,men of sóience," ãnd, of course, behind them, the doctors,
engineers, financiers, teachers, and so on'
Compared with the medieval university, the contemporary university 
has
developedthem..",".dofp'of"ssionalinstructionintoanenormousactivity;
it has added the trnctiån of r"r"arch; and it has abandoned almost 
entifely the
teaching or transmission of culture'
[The citizen] is the new barbarian " ' This new 
barbarian is above all the pro-
fessional man' more learned than ever before' but at the same time 
more
uncurture¡_trr" .ngin*i, t¡" physician, the lawyer, the scientist" (Adler, 1986:
ls9).
3. The destruction of the learner as thinker
ö"*ln ã.o about knowing and learning are obviously true of human beings. .requtrtng 
no
proof beyond ,n.r" introrpã.ìi*' u pttíon must.focu; on some point' one thing 
at a time
i;ä;;îi;;.n unytt,ing at allr knåwledge, skill. and discipline is built up.in.sequence'
this fact on that fact, this question from thit understanding, this 
skill on that skill; knowing
something requires un "*"i"ir. 
ofjudgment; learning is an active pfocess, which engages
all of the abilities of tne fearner;lriã uit t"urning becãmes a unity 
of knowledge for the in-
dividual knower. V"t, tt "r" 
à." ïåi ihe principlãs on which curriculum is organized' Sub-
i;;;; in"it, ""rtuin 
b"di;^;f k ;iåg", á." taught in quanra and for their own sakes.
After learning to ,"uO unOäi", ãitt.. r"äí*tia-ofiubjecf matter are treated 
as unimpor-
tanr; srudents are asked t" i;;;;';iy *hai the older generation wants taught, even 
if they
themselves don,t know *trut tfrurir; und beyond that, the quality of 
the person as learner'
ittht"., and citizen are increasingly treated as unimportant'
It is evident what a slow tortuous death the individual thinker has 
suffered in the clarity with
wtricn,qtfre¿ North Whitehead put the case in 1929'
Culture is activity ofthought, and receptiveness ofbeauty 
and humane feeling
(Whitehead, Thà Aims of Education, p' 13)'
In training a child to activity of thought' above all things we 
must beware of
what I will catl "inert idea'i" ' ', i¿"ui that are merely. received 
into the'mind
without Ueing utilizåå, ã' iåtttá, or thrown into fresh combinations 
(Ibid)'
Themindisneverpassive;itisaperpetualactivity,delicate'receptive,respon-
sive to stimulut. ;;;;";i på'tpon" its life until you havg sharpened it'
Whateverlnterestattact'estoyoursubject-mattermustbeevokedhereandnow;
whatever powet, y;;;;; 
"t";gthening 
in the pupil must be exercised here and
now; whatever porrìUitlti"t oi'n" tuf üft your teaching should impart' 
must
be exhibited i" til;;;';;l now That is ihe golden rule of education and a
very difficult rule to follow (Ibid, p' 18)'
70
The solution which I amurging, is to eradicate the fatal disconnection ofsub-
jects which kills the viølity of our modern curriculum. There is only one subject-
matter for education, and that is Life in all its manifestations. Instead of this
single unity, we offer children-Algebra, from which nothing foilows; Geomerry
from which nothing follows; History from which nothin! fo[ows; a couplê
of Languages, never mastered; and lastly, most dreary of all, Literature,
represented by plays ofShakespeare, with philological notes and short analyses
of plot and character to be in substance committed to memory. can such â üst
be said to rep¡esent Life, as it is known in the midst of living it? The best that
can be said of it is, th¿t it is a rapid table of contents whichã deity might run
over in his mind while he was thinking of creating a world, and had-not yet
determined how to put it together (lbid).
...the understanding that we want is an understanding of an insistent present.
The only use of a knowledge of the past is to equip us for the present. ño .o."
deadly harm can be done to young minds than by depreciatiõn of the present.
The present contains all that there is. It is holy ground; for it is the päst, and
it is the future (Ibid, p. l4).
The most shocking of these whitehead quotes, I find, is the one on the curriculum, since
many ofwe lovers ofthe liberal arts are trying to bet back to Shakespeare and two languages,
science, and literature. And who could ask fór a more wonderful ambition than for children
to feel themselves, like God, prepared to author a world, their world. He reminds us that
when we succeed in restoring some coordinated curriculum, we have not succeeded in restor-
ing the person-the individual, passionate thinker-to the center of learning; our work would
have just begun. But for my money, curriculum reconstruction is a good iiu". to begin. AsMortimer Adler points out, university curriculum are held together-mortty ty the alfhabet.
courses are chosen as much on the advice of a catalog indei as a human óunselor. pro-
grams of study and individual cou_rses are taken by recourse to an alphabetically aganged
listing, not by a concept of curriculum. what the student gets is overwhelminglyiocational
training, not education.
Rebirth
will, I can almost hear you saying; "so that's what's bothering you Bunky!', or ,.If that was
the answer, what was the question?" It is only fair to inform !óu that it is not wisdom like
that which has led me ro seek to undertake this internship wiih your program. Rather it is
th¡lememb-3nce, now a glimmer, of a course I once took wìth you on ,,rneiocial psychology
of George Herbert Mead." Do you remember? The glimmer is not the cou¡se itself-I
remember it quite well and continue to benefit from it to this very day-but ¡ather of your
interesl which seemed quaint at the time, of trying to expand the ireeäom of the individual
within Mead's understanding of the self. I foundlt quaint because Mead was such an ob-
vious friend of freedom, and individualism, and çommunity, and democrac¡ and of course
thinking. Don't you.remember, mind.is "symbolic communication,,' minã.is ,,thinking.',
It struck me at the time as being as absurd as criticizing Christ foinot being sufficienîy
christlike, a criticism which surely should be rese.ved for the churches.
But now I think I understand you befter, or ifl don't, I am still intrigued. I read you as want-
ing to free the thinker in all.of us_ at the earliest possible age, not ãt the expense of society
but as the necessary ground forìumane society-. yes, I aðmit it, I find myself moving in
a serious way to Rousseau, and carlyle, and yes, even to my namesake Emerson. In fãct,I am thinking of entitling my thesis. "Freeing the person:-The unfinished work of the
Enlightenment."
7t
It intrigues me to think that you are now teaching something called adult education' 
I can't
ildì;iñ¡oing that without some attentionìo the issues I have just raised. That is at
Ëuri rny 
'-u.ior suiposition in joining the class- I hope I have said enough here to introduce








Thanks for the recent letter regarding your internship plan' Your paper-will serve nicely 
as
a communication to the class. itr fuctJípatt.¿ it out a1rèady, yesterday. We,accept your offer
to act as course evaluator, and I persoìally would welcome any feedback you might care
ã ;i". .", on teaching style and class orgänization as well as content. Frankly, I have had
u fãi of i.ou¡f. teachiñg this course ou". ã-,. years, this being the fifth time.out of the stall'
i;ili ;h" book I amïriting is in fair part a chronicle of an educational nightrnare.
You will find out soon enough how the course relates to your interests, so there is no need
toun*ì.¡f oryourquestioñsnow. Onewordof explanationmightbeinorder.though' The
.tuo. ir un 
"ffort 
to find out what went wrong wìth hdult education,' which one author
;;;,ly;"lbd "The Sleeping Giant of North American Education." I don't know a.bout that;
I call it the Rodney OangèrnitO of world education. I frncy myself a rotund Charles Atlas,
*t o go", around'madlf saying "It doesn't have.to be like that." My intent is to develop,
oi.åt" correctly reinventia íniversal philosophy- of adult education, one that applies to
all aduls and whäre educaiíon counts. Wè nee¿ á¿útts who are willing to change-themselves
un¿ øt . on tf," burden of preventing nuclear war. Instead we have mostly folks who celebrate
themselves as being educãted menãnd women, at age twenty-fiv.e more or less. 
Most adults
t uu. ,toppø, huO¿iø around the TV. set or some barbecue, waiting around for a new genera-
tion of children who will value peace. The poor childrenl And, if you haven't noticed, adults
;; f";ìh;;"st part dislike "hildr"n-foi 
some they are a responsibility, for others an in-
.ánurni.n"., or a burden, ihen a pain, or a hateful ieminder, and in the worst case, moral
agents-littlé punishers- who muìt be punished first. Life increasingly becomes 
a war bet-
vieen the sexes and a war between the gènerations. And at the center of this mess 
are adults
who claim to be educated because the! have a B.A. and claim to be learning because they
g; i" ftñ; workshops. Árttt" same"time, as you declare, the thinker in them is dead'
Bring back socrates, an educator who knew he couldn't teach anyone aryqing. Instruction
is for"sophists. By the way, didn't your namesake R..W. say somellring like that, to the effect
that he ôould p.*iO" 'p.ouo"utioi for us but not 'instruction.' He was a wise man' in fact
he was "Man thinking."
That gets me to another reason for welcoming your letter. I have been invited to present a
papeias part of a Symposium in March on theìheme: "What Socrates Began: An Examina-
iloï of tn" Intelleci." i chose for my talk the embarassingly pretentious title: "The Person,
The Politics of Thinking, and the Éuture of Humankind." In December I actually wrote a
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terriblypedantic, boring, thirty page paper on that topic. when I got your letter, I saw im-
mediately that my paper didn't have to be this way. You were addressing tire same topic straþht
on, covering much that I was trying to say. I think I can say the rest þ writing it to yõu.
So, surprise, please find enclosed a short paper responding to yours. witl you as-my teaôher
and, I as you'|s, we might help each other improve our thinking on thinking, and on other
topics as well. Such a conversation is one view of human progreìs and perso-nal transforma-
tion. Is there really a better way?
I look forward to seeing you in March. I think the members of the class are looking forward
to meeting you as well. At least, they are curious after reading your first purugrulh. wo*.
Best personal regards and say hello to your sister.
Yours truly,
Willard D. Callende¡ Jr.
203 Margaret Street
South Portland, Maine 04106
Wc/w
Enclosure: Thinking about the Thinker
Thinking about the Thinker
and the Rebirth of Education
Don't expect me to be as organized, clear, and linear as you were in your bold little paper.
Let me-just say that I agree with you in general and that your raging words have lit-a fire
in me. why shouldn't I give myself permission to be just ãs outrageoirs. we go through life
knowing_ that what organizations say about themselves is mostly untrue. w-ho is goìng to
say so if we don't. Yes, you're some pilgrim alright.
Any_way, apropos of your argument, I just want to give you a couple of things to think about
on-Descartes, and from your namesake Ralph waldo Emerson. Àlso, I thought I would try
to formulate some advice to teachers on the assumption that you, whiteheadl and Emerson
are right. Be sure to tell me if I am way off base.
On Rene Descartes
I know you have read Descartes' "Discourse on Method" and his "Meditations,,' but I urge
you ûo do it again, after meditating on what you have written to me. I mean here we have
this brilliant, well-travelled,.best educated, responsible man, sitting alone þ that fire, seriously
entertaining the almost mad.prospect that everything he previous-ly believed to be írue migtlt
be 
.false. 
This project of radical doubt should be tried by every perron, because it has beãn,
in its effects, module 1 of the modern adult education ciass for all of us ever since, whether
we know it or not. And, he proves, with the help of a little devil and a dream, along with
the well known illusions of sense experience, thai one can rationally doubt the whole world
yay. .If w9 gach had the gurs ro follow his travelogue, his triptik, we would inexorably be
forced by his method to doubt the whole world away. What provocation!
And, E., look, look where he ends up at the end ofhisjourney, before he rediscovers God
and reinvents the world. He ends up with "The Thinker." In fact, in the ,.second Mediø-
tion" he drops the "therefore" in the cogito, "I think, therefo¡e I am." It becomes: ,.I think,
I am." In other words, thinking and being are identical at that point.
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But I rush ahead of myself. Descartes, in successfully doubting away everything 
can't escape
th. ,,I *ho doubts," 6e"uu." doubting is a thought. I can say: "I doubt away the physical
universe, including my own body, it might be a dream"; "I doubt away all of-my sense ex-
.,"ri"n."., thev miehibe illusions"; "Itoubt away my imaginations; what the hell is im-
ãñ;"";;tilaai;:I doubt u*uy mathematics ; tdoubt away other people" and, "I doubt
äi,îôo¿.;; brunt me all that aná I still must recognize that still small voice of the "I" that
ãåuût . OouU, thoughts are "I" thoughts, it is inéscapable. "I doubt, doubt is a thought,
therefore I think, therefore I exist."
So here we have proof that the "thinker" exists, and that man is a thinker before becoming
;;ythilg ;t". Aiso, we have proof that man.is.always a thinker' and that everything he is
i, n"u.r'_o." than a thought, even when it is built into steel and concrete.
But what a lost thinker! He can be sure he thinks, and therefore exists; he can be sure 
that




judging, and óncluding for examples. But none of the content of thought
i, tïå"**.ify tñrö; nã just ¿oubted it all iway! There is a knower whose lifetime knowledge
i, iã*i""1v chaótic; void; unbelievable. A thinker returned to rhe beginning of time, to
ifre Uig Uang, to genesis, to íotal amazement and, if he is lucky, wonder. What a 
funhousel
Isn't that the beginning of education? Isn't that where education should start? 
Isn't that where
.ã"""ii"" "r*ri, 
."rñuin., after we have come to know everything we know?
On Ralph Waldo Emerson
È.;ü; ,"" i.or your letter rhat you have read your namesake, Ralph waldo Emerson.
Ãi;", i; that youïnderstand his potential importance to your case. But, in the event that
vã" rt.*r, had the time to dig into allof his essays.or into the journals, let me 
offer a few
íip, ø, guidance. If I am not"wrong, Emerson plcks up and takes on Descartes' burden,
and with a lot of Kant and some Hime, picks up the iisue of the thinker, and does 
so in
Ámerican terms. And it is you he soughrto "ncouìuge-tead 
the Transcendentalist-he was
noit.ying to make the *o.íd *f" for iohn Wayne' My pelso-1{ ø-v91!9s T" '. Th" Divinitv
i.t oãt Ã¿¿r"rs," and the essays "Circles," ;Nature;; "Politics," "The Poet," and "Self-
Ràtian"".', ,,To essay is to te:' bo you g"t ihut little word pun: to say, esse, address, preach,
say, be?
But the essay I recommend for your project is "The American Scholar." I am told 
that each
.""y l. ã *ã.¿ cathedral, in *f,i.n *ä.yientence is a provocation which,can^evoke the whole,
u-iñt. jou.n"y into the infinite, if one but knows where to begin and stop, if one knows
o*."ii,'if on"lthat is-knows úow to be a self. With those enscription rules, I offer these
quotes from the American Scholar'
It is one ofthose frbles, which, out ofan unknown antiquity' convey an unlooked-
forwisdom,thatthegods,inthebeginning,dividedManintomen'thathe
*lght U. môre helptui to himself; juit as the hand was divided into fingers,
the better to answer its end.
The old fable covers a doctrine ever new and sublime; that there is one Man,-
;;;;; to all particular men only partfafly, or through one faculty;-and 
that
lou must take^the whole society io find the whole man" 
(Emerson, 1983, pp'
54-55).
And the last sentence in the same paragraph quoted above:
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The state of society is one in which the members have suffered amputation from
the trunk, and strut about so many walking monsters,_a good fiìger, a neck,
a stomach, an elbow, but never a man (Ibid).
And, on the scholar, with some apparent regret,
ln this distribution of functions, the scholar is the delegated intellect. In the
right state, he is, Man Thinking. In the degenerate statè, when the victim of
society, he tends to become a mere thinker, or still worse, the parrot of other
men's thinking (Iåld).
Emerson, isn't that something, he is ølking about homicide too, just as you have done. Isn,t
degeneration something like the killing of genesis, not exactly ä matricide, but more of a
slow, silent suicide.
And on degeneration,
The theory ofbooks is noble. The scholar ofthe first age received into him
a world around; brooded thereon; gave it new arrangement ofhis own mind,
anduttered it again. It came into him, life; it went ourfrom him, truth; It came
to him, short-lived actions; it went out from him, immortal thoughts. It came
to him business; it went from him, poetry. It was dead fact; nol it is quick
thought. It can stand, and it can go. It now endures, it now flies, it now rn-
spires- Precisely in proportion to the depth of mind from which ii issued, so
high does it soar, so long does it sing.
But,
Yet hence arises a grave mischief. The sacredness which attaches to the act
of creation-the act of thought-is transferred to the record. The poet chan-
ting, was felt to be a divine man: henceforth the chant is divine also. The writer
was a just and wise spirit: henceforth it is settled, the book is perfect; as love
of the hero corrupts into worship of his statue. Instantly, the booi< becomes nox-
ious: the guide is tyrant. The sluggish and pervefteà mind of the multitude,
slow to open to the incursions ofReason, having once so opened, having once
received the book, stands upon it, and makes an outcry if ifis disparaged-. col-
leges are built on it. Books are written on it by thinkeis, not by Ir,ian ihinking;
by men of talent, that is, who start out wrong, who set out from ãccepted dogmas,
not from their own sight of principles (Emerson, 19g3, p. 57).
again,
Hence, instead of 'Man Thinking,' we have the bookworm (1åi@.
And he was saying all of this in 1837 before the worship of science replaced science, and
the worship oftelerrision replaced the book. Nov, we are in danger or trying to wonhip critical
thìnking, which isn't Man Thinking either. Don't you see a similiar poinito ðassirer's , Tragedy
of culture." By the way, those are R.w.'s capitals on Man Thinking, just in case you tho-ught
them mine. He clearly didn't want us to miss the point.
What is a Teacher to do?
E., between the ¡¡vo of us we've described some kind of a bloody scene. could it be we've
bloodied our own hands in the act of describing the murderers? Ãre we just reporters? Are
75
we among the victims? I don't know the answers. I do admit some sense of stepping back,
;ãyrt;p, and sheathing the knife when getting to the question of 'advice forteachers.' Be-
õ;;ä fåno mysergivLg advice within the frmiliar, groored forms available in the teaching
,r.ãf.rriou you i.no*, u shórt, objective, upbeat, undisn'rrbing, reform list-a list of 'recom-
i"."ãrtio"r: Something is lost. At any ratè, here is the advice I thought I might give at that
,yÁp"rir- o" the inteliect, in so many words, without boring you with numbers and letters'
I certainly want to remind teachers of the truth of Descartes and Emerson, that man is a
ir,i"i.ãr, lí,"a 
l'Man Thinking" is her essence. When we aren't being mere animals, which
i- î i"i"i fun and real impõrrant too, we are thinking. Everything we are conscious of is
u ,tt ougttt' and 
,thoughts' are, unsurprisingly enough, the product of thinking.
Then, I would want teachers to understand what kinds of mentation go under this heading
;iiti;rk.g. Specifically, I would ask them to see that thinking includes imagination, feel-
ing,.otiuãtion, sentimênt, emotion, rumination, gng y' dreaming' remembering' reason-




*hich is gãing on consciously, or even semi-consciously, when
*. åo unj,,f,ing else. Thinking is the mãntal thing we do when we do everything. As Heideg-
ner and WittSe-nstein have shoin, among ottrers, thinking is mysterious-you can't quite name
ï;il;.h-ü;iftlt-on the other hanã it is amazinglyordinary; it is done all the time and
we can scarcely help ourselves from it, we can't prevent it'
This tells us that thinking is not synonymous with what is called rational thought, it can not
be equated with reason, scienceilogið, syllogisms, the dialectic, mathematical reasoning,
critiåt tnin6ng, or the consciousnJss of coniciousness. As viølly important as reason is,
üir u ,uU-typ" ãithinking, and the weight given to it is necessarily a political consideration,
a normative^judgment. i*itt ruy more about that in a moment. For now, I simply wish to
establish that the statements: "iam tired," "angry," "eagerl' "enthusiastic," "sketching,"
;ànticlpatlng next weekend," "remembering my grandmother," or "considering a new joU'
ur. noì"r, ì-houghts of a thinker than are the thoughts "two plus two equ-als four" or the
itt""!tr, ,.qu"n.ã "it is five minutes to the nearest store," "Johnny just left for the nearest
,ior.] ttr.r"io.", "It will take Johnny at least five minutes to reach the nearest store"'
After establishing that rational thought is a sub-type of thinking, I would then.share a nor-
-ãti* ¡uog..ni*ith teachers, a fiist politics on the appropriaÞ relationship 
between this
;ub_,yp" uí¿ n" rest of thinking. Speóifically, I would argue that our j_ob as.teachers is to
f,"ip '.iuO"nt" think better in all ãreai of living, in all of their thinking. I would then define
if,iritinj U.u"r as bringing all thinking undeithe co^ntrol of reason and compassion' To be
hu1¡unl. to be able to puioneself in ihe position of others, understand how.they feel, 
and
,tui. t"ifing with them. This is what I mean by compassion. The human journey-your
piúrimmagi E.-is one of learning how to ordér thinking and thus ûo-control passions by
ih"î;;;;r of rational thought, thãt is qr reason..Therefore, what is called rational thought,
i""f"-ii"g all those familiar nãmes of syll-ogisms, logic, critical thinking' mathematics, the
Jiut"ti", äO tfre like, are the most important-ways of thinking; by learning to think reasonably,
one learns to think better, about everything'
Reenter Descartes and R.W. Emerson. Here I would re-present the twin images.of the 
pure,
irãfpi"rì, .fr.*ic, disillusioned thinker on the one hand, the rational thinfe¡ of a doubted-
ffi uniu...", aid on the other hand, the aggressive, assertive, natural thinker, R'W''s self-
retiánt thintei. Combining these two imagJs, I would suggest to teachers that they think of
,*ã."o as people whose úought is naturally confident, loud, and constant, but on the other
hand, usuaily more than hafîrong. So, the first rule of teaching must be: insist that the
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students assert their thoughs openly and constantly. Before trying to help them think well,
make the classroom safe for their thought. A human ueing tñints aboui everything; 
"u.iis a natural philosopher. But tricked þ the illusions of our sénses and the ideas äf ouip"*,
we assert in ignorance and error before learning to assert truly and well. But, no teacher
can expect the silent, seated, shut-down student to learn to assert reasonably; such silence
and non-assertion only kills the thinker even as it claims to transfer tnowleäge. The child
has to be allowed and encouraged to be exuberantly assertive in order to knõw what they
assert; otherwise they will forget what they think or reserve their thinking for other com-
pany' even as they learn to parrot official thoughts. The sequence then is ã classroom safe
for assertion, of error as often as truth; followeã by the use òf reasoning p.o."rr", to doubt
the world away, reachieving wonder; followed by the rebuilding of thã 
^world 
through the
newly learned tools of reason.
This would get us to Whitehead's truth. There is only one curriculum, life as the child ex-
periences it in the "insistent present." The teacher tãaches thinking in t"a"nittg anything,
any topic, any subject, any performance. And the context of that t"uðt,ing is t¡e ånlO t¡int-
ing in her or his insistent-present. Thinking is not a special topic, or a segmented part of
the curriculum. It is all of the curriculum and the respònsibility of every tJacher. In dance
and sport, the body thinks. In writing, the hand think;. In sciente, the eye thinks. In speak-
ing, the mouth thinks. In mathematics, the inner eye thinks. tn a sense, thinking is ail that
is øught. I am not saying here, of course, that there aien't crucial disciplin"r-.*a1fu, writing,
speaking, debating, and calculating are crucial skitls, the forms ofìhinking and ãiscoursãj
mathematics, aft, music, and science are crucial disciplines. These are irreilaceable means
to teaching the thinker to think better, and about everything.
lina]lyr following Israel Sheffler and ofcourse Socrates, I would argue that all knowledge
is self-knowledge and that each thinker educates oneself. Therefore, täching should be seen
as a process in which people ar.e heþed to exercise judgment. By exercising juà'gment, thoughs
are transferred. All we can do and best do as téachers is shãre conteñlkíowledge, fro_cedures, skills, and performances-to the accompaniment of reasons. In sharing reasons,
we allow the student to understand our assertions, both of belief and principle, unã to ¡udg"for,themselves. By thinking with people, we allow them to think with us, both'in agreement
and difference. Teaching is the sharing of worlds through co-thinking, the co-th-inking of
contemporaries who happen to be of different generations. As such, traðitions are continried,
recreated, extended, and superceded. Valued worlds are reinvented.
E., that is the gist of what I intend ûo say on March 26. Any reactions?
Your brother in thought,
Will Callender
on March fourth, I received E's response, which was lengthier and more critical than I had
gxpected. Frankly, I had anticipated a short note or approial and encourage."nì. rn. t"tt".
in total is not worth full duplication, nor is that n"."rùry here. I limit m¡7setf ø tfre sharing
of key paragraphs which bear most directly on the advice I had given ío teachers. of the
quality of that advice he says,
Perhaps' you're too nice to teachers or make too much money doing staff
development workshops to afford the cost of telling the trutrr. rein! unffiroyø
myself, I'm not burdened by a similiar deficit. The truth is that the current educa-
tiónal system is not set up to nurture thinkers. Rather, its aim is to fill positions
in the division of labor. The subject taught is given greater importance than
the learner and the job for which it is considered preparation is given more
importance than the general education, being, and citizenship of the student.
Liberal education, that is education to liberate the thinker in the person, has
lost out to vocational education, education to place the student in a job.
That is perhaps why we have this current frd toward critical thinking. To put
the case directly, teachers tend to be wrongly encouraged to teach children "how
to think" in segmented roles rather than to discover and nurture the thinker
in themselves. Children are, for example, encouraged to think rationally in
mathematical and scientific reckoning, but to obey authority when it comes
to morality, ethnicity, national conduct, sexual activity, and religion' In a kind
of switch-ón, switch-off system, rationality is sanctimoniously crowned as good
and operative in a research lab, in engineering, in computer science and in
calculãting people's profit margins and taxes, but heretical when it comes to
concepts õf-Coã, bodily urgings, and national conduct. The diffusion of cur-
riculum is not acccidental. The dominant value now is on a docile, weak, com-
pliant person-a consumer, a non-thinker-who is simultaneously a rational
crackerjack at Paid work.
But now, as always, democracy and strong institutions depend upon people -wh9
arè fully informed, reasonable, and responsible, citizens who can and do think
deeply ãbout everything, not just in narrow fields of inquiry. We need thinkers,
we need "Man Thinking."
So here is a little list of the enemies of thinking and democracy: blind trust;
obedience; fear; power; reverence; guilt; shame; manipulation; anxiety; fraud'
In short, the basiJ of compliance on which so much of nationalism, fake religion,
sales, aàvertising, and employment rests. And I should include one of the big-
gest enemies ofihinking-1¡e do it because I said itlyou owe it to me' basis
on which so much family life is organized.
So, the rediscovery of critical thinking is only a sign that even the little think-
ing required in segmented jobs is absent. well, I am here to tell the world that
yo-u 
"un't 
restore thinking without valuing the thinker. And, everything I see
iells me that in educational institutions the thinker is dead.
Will, we need revolution, not reform.
I wrote E. a short letter of appreciation, admitting also that he was still too bold and daring
for my tastes, and, yes, porrlùty my pocketbook as well. To my way of thinking, revolution
meani turning the world^ over again and reforming it. If that was what he meant, I certainly
was with hinion re-volution; it appears that real reform and revolution are the same thing'
I told him I would welcome stilianother pass of the circle on the topic of thinking when
he joined the class the following week. I warned him that the other members of the class
*.i. fnor. conservative than either of us, although I couldn't tell him in all cases what was
being conserved. I suggested bringing them in on the discussion. It can get boring talking
only to yourself' 
witrard D. callender, Jr.
Human Resource Development Department, College of Education
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Two types of thinking now dominate our culture. For purposes of public discourse objec-
iive tírinking reigns supreme. Its essential marks are reliance upon the observable, the
Áeasurable *¿ tñ" qqantifiably reliable. It seeks mathematical expression and.is satisfied
when its results can be set forttrin terms resonant with numerical calculation. Phrases such
as "ffi% of all respondents. . ." or "the correlation between median income and voter choice. . '"
ui" r"p..r"ntutive types. Its prose is flat but confident; its tone serene and unquestionable'
Most ievealing is thé fact thãt its conclusions are presented in the declarative mood so that
the ¡eader is gliven little choice in terms of reaction. A neutral display of fact-based informa-
tion is presented: reaction is neither desired nor expected'
Subjective thinking, the other dominant mode of cultural thought, is value-laden and often
ã.pfuyr the subjunðiive mood as it seeks to engage the reader's attention. Is distinguishing
feafures include hortatory appeals, emotional discourse, hyperbolic rhetoric, and often rather
shameless attempts to 
"ã¡oié, 
trap, and seduce the reader into agreement. Phrases such as
liwould that. .", ór "non" but an insensitive.. ." signal its presence. The aim of this kind of
thinking is the establishment of links of agreement, shared modes of identity and unqualified
acquiescence in the general movement of thought being presented'
Though both types of thinking have earned their place in our age, their struggle to attain
."rp"õtiu" dominance has left no clear victor. Both are useful, both will continue to be
emþloyed and each will, most assuredly, consider the other to be an inferior mode of think-
ing. fireir mutual antagonism seems inevitable and, sad to say, of not.much consequence
in-advancing the cause of civilized discourse about issues of great importance' Left to
themselves, these modes of thought can do little more than berate each other and hope that
swings in public opinion bring them into periodic favor. This state of affairs is as it should
be for neither way of thinking posseses any metaphysical ultimacy.
There is, however, another way of thinking that attaches supreme importance to.metaphysical
adequacy. I call it: normative thinking. Its place in the history of philosophy is an honored
on" ïith Pluto as its primary historical representative. In more recent times the thought of
Alfred North Whitehead Qd29;1933) can serve as an illustrious example' As I will attempt
to show, both objective and subjective thinking owe their power to this foundational way of
thinking. Normätive thinking ii ground and guaranÛee of these other secondary modes of
thought.
Normative thinking is tied to a metaphysical theory. Our first task is, therefore, to sketch
in general terms iS-major features. These principles will, in tum, reveal certain dimensions
tha"t thinking must øke account if it is to be judged an adequate portrayal of reality. Finally,
these domaiis of reality will be emplcyed to establish ttre basic criteria þ which good thinking
can be measured.
A Metaphysical Sketch. Everything that we knorv in the temporal world-is what it is because
of its relations. In fact, the reátity of m" world is grounded in relationships. One corollary
of this principle is that we cannot speak of things at all. Therefore: let us call everything
that truiy is ai event. Events come to be and perish: ttreir perishing is the birth of a f¿ct.
Facts are the touchstone of objective thinking. The coming to be of events is marked by their
internal intensity: this felt domain is the source of subjective thinking. Neither type of thinking
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concerns itself with the conditions, categories, and formal structures underlying this
metaphysical process. Normative thinking seeks to describe, explain and justifu this foun-
datioìai procóss. Its purpose is to identify and use the norms whereby this universal process
arises, eipresses itsólf, ãnd becomes an ever-advancing layer of fact in the building up of
the universe.
The temporal world is the scene of the activity of finite creatures. As finite they are deter-
minate; that is to say, they possess specific identities that are the outcome of the perspective
they employ in ordér to foCus the indeterminate nature of their environment. Events become
."ui by i"uéon of the way in which they shape the opportunities for being that are at theil
dispoÃal. What this concretely means is that every real eventlas a structure. A structure
is a way ofhaving identity anddifference together such that difference contributes to identi-
ty andidentity rãspects diff"r"nce for its contribution. In weaving difference onto identity
a structure participates in a value which then becomes a norm by which that structure can
be measureå. This participation by structures in values is at the very heart of normative think-
ing. To the degree that an event iealizes a value in its creative self-becoming, to that same
degree it can be judged as a relevant success or a disappointing failure'
Thus, when we characterize something as good, we are really noting that an eventhas establish-
ed a good way to be. Goodness is not simply a quality inherent in athing but ¡ather is an
expre-ssion of the measure to which an event has realized its ideal. We speak, therefore, of
a good basketball player as realizing to a certain degree the goodness that should be reflected
irithe event of playing basketball. Similarly, an orange is good when it matches the norms
for goodness that should be inherent in its structure.
Harmony is the term Plato uses for this process of structuring the world so th_at a single uni-
que eveni having its own subjective intensity and objective facticity comes to be. A harmony
is a good way tõ be becausè it "fîts" together the objective diversity of the.world and the
...uiiu" uniÇ of the nascent event. When, therefore, we say that something is good we are
actually remãrking on the way in which it brings together the complexity of its environment
and thð simplicit/of its aim. Every harmony is a value since it achieves a togetherness of
parts by reaion ofan ideal way to be. Ofcourse, no harmony is perfect andthere are degrees
äf success and failure in all efforts to become real. The point is human thinking can estimate
the levels of approximation to the ideal by reason of the norms it uses in making judgments.
This is the fundamental usefulness of the Platonic theory of Ideas. The Ideas are the forms
used by creatures to make real what is ideally possible for them. Normative thinking can
establish these ideals and estimate the degree to which creativity has succeeded in allowing
them to ingress into the temporal world.
We can summarize this metaphysical sketch by saying that: to be is to be a harmony. Every
harmony must exhibit rwo feãtures. It must possess complexity and simplicity. Complexity
is requiied because being is relational and the relations possible in the universe. are indefinite,
tny.iud, and inexhaustible. It must exhibit simplicity because every event is just itself; that
is"to say, every event has its own unique identity. Simplicity is theway in which the universe
.".ti*t a spócial focus in the perspèctive provided þ the aim of the event in-question' To
use ancient^but still powerful wbrds, everything that comes to be does so by solving the pro-
blem of the One and the Many. The many are respected by complexity; the one is the result
of simplicity. Still: a harmony is more than these two features since it does something unique-
it harmonizes the universe fit¡m the perspective of the event in question. A harmony, therebre,
has a third unique aspect: it creates something new The novelty that inheres in a harmony
springs from its enviiionment of what is possible for it. We have already noted this dimen-
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sion in speaking of the value which a structure seeks to 
incorporate in its coming-to-be. A
,".""rrnl harrñony maximizes that value by minimizing features irrelevant to that ideal.
Ñoirã..on' 
"un 
be completely successful since the creatures of the temporal world are finite,
*o".]n., und li.it"d instancés of creativity. We can ¡estate Plato's Form of the Good this
"ír]u','nàoãn..r 
is achieved when an event brings together in a htting way the complexity
n¡ï ".;;ir;"-ental situation under the simplicity of the value it seeks to realize and ex-
p."".î ùfr*"head's famous epigram: "the many become one and are increased by one'"
Nature is, therefore, a mixture of unity and diversity. The combination 
of these two factors
uàril, fro- o."asion of experience to óccasion but the basic format of self-creation remains
.ã"ì""r. In this way the ioregoing metaphysical sketch brings together certain universal
;;*;;, of the science of beirig: idãntity ls the ourcome of the unity impressed on the en-
;;;;;;a by its self-creative õreatures; difference is the result of that effort as seen from
;h;;;;"i"" of a judging entiry. with the mention of judgment we are in a position to
Utittg tfth metaphysics to bear upon the question of thinking'
Normative Thinking. when the level of creativity in nature reaches that of the 
human, we
ãr" 4""ü"g with an "îtity 
tttut for the most paft leacts to its environment by judging it' In
;if";;-rhË"."unts to thinking. To think is to estimate the value of what is thought about'
i¡ir ir u natural process practiõed by all humans, though obviously' t9T: do it.better than
átllers. What I wiìh to emþhasize is the valuational elemènt in thinking' This is a direct 
result
of the metaPhYsics just sketched.
Normative thinking has an obligatory value for it is demanded of temporal creatures that
ih;t|o'" to terms"with th"it pãrt, ieact to it in the present and judge its.significance for
the future. Thus, every tempoäl creature lies along a triadic time Line. The 
past, the pre-
rå",,ã"¿,tt" t tu're constitute the temporal zones of its being. For our purposes,.we arc restric-
il;;.;"dyris to the human level. In principle, however, it is possible to show how each




h terms of human æmpoìaúty thought moves through these zones in the follow-
ing manner.
The past registers its presence through feeling. we never merely react to the 
past but rather
a.""pt it p.är.n." thiough a process-of fe.li"g.iq worth. This process can be entirely con-
io.-ãi øi"r.UV we simp'iy repeat the past in ã[ its.characteristics. When this is the mode
ofìå..ption *Ë are in the iealm of ptryiical matte.r;. in effect, this is the inorganic kingdom '
ifr"r" i, a necessary obligation for^hutnans to feel their past since this region is for the most
part the ground of stabilit and order. without order no significant value can be achieved
i;;il":"ìdËr*uiio*.jup in the onrush of time' The immediate past of a human being
i, tt" UoOy with all its anteËedent states but this past also includes our culture, traditions'
uìá inrtitútions. What is important to note is that th" putt is the necessary base out 
of which
originalityandspontaneityarise.Withoutitlittleofsignificancecanoccur.
The present is the moment of original individuality, that phase of time whereby spontaneity
asserï itsetf so that genuine nouáty can come to be. Change and creativity 
is entirely due
a1t . p."r"nt and itl operation.. Th" past cannot change since it is no longer; the future
;;;;åh*g" rince it is iot yet. Only within the temporal dimension of the now does originali-
if .rr".t ii.."ff. Therefore: ior humãn beings the present is that time zone within which their
real contribution to the process of reality Jun tuk" hold. We may bring together 
the past and
Ëp.ñ in this way:'the present.feels rhe past so as to take account of tl-1.1 nou"t *ut.
iÀiírã""fty can be ai minimal as simply feeiing what was then now or as maximal as feel-
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ing the past in an entirely different way. This is what happens in a successful therapy 
pto-
g.ã-. fï" scale of noveþ is not at this moment a question. It varies from person to person
ãnd situation to situation. What matters is that deðision in the present moment alters 
the
p^uã"ãirt"i"uv lets real novelty enter the actual world. But humans are distinguished by
iheir continuity; that is to say, human beings show concern for the future. In the 
present
,-,'Àrn"n,, therefóre, there is ui*uyr th" real [resence of the future. It is this intersection of
tfr" pr"ránt and the future that mãrks the emergence of judgment' Judgment.entails a 
con-
."*'fo. th. pr"sent as it slides into the future. Normative thi¡king expresses itself most clearly
in this phase of time's development.
The futurc is the not-yet that the pfesent takes into consideration in estimating its novel reaction
to tt 
" 
p*,. In other words, humìns aim not simply at satisfaction in the present but also in
the reievant future. To be óoncerned with the future is to show concern for how 
it will be'
But to be is to be a harmony. Thus, to think about the qualityof the future.is to concern 
oneself
;fth ,h" possible harmonies emergent from those dècisions made in the present' This is a
natural act of judgment carried oui by all those conscious of the flow of time. Animals 
do
it and so do humãns. we are concerned with finding out how to do it in a good way'
Recall the situation facing each human being. The past must be faced, a unique 
self created
in ,fr" pi"r"n, und the claíms of the future must be satisfied. Effective human thinking must
"rrpr"v 
some norms by which these obligations can be satisfied. There is, thus, a 
phase of
conformation (the pasù a phase of originaiion (the present) and a phase of efftcacious satisfac-
,l* t t " n 
tuà). Witt out a way of eialuating theie.temporal phases,_ the. humSn being has
onlyìwo options. It can either'objectively irirror its past and thereby.deny the reality of
iiñ or it cån subjectively "*pr"r, 
it, being and thereby deny the past_and the tuture. Neither
solution is in accõrd wittr ttre ruU ,*".p oI nutu*l process for both distort some dimension
ãi t".po.utity. Without normrhuman judgment fails the test of adequary since it is insuffi-
"i"rtfi "quipfiø 
to estimate the range oi poisible goods. This, of course, does not stop humans
ü"À-p.**,àing without norms: 
-that 
is one measure of the decay of a culture.
There is available in the history of western philosophy a set of norms for thinking. This 
schema
is also in tune with the metaphysics we hâve skeiched. The norms are to be found in Plato's
Divided Line where he sets out both the domains of thinking and the various norms 
that
ã"""." ,rt"ir ,rccessful completion. In the_ s-ixth book of The Republic Socrates 
is at pains
i",ry a show that all thinking is not equal_but_rather congnrent with the experiences that
u." to b" thought. Thus we arrive at four levels of thinking:
1. The domain of imagination which is characterized by discrete images and opinions 
reflec-
üng t¡e seeming i-poiøn.e of such things. This is_the realm of "guesswork." One could
beîorrect, one ðould be wrong; but one wõuld never know why one was on the mark or off 
it'
2. The domain of interpretaiion which is characterized by experiential effort that 
renders
more and mgre truth aJexperience becomes funded in the history of the knower' This 
is
a realm of "know-how." As long as experience stays within its steady routine, success 
is likely'
i"r", too, the knower doe, noik'o*ïhy the truih is achieved. Rather, success comes about
as a matter of Practice.
3. The dornainof theory. within this realm, the knower is granted a certain level of univer-
,utity fo. tt.o.y seeks thL greatest stretch of application. Theory prwides a.measure of per-
manence to the effort of thi"nking. Here we are át the level of "knowing-that"' When a theory
i, i*ty tno*n, the knower knolws that this is so because the theory provides a unity of ap-
;il;,i'";;..á on principles rather than a tund of experience. Theory seeks to embody an
èxplanation for the truth of interpretation'
alJ
4. The domain of responsibility. This realm seeks to know why something is the way it
is. Furthermore in a Platonic universe, everything in some way is good. Thus, to knov', why
something is the way it is, is also to know why it is good. In other words, responsibility is
the way in which humans think so as to come into proximity with the good. Responsible
thinking "knows why" something is a good way to be.
These four domains of thinking are governed by four respective norms. The domain of im-
agination is governed by the norm of Beauty, the domain of interpretation is governed by
the norm of Tfuth, the domain of theory is governed by the norm of Unity, and the dornain
of responsiblity is governed by the norm of Goodness. Note that goodness is all through
the other domains since beauty, truth and unity are a good way for imagination, i¡terpreta-
tion and theory to be. Similarly, unity is all through truth and beauty since interpretation
and imagination require its presence. Also, a theory should manifest tmth and beauty if it
is to be both important and compelling. Truth is what is important and, therefore, the norm
of beauty is related to the domain of interpretation in the sense that whatever is truthful should
also be engaging. Finally, beauty is that norm by which the imagination presses closest to
the real because the beautiful is that which compels attention and engages us. An imaginative
entity that does not engage our consciousness is not in any important sense a success. The
very meaning of the imaginative is the arresting: beauty is the quality which engages our
attention.
These four norms-Beauty, Tiuth, Unity, Goodness-are continuous with each other and
overlap in the harmonic flow of reality that is process at its most intense. They represent
the best way to think when we are operating in the specihc domains in which they serve
as guides. Thus: when we wish to think imaginatively, a good way to think is in the most
engaging or beautiful manner. When we wish to think in an interpretative fashion, it is good
to think truthfully. When forming a theory, it is good to seek unity. Finally, when we wish
to think in the most responsible fashion, we must think of a good way to be.
The justification of normative thinking is found in its results. What is more, normative thinking
can satisfy the requirements of both objective and subjective thinking. This is because it
is wider and more foundational than either of those ways of thought. Wider because it spans
all the dimensions of time. Foundational because it supplies to those types of thought the
very norrns they use in judging themselves. In other words, subjectivity is possible because
of the norms it embodies; objectivity is possible because of its respective norms. Neither
supplies its own norms but must look to normative thinking for appropriate justification.
Equally important, normative thinking guides the four domains of human thought to their
appropriate satisfications. Imagination rests in the presence ofbeauty. Interpretation stops
at the place of truth. Speculative theory is finished when unity is achieved. Responsibility
is over when goodness is achieved. In this way, the desire of thought to be complete is mov-
ed towards its conclusion. Of course, in a process universe such completion is impossible:
totality is no goal of normative thinking. Still: some guidance has been had since the beautiful,
the true, the one and the good have received at least partial exemplification in the realm of
actuality. Specifically, those using imagination know what norm should guide their effort
if they are to seek their own and others' satisfaction. To be imaginative is to express beauty.
Anything less is unworthy of such thought. To interpret is to seek truth. Anything less is
unworthy of the interpretant's intention. To theorize is to seek unity. Anything less is not
theory. To think responsibly is to seek to manifest goodness. Anything less is not a good
way to think.
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What is important to note is this brief examination of normative thinking is that each mode
of thought is valuational for what drives it forward is the aspiration of normative ideals. Thus,
those in need of felt satisfaction strive through imagination to attain the norm of beauty. Ar-
tists do this. Those who seek concrete results strive for truth in the sense of selecting out
what is important. Scientists do this in their different disciplines. Those who strive for ex-
planatory power seek the unity of a testable theory. Philosophers should do this. Finally,
all human beings seek the Good insofar as they know it since the Good gives happiness.
Responsible thinking brings us into the presence of the good and therefore it is in human
self-interest to think responsibly.
Normative thinking is justified by its results. The following diagram sketches both the results








The Form of The Good
The Form of Unity
The Form of Truth
The Form of Beauty
Justified by
Happiness (A good way to be)
Explanatory Power
Important Results
The Feeling of Engagement
This analysis of normative thinking can be concluded by summarizing the three obligations
that time imposes upon humans in their effort to think:
Fi¡st, in feeling the past we are under the normative responsibility of faithfulness
to its experiential content. Denial will not do. Second, in our spontaneous self-
growth in the present we are under the normative responsibility to create novel
thoughts actually relevant to our existing situation. Otherwise we live in fan-
tasy.Third, in our intentional attitude towards the future we are under the nor-
mative responsibility to seek the embodied presence of Beauty, Truth, Unity
and Goodness. Otherwise we are irresponsible and unhealthy.
This last reference to health underscores what I take to be the very meaning of normative
thinking. Human health and happiness depend upon the wholeness ofour being. Thought
is one way in which that wholeness can first of all be sighted and then achieved. The demands
of time are such that a measure must be found against which the possibilities of life can
be ranked. Neither objective nor subjective thinking can locate that measure. Normative
thinking is precisely the effort to recover that measure which is appropriate to our specific,
concrete time.
If this effort to lay out the meaning and significance of normative thinking has been suc-
cessful, then a new understanding of metaphysics becomes possible. Indeed metaphysics is
abstract (which is why most people don't enjoy,it) but its aim is to shelter and protect the
concrete. Meøphysics, propeily done, elucidates the present moment in all its shining value
and all its rich potential. Thus, to think normatively is to do metaphysics. And that is a good
way for a human to be. Without such rigorous cognitive activit¡ triviality triumphs and the
power of a civilization to counteract such entropic forces shrinks. To think normatively is
to stand against the forces of decay. Nothing worthy of the human can last for long without
a measure of excellence. Such measures are to be found in the real world if normative think-
ing can be restored to its proper eminence.
Joseph Grange
Philosophy Depañment, College of Arts and Sciences
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BE.COVERING VS. RE-çQ|VERING_OR'THINKING
THROUGH' THE QUESTION'V/HAT SOCRATES BEGAN'
William J. Gavin
The overall theme of this symposium is entitled "What Socrates Began: An Examination
of the Intellect." The specific theme of this session is entitled "Promoting Thinking through
the Disciplines." I propose in my comments today to act as I believe Socrates himself might
have acted with regard to these two titles. In so doing, I hope to reveal, in an indirect way,
what I believe to be the spirit, if not the letter, of Philosophy.
How, then, would Socrates have reacted if confronted with these two themes? Hazarding
the pitfalls involved in any reconstructive analysis, I would venture to state that the very first
thing Socrates would want to do, and would want us to do, is NOT to take the meaning of
these titles for granted. The most significant item in the first title is the colon. At first glance,
it purports to indicate an answer to the questions, "What did Socrates begin?" Answer-an
examination of the intellect. But surely this is exactly what is at issue. What, if anything,
did Socrates begin? We ought, I would argue, to refrain from privileging an immediate, or
over hasty, answer to the question. We ought, in short, to avoid invoking closure by inter-
preting the very title of our symposium too simplistically.
First of all, let us recall what we know, or more important, what we don't know, about Socrates.
The man himself wrote nothing, preferring, from what we can tell, the activity of Philosophy
as engaged inquiry. We have no written words, no text of Socrates, lying around waiting to
be read off like a note from the dentist. Indeed what we know of Socrates comes from three
portraits, one by Zenophon, one by Aristophanes, and, or course, one by Plato, his disci-
ple.t It is the last that provides us with the most detailed account, but surely it is not a com-
pletely detached representâtion. It is, for example, difficult to know when Socrates is speak-
ing, and when Plato has inserted his own ideas into the character of Socrates. Even when
we leave aside the fact that there are other accounts, and the fact that Plato is not neutral,
and the fact that we cannot get at the source, but are left rather with only a "trace," with
no original recoverablef what does the portrait look like?
The portrait is, I would argue, an ironic one, complex, revealing and concealing at the same
time.3 In The Apology, Socrates first tells the 'Jury" that they will not hear any frne speeches
from him; he then proceeds to give a speech which is a model of forensic excellence; and
thirdly, the speech doesn't work.a Accused of believing in gods of his own invention instead
of the gods recognized by the state, and of corrupting the young, he reclassified the charges,
announcing that he is more concerned with old accusations that the inquires into the things
below the earth and in the sky, and, that he made the weaker argument the stronger, and
takes fees.s Having privilieged this accusation, he announces that he can't defeat it, because
he can't confront his accusers; there is, again, only a trace. When his friend Chaerephon
went to the oracle at Delphi and asked, "Is anyone wiser than Socrates?" the oracle responded,
"No one is wiser." Ignoring the ironic arnbiguity of the response, what did Socrates do next?
He tried to disprove the oracle by finding someone who was wiser than he. Or, perhaps bet-
ter, he reacted, not to the oracle but into the ambiguity of the oracle, so that the meaning
of the oracle could be constituted by his activity.6 The oracle, like the text, is ambiguous,
and within the text the portrait of Sociates is ambiguous. In the text he notes that the true
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meaning of the oracle must be that he is wisest only in this, that he now knows that he doesn't
know what he once thought he knew, whereas other people think they know but don't. what
then, did Socrates begin? Is this what he initiated-getting people to realize how little they
really knew? Was Socrates being disrespectful of the oracle in trying to disprove it, or rather
was he trying, hermeneutically, to interpret the meaning of the text (if we can call an oracle
a textx
Socrates is often claimed by various traditions in Western philosophy as being the first of
their number. Is he the first analytic thinker, and is philosophy to be primarily seen as a
form of logic? Or, is he, on the other hand, the first existentialist, exemplifying by his life
the difference between an authentic and an inauthentic existence? Between making it and
faking it? Plato himself is not overly helpful here, giving us at least two pictures of Socrates:
one tn The Phaedo, a¡d a different one in the Symposium. The Phaedo, for example, presents
Socrates as an ascetic, as rather cerebral, perhaps viewing the body as a trap, or a tomb
for the soul. However, even this dialogue has its ironic side. several so-called "proofs" for
the immortality of the soul are given, but perhaps the most important thing about them is
that they don't work. To prove that there's no such thing as a dead soul is not to pfove that
the soul exists and that it's immortall There is logic employed in this dialogue, as in all the
others, but the net effect is somewhat ironic. The result of thinking critically about the soul
is the realization that the soul cannot be caught in the snares of reason-though ironically
enough it is only through reason that we come to realize this. The thinking in The Phaedo
is rigourous, but it is also playful, in a serious, undermining sort of way. Socrates is, after
all, about to die. In this dialogue Socrates says, "those who really apply themselves in the
right way to philosophy are directly and in their own accord preparing themselves for dying
and death."8 Is this then, what Socrates began? How does one prepare for death? Death is
not an ob.ject that one can confront, and there's no guafantee that the death one decides to
await will be the one that actually shows up. Indeed one of the disclosures in the dialogue
is that we cannot wait for death per se; we can only await a particular form of death.e Socrates,
inThe Apology, and here inThe Phaedo, has decided to await, t0 attend a particular form
of death; he has through proposing free room and board as a counter-penalty, forced the
polis to either terminate him or to tolerate his questioning. True, Socrates is famous for the
idea that "the unexamined life is not worth living." But what is also the case, though often
overlooked, is that on many crucial issues, such as that of death, and of the immortality of
the soul, the questioning ends in aporia, in realizing that we don't know what we thought
we knew. If there is a hnal proof of the immortality of the soul in Tft¿ Phaedo, the proof
of the pudding is in the drinking so to speak, i.e. , in praxis, in the actual existential commit-
ment of Socrates, in his willingness to die for his beliefs, which beliefs, when subject to critical
analysis, remain open-textured, and essentially so.
In sum, I think it is important to "think through" what Socrates began, because it makes
a great deal of difference whether we see him as just a critical thinker engaged in problem
solving, or whether we realize that he is a person engaged in thinking, situated in thinking,
and not at all neutral about the outcome of the investigation. Reasoning plays an essential
role for Socrates, but it does not play the only role; it is necessary, but it is not suffrcient.
Socrates is not a disembodied or transcendental "cartesian" ego, wondering whether or not
to get involved with life. He does, indeed, stand for the spirit of free inquiry; but too often
it is assumed that the result of that inquiry will be an answer; more often than not it is simply
the reformulation of the original question at a more complicated level.
In an insightful article entitled "Teaching Critical Thinking, Part One: Are We Making Critical
MisøkeJ?", Professor Robert L sternberg suggests that what often passes for critical think-
ing differs significantly from the problems students will eventually face in the real world'
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Among Sternberg's coÍtments are the following points. First, in "the everyday world, the
first and sometimes the most difficult step in problem solving is the recognition that a pro-
blem exists... Training students to solve problems already posed for them does not train them
to find and select important problems on their own."ro Second, in "everyday problem solv-
ing it is often harder to figure out just what the problem is than to figure out how to solve
ir.'r 1 Going further, in "everyday problem solving, it is not usually clear just what inþrma-
tion will be needed to solve a given problem, nor is it always clear where the requisite inþr-
mation can be founi."tz In addition, the context of a problem is important, though usually
it is ignored. "The solutions to everyday problems depend on and interacÍ with the contexts
in which the problems are presented. Problems in books are ususally decontextualized."l3
And finally, for Sternberg, " [e]veryday problems generally have no right solution, and even
the criteriafor what constitutes a best solution are often not clear,"ra oftentimes depen-
ding as much on tacit knowledge as on formal knowledge.
It seems to me that sternberg's criticisms of critical thinking do not, I repeat do NOT, apply
to_what socrates began-but only if we take, i.e., interpret, the dialoguè correctly. plrii ór
all, socrates' procedure is to "trick" people, through questioning, inio realizing ihat a pro-
blem exists, to get them to realize that they don't know what they thought they-knew This
is therapeutic and sometimes painful. Also, as we shall see, it's io-"ti-e. dóbatable as to
what the problem really is. Secondly, although there is in some sense, progress in the dialogues,
if I'm right about socrates being wisest in knowing that he doesni kñow what he thJught
!9 kn"*, then what goes on in the dialogues is a còntinual reformulation of the problein.
This leads me to the third,. and most important poi¡t about the socratic texts, namely, the
CONTEXT of the text. who Socrates is speaking with, what the subject matter is, how a
specific dialogue ends, what socrates leaves unsaid, or says indirectly, what he argues for
existentially by his acts, his praxis, based on commitmenis which in-some respects trans-
cend the bounds of logic-all these need to be taken into consideration when wì reflect on*what Socrates began." Going further, every time we consider these texts we are actually
RE-considering them in the context of the present. we are, you and I, remembering the pasi,
but every remembering of the past is not simply a recollectión; it is also a re-MEMBERñG,
a re-structuring of the past, a re-classification of what items in the past are to be deemed
important, and of which ones are to be marginalized.
As one looks at the text of rh3..Ag.otogy, or of any other number of dialogues, it is too easy
to say, 'what is the problem?" The problem heie is impiety, or justice, ã. ,ó.*. to be the
case in Book one of rhe Republic. one can then, of course, go on to ask, ,.How does socrates
soLVE the problem? one can't, of course, get too far with this approach, for at least three
reasons. First, socrates doesn't solve the problem; he doesn't tell you in Book one of rhe
Republic what justice is. The book ends in a sense of "aporia,', of .,knowing that one doesn't
know what one thought one knew" about justice.rs Many of the dialogues ie of this nature.
Phaedo: problem-the immortality of the soul, please prove. Result: indeterminate. or take
the Meno. The problem is, is virtue teachable? Answèr-again, on the face of it, indeter-
minate. or take that most "logical" of dialogues, The pa...iid"r, where the young Soc¡ates
"learns" that "if the one is, i.e., exists, then the one is actually two, is unity and exìstence."16
Ans^we1s to these types of probìems always end in aporia in ihe texts, anã indeed they have
to, for socrates has told us that he is wiser only in that he doesn't know what he once túought
he knew.
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Second, pulling out, or privileging the surface featu¡es or the text like this ignores too much.
It ignores, for example, the fact that most of the dialogues end with a myth, or a story, or
a narrative, that myth takes place after, not before reason, or critical thinking, has done its
work, that myth becomes more and more important in the dialogues, occupying, for exam-
ple, the central pivotal section of The Republic, and the end of the dialogue.tT
Third, this approach ignores one fundamental aspect of the text, and that is, that the pro-
blem is often up for grabs. What is actually on trial in The Apology? On one level it is Socrates,
but on another level Socrates has put Athens on trial. That is, he, by his counter-proposal
of free room and board at the city's expense, has forced the Athenians to decide whether
their city can tolerate self-examination. On a third level, it is Philosophy that is on trial in
The ApologY.t8
In short, the Socratic texts are opaque, and, as such, allow for different interpretations to
arise. One can emphasize Socrates as critical thinker, but to do so ignores much of the text,
as well as subjecting Socrates to Nietzche's criticism that his (Socrates') rcasoning techni-
ques were merely a distraction, a denial of the illogical and atavistic dimensions of life.te
I'm not saying that Socrates is merely in the eye of the beholder-that we can see anything
we want in the texts. This would simply render the text superfluous. But it does seem to
me that there's more than one Socrates hiding in the text. Besides the logical Socrates, there's
the religious Socrates, the unknown Socrates referring to his unknown god; there's Socrates
the Athenian, ttre city-dweller who nonetheless goes symbolically ouside the space of Athens
to the Piraeus in The Republic, and who goes ouside the walls of the entire city in the Phaedrus,
and who suggests, at least at times (e.g., The Apology) that civil disobedience is permissi-
b1e. There is, finally, or non-finally, the ironic Socrates "laughing up his sleeve at all the
world," as Alcibiades says in the Symposium.20 These are not mutually exclusive Soc¡ates-but
I would argue that we should not succumb to a reductionism in suggesting that one specific
portrait is the basic or foundationalist one. The ambiguity or the text should be nurtured
and preserved.
Finally, what we tend to forget as we look at Socrates in the text is that he's STILL looking.
Even in The Phaedo, where he is dying, he's still trying out various hypotheses. The self
or person is not an object or billiard ball to be examined in a detached fashion. Socrates,
in brief, did not begin problem-solving. It's rather hard to say what he DID begin, but whatever
it was, he didn't finish it either. He discusses topics which are of concern-he's not neutral,
or uninvolved with them. He doesn't simply take up any topic and argue forcefu1ly or logically
for it. This tactic would place him much too close to the stance of the sophist, the group
he most distrusted, and, ironically, how he himself was perceived as by society at large. The
topics he chooses to examine are difficult ones: what is justice, what is courage, what is
impiety, what is love, is there an immortal sou1, can one prepare for death. These are again.
items of CONCERN, not intellectual crossword puzzles. And it's difficult to say what he
finds out about these topics, save, again, that a lot of people think they know a lot about
them but actually don t. But one thing that is of importance here is that he doesn't turn away
from these topics and select easier questions-questions with answers, more manageable
questions, tame questions. Because of this very refusal to turn from the unanswerable, there's
an ironic sense in which Socrates ends where he begins-with questions. He's still making
a new beginning!
Can we affo¡d to do less than Socrates here? I think not. Let us, then, in the spirit of Socrates,
make a new beginning and turn to our specific panel. The title of our particular panel discus-
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sion is "Promoting Thinking Through the Disciplines." How would Socrates react to this
more specific title? Again, I think he would want us not to uncritically accept one meaning
or definition of the term "thinking through."
At its most obvious level "thinking through" carries with it an instrumentalist connotation.
It means "thinking by means of," thinking via some tool, utilizing one approach, as oppos-
ed to another. Thus, one would promote thinking þ means of history or þ means of science,
or by means of philosophy. I do not think Socrates would have accepted this definition, mainly
because it would reduce philosophy to technique, to a "trivial pursuit," and, at least for
Socrates, philosophy was a way of life, not just an analytical tool.
In a second sense, promoting thinking through the disciplines would mean thinking
THROUGH a specific discipline to its end; to think through is to think out, to attain closure,
to reach the end, the boundary or terminus of a specific discipline. I do not believe Socrates
would have completely accepted this sense of the title of our panel either, for it connotes
the sense of completion, of covering all the content of the philosophical discipline, and for
him at least, that was something he never achieved. Even at the end, he knew that he didn't
know for sure.
There's a third sense of "promoting thinking through the disciplines," one which connotes
thinking outside of, disclosing the boundaries of, a specific discipline, indicating limitations
of any claim made within a specific discipline. To promote thinking through the disciplines
in this sense would mean weakening the supposed autonomy of a specific discipline, indicating
that no one discipline has certain and undistorted access to reality. I believe it is this third
sense of "thinking through" that is closest to the spirit of Socrates. While he used the discipline
of analytic or critical thinking at times, he did not, I believe, view the latter as sufficient.
Necessary yes, but sufficient no. Language, and is ideal form, logic, can be immensely
liberating; it can also be insulating. It becomes insulating precisely to the extent that it is
viewed as sufficient, as capable of revealing, copying, mirroring, once and for all, what is
supposedly objectively "out there," or objectively "in here," i.e., the self or subject.
Philosophy, for Socrates, is not reducible to logic or critical thinking, for the same reason
that the spirit of the law is not reducible to the letter of the lawJt namel¡ something that
is important, namely the VAGUE or MYSTERIOUS,22 is lost.
In the foregoing I have tried to be true to the spirit of Socrates. Just as he refused to take
any definition for granted, so too I have tried to give some reasons why we should not take
for granted what he began, or what "thinking through" means. My approach, as was Socrates,
is logical, but, in the last analysis, it transcends the bounds of logic. It is an interpretation*
one for which I can argue and give reasons, but not completely prove. As others have done
through time, I am trying to indicate what the problem really is, perhaps a bit more candid-
ly. and for me the problem is precisely NOT to $uccumb to a problematic analysis, but rather
to indirectly disclose, and to nurture, the polyphonic diversity of the text and the con-text,
i.e., all that goes with the text. Only in this way can we be true to the spirit of Socrates,
who in the dialogue called the Theatetus says that "this sense of wonder is the mark of the
philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin..."z: To preserve philosophy, which is
what I believe Socrates would want, we must preserve some wonder as to what Socrates
began.2a
William J. Gavin
Philosophy DeparÍment, College of Arts and Sciences
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WHAT IS THINKING? A SEARCH FOR THE
THOUGHTFUL CURRICULUM
Janice Travers
My chief questions in this paper are what is thinking and what makes for a thoughtful
classroom. I have addressed my questions to three twentieth-century philosophers: John
Dewey, Martin Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt. Each has addressed the subject of thinking
directly, and to varying degrees the work ofeach has implications for the subject ofeduca-
tion. That I have directed my questions to philosophers rather than educational psychologists
or human development theorists perhaps requires some explanation. In asking the question,
"What is thinking?", I am asking less for an operational dehnition suitable for use in classroom
and laboratory research than for some meaningful conceptual framework for using the word
itself. As such my inquiry may extend itselfbeyond the naturalism ofscience into language,
history, and philosophy.
Before outlining some possible answers to my questions, I would like to offer an explanation
for my interest in the subject of thinking. In the course of my own formal education I have
heard both students and teachers assert from time to time that an education, particularly
a university education, teaches a student "how to think." Upon reflecting on my own educa-
tion, however, I am not at all certain what knowing how to think means.
The phrase "how to think" seems highly ambiguous to me. Does it mean how to reason
toward a specific outcome, a mathematically precise answer or a technical solution that satisfies
the parameters of a problem? Does learning "how to think" mean I have learned some techni
que? Or maybe learning "how to think" means the learning of an attitude, an attitude of
questioning or doubt which demands clarification and meaning and aims at a heightened
awareness. Both explanations imply an emphasis on the word "how" in the phrase "how
to think," and both imply a certain skill or virtuosity. Still a third explanation might place
the emphasis on the word "think." And this explanation may simply mean that an education
initiates a student fully and finally into all that thinking means. ln the course of examining
the work of Dewey, Heidegger, and Arendt, I have come to believe that the last of these may
represent the best explanation and that the problem for higher education is creating the con-
ditions and the space large enough for thinking to occur.
Tâking on the task of reviewing the work of three philosophers and some implications for
education in so short a space as this paper is not cautious or wise. I have no doubt that errors
and inadequacies abound here, and I hope that they can be forgiven. But even if it is only
the erroneous here that gives us to think, something will nonetheless have been accomplished.
What Is Thinking?
In examining the work of Dewey and Heidegger, I was struck by the remarkable similarities
of some of their views. Both are concerned with the human being existing in the world. Neither
places the human being in the position of the passive observer of the world. Neither makes
the human being the subjective and willful creator of the world. Both are concerned with
the problem of time. Past, present, and future, memory and projects are features in the
philosophies ofbottr men. Both have a deep aesthetic sensibility, and both have a keen historical
awareness of the decline of Western metaphysics with the rise of Western science. On the
subject ofthinking, however, the divergence in their views becomes clearly apparent. And
it is the way each frames his question on the subject of thinking that introduces such a
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divergence. Dewey's question (1933) about thinking may be summed up as this: How do
we think in order that we may solve problems? Dewey's concern for thinking is restricted
to an epistemology or a psychology of knowledge. And knowledge for Dewey is gained in
the process of solving problems and a discovery of what works.
Heidegger, on the other hand, does not place such a restriction on the question of thinking.
His concern is for thinking in a much more basic context, that of the ontology or an account
of the Being of Dasein. "Dasein" is the not easily translatable term Heidegger applies to
the existence of the human being who must project a future in the fuI1 awareness of death.
Heidegger (1968) phrases his question about Dasein's thinking in a way that is difficult for
us to hear. "What is called thinking?" he asks, and then he rearranges the syntax of the question
in many different ways so that we are led to understand that it is a call from Being itself that
brings Dasein to think.
What Plato called "wonder" may be articulated in Heidegger's question, "Why is there
anything at all and not, rather, nothing?" (197).t This amazement at sheer Being is what
gives us pause to think, then, in Heidegger's view. The question hints at a divine mystery
at the core of thinking. It hints at something irreducible and enduring in Dasein's world.
Thinking takes on the aspect of the sacred implied in its root word "to thank." To think,
then, is to give thanks for the sheer Being of a thing (1968, p.244).
In contrast, Dewey (1933) reduces the notion ofwonder ûo "curiosity on the intellectual plane"
(pp. 37-39). This curiosity is achieved through stages of human development, the first of
which is an organic stage characterized by a vital overflow of energy which causes a child
to get into everything. The second stage, the social stage, develops under the influence of
social stimuli, and questions such as "What is that?" or "Why?" begin. The final stage of
wonder, that curiosity on the intellectual plane, can be achieved only by attaching curiosity
to more remote ends which control and bind a sequence of inquiries and observations into
what we may properly call a problem-solving sequence. Within this sequence the human
being learns to think consequentially. (Thomas Hobbes, of course said this earlieq better,
and with greater originalit¡ and much of Dewey can be read as a democratic footnote on
the Hobbesian social contract.)
The ways in which a problem may be solved are not unfamiliar to any of us. We may collect
facts, examine, test, and experiment our way to a solution and the end of a thought process.
We may develop orderly methods. We may analyze and synthesize, apply ideas, organtze
meanings into specialized concepts. We may operationalize our definitions. What all this
adds up to, ofcourse, are the methods ofscience and technology, and it is difficult to challenge
thinking in relation to the knowledge of science or technology which has achieved so much.
It would seem wiser then not to challenge, but to supplement such a conception of thinking.
In comparison with Dewey, Heidegger's atteqpts at a new philosophy of thinking may ap-
pear insipid, even mystical. (His best known American critic, Walter Kaufmann (1956) sug-
gests the adjective "pathological" (p. 39).) That Heidegger might characterize Dewey's no-
tion of thinking as inauthentic doesn't hold much sway until we are prepared to ask once
more my original question: What is thinking? This question does not ask only "What good
is thinking?," "For what might thinking be used?", or "How can thinking be improved?" Dewey
can answer each of these. But Dewey answers very few questions about the phenomenon
tThis translation is actually found as a quote in Arendt (1978, p. 145). It has been substituæd
for Krell's because of is simple elegance.
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itself or its phenomenology. And by pinning thinking to the problem of knowledge as con-
ceived in the terms of Western science, Dewey is prepared to jettison a good portion of the
phenomena we often call thinking. Of what do the phenomena consist? Daydreams, habits,
traditional beliefs, passions, imaginative flights of fancy, the stream of consciousness, and
Baconian idols might be good way of categorizing them.
What Dewey is willing to cast overboard, Heidegger is eager to gather, but it proves, however,
to be no easy task as Heidegger admits in his later work. Poetry, it appears, might offer a
way of thinking that is closest to the enduring worldly home of Dasein. Heidegger's persis-
tent theme is a line from the German poet Holderlin: "Poetically man dwells" (191, pp.
213-229). Heidegger's new philosophy becomes difficult to follow, for it takes on fewer aspects
of traditional Western philosophy. Is logic becomes less formal, more poetic as Heidegger
wanders seeking a way in language and words. His philosophy of thinking becomes less an
argument for poetic thinking than its pure demonstration in language. We cannot read Heideg-
ger with the hope that he might lead once and fo¡ all to an answer to the question of what
is thinking. The formal properties of Heideggerian thinking cannot be expressed in the abstract
categories emplt-ryed by Dewey. We can only hope to understand by listening hard to his
language which is called to things whose Being appears through the words. For example,
I{eidegger says:
The poetic character of thinking is
still veiled over.
Where it shows itself. it is for a
long time like the utopism of
a half-poetic intellect.
But poetry that thinks is in truth
the topology of Being.
The topology tells Being the
whereabouts of the actual
presence (1971, p. l2).
What Heidegger seeks is not practical knowledge, but poetic truth, or what he prefers to
call an unconcealedness. Language appears tro be a key element in this search' The "topology
of Being" is an area of revelation or an unconcealedness of a way or mode of being in the
world, and poetry can explore this topology. Heidegger is searching for a way of thinking
that finds a new opening for truth that can be found in neither Western metaphysics nor science.
It is a way that is prior even to the notions of rationality or irrationality themselves (192
p. 391). And Heidegger is prepared to abanclon a 2500 year-old tradition of thinking in order
to find a new way back to an old question.
I anr not prepared to accept fully Heidegger's i¡terpretation of authentic thinking. At bottom
I remain ambivalent toward his work. What appean at one moment to hold the most marvelous
insight descends at the next moment to the most mediocre sentimentlity as when Heidegger
'îwells poetically" (lØ1, pp. 145-161) in a world of Black Forest peasant cottages, herds
grazing at pasture, or the old bridge in Heidelberg. (Truly these are the utopisms of a half-
poetic intellect.)
And, yet, there is something compelling about Heidegger's work: something so compelling
that I (like many others) cannot resist the temptation to help find the way of thinking he seeks.
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It is a way of which Heidegger speaks time and again but never affirms as the way of think-
ing he wishes to find. It is a way that was at the outset a poetry, the original poetry of Homer.
It is not the same way of knowing as is offered by the sciences. It is, rather, a way of telling
which for Heidegger lies close to thinking. It is the way of Mnemosyne, the mother of the
muses so near toHeidegger's heart. That way, of course, is thinking historically, and what
I am suggesting is that the philosophy Heidegger seeks is a history. The new philosophy,
the new way of thinking he seeks is simply the mode or story that gathers the past and sup-
plies Dasein with a meaningful world.
And, if I may speculate my way out on this limb even further: Heidegger fails to afhrm openly
historical thought as his new philosophy, because he refuses to tell his cnvn history. The disap-
pearance of Being he mourns is only his plain refusal to respond to its call. This refusal is
what gives some of his poeticizing overtones of German nationalism without German history.
It is what gives it an unsavory reactionary and sentimental character. What is genuine in
Heidegger is the search for the meaningful philosophical alternative'
And I might add that it is perhaps only by way of historical thinking that Dewey's progressivist
notion of thinking can be made to have meaning. Active problem solving thought sequences
must have a conteit to hold an appeal for any of us. This context or historical matrix is summed
up by Dewey in his vague but crucial term, "experience." And it is out of the American ex-
pèriènce that Dewey himself poses the problem of thinking and proposes the progressive
iolution. For this reason, Dewey holds an important place in the history of ideas, and the
cosmopolitan appeal of those ideas makes sense. But in giving ourselves to thinking of our
more rècent historical experience, we may find ourselves in the strange position of thinking
toward the posing of new problems, problems that the philosopher Hans lonas (1985) views
as Faustian, problems that have arisen out of our scientific hubris and that faith in "reckon-
ing with consequences." (And we shall be truly fortunate if they can be solved.) In this thinking
Héidegger in his thoughtfully errant path has succeeded. The significance of his thinking
lies in the posing of new problems by means of a radical ontology which questions the ra-
tionality of a purely scientific reasoning'
At this point I have briefly outlined Dewey's pfescription for thinking and Heidegger's display
of thinÈing on thinking. What remains is to speak of the phenomenon of thinking as it has
appeared io those who think. Here it is Hannah Arendt who offers the re-search on the sub-
jécì with an historical examination of thinking. Her work must not, however, be confused
with what is called the history of thought or ideas, an intellectual history. Arendt's subject
is Western thinking qua thinking, not the development of ideas or knowledge.
While Heidegger, her mentor and close friend, searches in needful thought for a poetic dwell-
ing place, Arendt dwells realistically and courageously in the historical world. Unlike Heideg-
gei, she does not reject outright the whole tradition of metaphysics or science, but rather
tums some of is methods upon the tradition itself, Arendt is no Deweyan pragmatist, however.
For where Dewey makes room in his philosophy for useful truths, or what we might call
a practical faith, Arendt makes room for thinking and conscience. Arendt's historical and
púilosophical views are concrete. She has called herselfnot a philosopher, but a "p_earl fisher"
iYoung-3*"¡1 , 1982, p.95), one who searches history for a little illumination of the human
condition. In this role, she may well be remembered for delighting, surprising, and outrag-
ing her readers with the gems she has discovered.
Arendt intoduces her book, The Liþ of the Mind (198), with an explanation of the motiva-
tion behind her inquiry. Her major question is the problem of evil and the relationship it
bears to thinking. This question arose in her witnessing of the trial in Jerusalem of the Ger-
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rnan war criminal Adolf Eichmann. There Arendt was struck by the ñct that Eichmann never
appeared to think, not even when confronted with the imminence of his own execution. Not
a^siupid man, he nonetheless appeared to be utterly shallow and completely thoughtless.
Thus came Arendt's now famous phrase, "the banality of evil" (Arendt, 1964), and an in-
quiry into the relationship between thinking and evil.
As with Dewey and Heidegge¡ my discussion of Arendt's work serves only as a glance. Within
her inquiry into thinking she offers evidence of several phenomena which I shall outline here.
First, ihinking and cognition are separate faculties of the mind. Cognition or knowledge
depends on evidence of the senses and the common sense. Scientific enterprises may make
usã of thinking as a means to an end; thinking by itself, however, can never produce such
knowledge. It is simply the search for meaning.
Second, the process of thinking is invisible and occupies itself with the invisible. At the same
time, thinking presupposes speech which can make things of the appearing world a part of
the thought world via metaphor. The metaphor is a one-way bridge from the world of ap-
peu.un."i to the mind, and this linguistic bridge gives thought its feeling of reality. Those
ãf us who have had the experience of "spinning our wheels" in thought can understand the
sensuously real quality of the metaphor.
Third, since thinking by itself never attains knowledge, it runs in circles' ( prefer the image
of the Mobius strip.) It dissolves and re-forms the concepts given in metaphorical language.
All the puzzling ãuaüsms of Western metaphysics arise out of this property of thinking.
Fourth, thought in its circular course has reflexive properties so that I may think with myself
as a two-in-one engaged in soundless dialogue. This two-in-one is why I must "collect myselfl'
and "gather my thoughts" in order to end a train of thought and present myself to the world.
Finally, the guiding experience for attaining this soundless dialogue of thought is friend-
ship. We muit speak with others in order to reflect and discover that the dialogue may con-
tinùe in solitudé in the process of thinking. The important points here are that the dialogue
is carried on with others in friendship and that the dialogue remains friendly. This for Arendt
is the source of conscience, and it can be avoided only by not thinking'
Notice that the conscience or the consciousness of dialogue is not framed in Manichean terms.
It is not that struggle between good and evil that we see in a Dafff Duck cartoon where a
winged and haloed duck on one shoulder argues over and against the pitchfork waving duck
on tñe other. Nor does the conscience represent an ever-present superego with its list ofcom-
mandments. The criterion of the conscience, as Arendt describes it:
...will not be the usual rules, recognized by multitudes and agreed upon b/ socie-
ty, but whether I shall be able to live with myself in peace when the time has
.o." to think about my deeds and wo¡ds. conscience is the anticipation of
the fellow who awaits you if and when you come home (1978, p' 191)'
In Arendt's final analysis, thinking is relevant to the problem of good and evil in that.it prepares
the way for judgment. And judgment is an altogether different faculty of the mind which
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shows itself in the world as the ability to distinguish right from wrong and to act on that
distinction.
What Arendt has done, in effect, is to create a human psychology researched in the history
of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the twentieth-century existentialists. It should be
noied, tto*euer, that in this research on thinking she shows a special fondness for the
philosopher who never wrote anything, Socrates. As Arendt admits, she holds Socrates up
às an ideal type, someone who has a representatiue signihcance as a thinker It may be,
however, a wãiljustified choice precisely because, while Socrates was undeniably a thinker,
he neither wrote nor claimed to know much more ttran his own ignorance. Socrates emerges
therefore as the thinker possible in everyone who speaks. With Socrates as a model, think-
ing does not become thè property of the academy or the sciences, but a possibility for the
co,-mmunity. Its display in thô dialogue Socrates carried out with everyone he met implies
thinking's ðor¡-unul source. That we now conceive of thinking largely in its relation to cogni
tion shóws how much we are willing to forget of our cultural history'
Toward a Thoughtful Cuniculum
The scientist, the erigineer, the poet, the historian, the philosopher, and not least the citizen,
all seem to be capable of thinking. The question remains as to what relationship thinking
bears to education. That education rcsts squarely on the foundation of the social sciences
is an indication of the answer. But is the answer at all meaningful? Does the answer reflect
a thoughtful search for the meaning of education? In any adult education classroom, for ex-
ampleianswen to the question of the purpose of education are likely to be several: socializa-
tion; economic p.ogr"i.; a personal ideology of the self. And the matter is likely to be left
at that. One thing iril"ur, wã are not engaged in dialogue, and we may not be thinking mean-
ingfully at all. Èor some it may be a legitimate question to ask whether such thinking is at
alirelevant to the subject of eãucation anymore. However, now that practitioners of adult
education tend to regãrd education as the Deweyan bios, or life process, and its telos, or
purpose, rather than ai a preparation, the question appeârs to demand an answer more urgently'-Socìates 
never said, after all, that the life not spent in continuing education or group pro-
cess was not worth living.
It is not my purpose here to attempt an answer to questions so large. It is, however, my pur-
pose to raise poisibilities for dialogue. (Those who know me will recognize this as my thin-
iy veiled argument for far more attention to history and philosophy in the field of educa-
tion.) To do-so, I believe that calling certain cherished notions of the progressive classroom
into question is required. Among these are Dewey's thoughts o,n the child-centered curriculum
@wórkin, 1959). (What for puqposes of this paper will be referred to as the learner-centered
curriculum.)
Dewey's point in discussing the progressiv.e learner-centered curriculum is not that all learn-
ing shbuld be placed at the demand, whim, or desire of the learner, but that the subject must
bJtransformed to be made relevant and useful to the learner. Dewey calls this transforma-
tion of subject matter "psychologizing" (Dworkin, 1959, pp. 104-11Ð. The subject must be
psychologized to appeai tó the four-fold instincts of the human organism: communication;
à*þ."rrio.-n; making; inquiry. In psychologizing the subject matter, education 
js- converted
to the life process itself. This is why Dewey can suggest that education is a lifelong enter-
prise and not merely a matter of preparing youth. He can argue that education is thephilosophy
ãf üfe, and we might add that Dewey has given us life as a philosophy of education or
philosophy as a life of education. And Dewey calls this transformation in education
progressive.
For those of us not so privileged as Dewey 
to stand^on the outside looking in at the progress
of the human speciel lif" p;;:;;;;, rlr; qíestions of .education appear 
very different. Despite
the answer of a telos i" h;;;;gr"sË, we are still left with the nagging 
question of the
meaning of goodness, t*Ût,î"":tivi*isáom' 
justice' courage' and the ultimate question of
Being. we are left with ,h" ilil;i "i;h"iÉ 
any of these concepts can endure and resist
i;;.;;ili;;;nriuugrìt of ttie human life process for irs own sake. we are 
left with the ques-
tionsofouractions.enowearestillleftwiththequestionofhowtoprepareouryouthor
ourselves. Education *"y b;;;" ;;;wer, but it will be education whose 
wagon cannot be
hitched to the srar or progr;i, ;;it-plogi.ss is defined in 
terms other than those of educa-
tion. Progressive educatioiït un uit*i' was only a useful truth' and 
it ceases to be true
as soon ai it ceases to be useful'
Educationandthecurriculumareoursubjectshere'andnoamountofpsychologizingwill
release us from the "blig";i;;f 
thinHng atout-tttem wirh all the Socratic perplexity they
propose. Nor does it ,""rn-ìtãt tt " 
tno*î"0g" of the sciences can resolve this. We are still
in the position ot questlonlng the nature ofour 
purposes or the purpose ofour nafures' And




arsuments on the learner-;;;;;;d""*"s subject-centerãd curriculum 
to make a place for
äääî.;;ä'i.ñ;i;;;.;;"iJJgs"rl thut it is only an issue-centered 
curriculum
that can create a ptuc" ror*Jiîtåg*ì"J.ä"r.ienrious thinking toward 
the problems and
projects of education *d ü;;ï,;t other discipline for that matter. An issue, 
after all,
issomethingthatmatters,'"-'.t.i"ginquestion,somethingindispute.Itissomethingwith
public significance that ,.qîir*';;åili"';. Á; issue is "the-thing" (to use Heidegger's 
ærm)
in the space between leuin"r, and between learners and 
subjects. As such the issue calls
for dialogue, conscience,;;ãtb;t" all, thinking' An issue 
ii the complex problem that is
born out of experience,s .aïv,ìt à ronging for a 
"funrre, 
and what Arendt (1958) has termed
the human condition "f 
';;i;";ìi;" ipi' 'rs-rsrl' The resolution of real issues would give
some real definition to the word "progress"'
Ultimately,meaningfulthinkingtakï.u.Sb39\totheorisinalissue-centeredplace'therestless




This place offers neither *]"*ii" rior technological knowledge. Insæad it offers 
the expertence
of orherness with all it h;;;;iJi;;iiu"n"r. ãnd if not knoi,ledge, then at.least 
acknowledg-
mentwithinthedelicatehumanfabricofmemoryandpromise'Neither..progressive''nor
"reactionary" are teûns *ää ;ñ;tt;ppty to it'it ¡oúrney back where we 
arrive with on-
ty wtrat Soõrates began-plus a little experience'
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Halfway through an opening talk about the aims of an introductory philosophy
course, an agitated hand was raised by a student in the first row. "You propose
an endeavor to learn thinking. You intend this to be done here in the context
of a universíty-standing there in front of the class, within neat one hour and
fifieenminute tíme blocks, twice aweek, by means ofpolíte, ordered talk. This
is crazy. You should be up on îop of that desk, jumping up awl down, scream-
ing." My only reply was that screaming may take dífferent forms.r
A university, indeed any educational endeavor, exists to instigate and sustain thinking. This
is its life-giving purpose, its reason to be. Hence, it is literally a matter of life and death
that a university come to grips with what it understands by "thinking." When such inquiry
is dulled or ceases, eclucation risks abandoning any real insight into what it is about and,
thereby, relinquishes its only means of self-protection against becoming something which
it is not, in short, a dummy, a mock-up, a ptetense, a sham. Without deepening appreciation
of what it means to think, institutions of learning take to going through the motions, much
as the profoundly bored allow busyness to compensate for and ultimately supplant genuine
activity. Unless it be very careful about thinking, education can come to earn that deadly
colloquialism about pursuit of "purely academiC' matters. Poets and science-fiction thrillers
have given us fair warning concerning the night of the living dead. Growth in size, popular
support, increases in funding, complexity of operation, proliferation of programs, serv ices
and staff, may disguise but cannot guarantee educational viølity. At its ever so fragile cente¡
this vitality depends upon deepening appreciation of what thinking is.
Yet, it is precisely in education where the term is used so often that risk is greatest that "think-
ing" becomes taken for granted and thereby abused. We presume a great deal. Billions of
dollars and countless hours are given over to the cultivation of "thinking" in our schools.
We confidently persist in grading "thinking"; we praise and condemn, certifying failures
and summae cum laude. We busily devise courses, curricula and programs, designed to get
people to "think" and "think better." The operative assumption in all this activity is that
we know what we are promoting: namely, "thinking." We assume that we have a pretty sure
handle on what thinking means, even if we would be hard pressed to provide any precise
definition. Another operative assumption is that further insight into what thinking means
will essentially involve extending, elaborating and sharpening the conception of thinking
we already presuppose. We presume to be on the right track and have merely to proceed
further. In this paper, I want to examine these assumptions. I do not share the assumption
that we have any clear understanding of what thinking is. Motivating this work is the suspi-
cion that what thinking has come to mean is but a small part, far from exhausting, the nature
of this activity and that this reductive sense of thinking is responsible for much that is awful
in our lives and conduct. Furthermore, I suspect that deepening appreciation ofwhat it means
to think might entail radically unlearning the way thinking has been understood traditional-
ly. I have reached the point whe¡e it is necessary to weigh the terrible words that "what is
most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking."2 Is
to2
it possible to be full of ideas yet in a profound sense thoughtless? What must change in our
conception of thinking if our thinking is to become less awful? Finally, I want to pursue the
implication of such reflection for educational practice. . .for our self-conception of ourselves
as teachers, for the design of courses, for conduct in the classroom.
Before proceeding, I would like to try to indicate what provoked my reflection upon this topic.
It was not, first and foremost, any philosophical theory which forced the question of what
is meant by thinking. With few notable exceptions, the number of modern philosophers pro-
foundly disturbed þ what thinking has come to mean is surprisingly limited. Indeed, preoc-
cupation with philosophy more than anything else may give us the stubborn illusion that
we are thinking just because we are incessantly "philosophizing." For me, the question arose
quite unexpectedly out of my teaching experience, in particular, my experience of students
who fail courses. As I see it, students who fail courses generally fall into two, quite distinct
groups. First, there are those who are chronically unprepared for inællectual work, "students"
(in this case, the term has to be used euphemistically) who come to college semi-literate,
paralyzed by years ofboredom and mental inactivity, profoundly uninterested, seeking only
to get by and get credentialled. These I fail confidently. The second group, however, is quite
another matter. There are always a few students in a class who fail not for lack of intelligence,
preparation, or sincere desire to learn, but precisely because they are so possessed, indeed,
exceedingly so. Why should some of the best students fail? I have compiled observations
of this second group. First, they are uniformly disturbed þ the "pace" of courses. Whereas
other students enjoy or tolerate course "breadth" (often a polite way ofsaying-the frantic
and fanatical rush through great amounts ofmaterial), these students instinctively rebel. They
have the tendency to "mine" a text or an issue and will avoid or abandon searches which
are content to remain scratching the surface. Second, these students are the least grade con-
scious. In quiet displays of courage, they often refuse to turn in a paper until they can be
halfuay satisfied with what they have written. They are open to the possibility of being paralyz-
ed by a question or issue. Third, they come to the reading of texts and the discussion of topics
with real axes to grind, with definite biases. They fight texts with such vehemence that one
would think that their lives depended on it. They aren't neutral spectators and don't pretend
to be. They want their studies to speak to real, immediate, lived problems in which they
have a stake. Fourth and finally, their attitude towards the "rational, intellectual process"
is, not infrequently, suspicious, if not downright contemptuous. Faith in reason is not
something they take for granted. And, as I have come to understand, their lack of faith in
reason is why they are so often fanatically dedicated to it. One is never dedicated to something
in which one has complete confidence. These students plzzled me because their attitude
toward "thinking" was deeply disturbing. Suffice it to say that these students pushed me
to my question: why are some of the most thoughtful and sincere of students failing courses?
What do my courses have to do with instigating and sustaining thinking? Well, what is "think-
ing" to begin with?
The first task is to try to identify the conception of thinking with which we presently operate
and which we, for the most part, take for granted. I am willing to grant that there is not
one univocal conception of thinking capable of encompassing what all of us understand by
the term "thinking." What is possible, I think, is to identiff what historically has come to
be the dominant model of what we mean by thinking. That there is a dominant model or
conception of thinking is a judgment which will have to be defended. Determination of this
dominant conception occupies the initial part of this essay, for even if the traditional con-
ception of thinking may have to be unlearned, it first must be recognized and clearly
understood.
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Let me start by way of an example. Just a few minutes ago, my attention was suddenly caught
by a piece of music. For a moment I forgot what I was doing and listened' I was absorbed
Uy thä nood of sound. Then I recognized the melody and almost at the same time noticed
that I had stopped working. I became conscious of listening and soon I went back to work,
while the soñg receded into the background. The magical moment had passed.
One could give more striking examples of such an experience' We mly recall how in the
midst of a farty we sometimès seem to step outside ourselves; suddenly we are no longer
a part of thì pãrty; we have become spectators and what a moment ago seemed witty and
entertaining,ìow appears shallow and unreal. We may still be smiling, still talking in the
,u." *unnl"., but our own words sound lìollow, meaningless, almost as if we were not the
one speaking.
But let us return to the first example. At first, I was not aware of listening to the music. I
simply listened. Attention was soiompletely seized by the sound that the experience was
*u.^t"O Uy an extreme self-forgetfulness, an absence of self-consciousness. Only later, after
naming th" rong, and in naming it, becoming conscious of my listening, could I say that
I was ñstening, that there was an "I" engaged in an activity which had a^s.its.object a song'
In naming thã song, I singled it out and in so doing I became aware of its being just one
object arñong othe-rs. Mylnterest was no longer absorbed by the song alone. With this the
exierience cîanged. One aspect of this change was that I became conscious of the polar
structure of the elperience: that there was an "I" who was listening and that the music was
an object for this sub¡ect. I certainly was not aware of this in the immediate experience. There
was just the experience in its unity. Tþrms such as "I" and "music" were introduced only
in the reflectivé attempt to seize the situation. But more important is another aspect. I found
that once I had becomè aware of my listening to the music, it had lost its magic' It had ceased
to speak to me. It had lost its hold. No longer was I overwhelmed by the music and moved
to tåars. Although I still heard it, it had bècome a silent object. I found that I was rea1ly
listening only to ãtyself. Upon reflection, the experience seemed to change: it seemed strangely
monological.
Now, the intent of this example is to recall us to the onset, the irruption of reflection. It can
be studied for a preliminary grasp of what we take thinking to involve. I recognize, of course,
that trying to cåpture tfre âOven^t of reflection is a bit like trying to seize.one's shadow, in
that wlatãver is iaid ofpre-reflective experience is unavoidably influenced by the reflective
standpoint. The pre-reflèctive can be likened to one's childhood: we know we had a childhood
but ail attempts ät recalling it are from the standpoint of an adult. In considering the exam-
ple it seems that reflectioriemerges in the event when we first become self-conscious of our
àxperience. The first and foremost indication of this self-consciousness is the attempt to name
our experience. Inherent in this act of naming is the attempt to construct a mental map of
our exierience. In reflection, language is used as a tool for mapping, for the re-presentation
of our experience. Whether tanguagã is fundamentally a tool' whether language is first and
foremost a representing of expãrience are questions for subsequent examination' For the
time being, hówever, leius concentrate on thè mapping entailed in reflection. The first thing
to U" u".y""t"ur about is that no map is identical Ûo what is mapped. There must always be
a ænsion, a gap, between the two. were a map to do full justice to what is mapped, the distinc-
tion be¡veen the tt"o would collapse. A map is always an abstraction from, a highlighting
and a concealing of, what is mapped. A map calls attention to certain typological features
ofa tenitory; it"proþcts its concèm with these features þ identiffing them and by showing
ho* ttt"y ai"'tyst"mati.ully related. Furthermore, a map is created for some use' although
Àuny ¡1äp, wiil not always make immediately clear the particular use which governed their
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articulation. For instance, certain nautical maps will indicate the various depths of a body
ofwater. For anyone dependent upon the safety ofa keel, the usefulness ofthe small numbers
and squiggles is evident. A motorist's map of the same body of water, say a lake in northern
Maine, will not bother with the same information.
A map, then, involves an always partial articulation, a highlighting and simultaneously a
concealing, of certain aspects of experience. A map systematically inter-relates those ter-
ritorial features it focuses upon. Furthermore, a map implicitly or explicitly is for some use.
Going back to the original example, evidence of such mapping is wholly bound up with the
attempt to name what it was that I was listening to. In naming what I was listening to a "song,"
I frame it, I situate it within a conceptual map. The concept "song," although it does not
tell me a great deal, does articulate that what I was listening to was not a floating rabbit,
a tree in bloom or a nightmare. Another point which is evident in the example is that the
very ease with which I identified what I was listening to as "song," testifies to the fact that
in reflection, in the utilization of mental maps, most of us presuppose maps which haven't
been set forth by ourselves. Rather, we operate with mental maps which others have created.
For the most part, we simply accept and employ mental maps which others-our parents,
our teachers, our ancestors, our society and culture-have handed down to us. We are so
thoroughly inculturated into the utilization of a particular mental map that the very existence
of such a map is something which ordinarily escapes our notice. It is, indeed, easier to learn
to forget how to ride a bicycle than to seize awareness concerning the presence of our mental
map. We are habituated, perhaps the more correct word is indoctrinated, to a mental map.
To have engaged in creating even the tiniest space within this mental map, to establish or
transform the contours of our mental map, is a feat beyond the experience of most of us.
The Greeks had a word for those who undertake their own way of conceiving the world.
The word is "idiot." Our word might be "genius." The two have a lot in common.
What is generally understood as "thinking" places great emphasis upon the reflective ac-
tivity of situating what we experience within the parameters of mental maps. It is the forma-
tion of ideas or mental pictures of experience which defines thinking for us. Even this deter-
mination of thinking, however, is still too general in specifuing what thinking has come to
mean. "Thinking" connotes not only the formation of ideas, but also a precise way of inter-
relating these ideas within our mental map and the ancient word ûo describe this relating
of ideas is logic.
Logic is an extraordinarily difficult thing to define, yet it has played an enormously influen-
tial role in western culture's attempts to speciff the nature of thinking. Ask most people for
synonyms for thinking and the term "logical" will appear very high on the list of sugges-
tions. The historical roots of this position go very deep. Speaking very roughly we may say
that there are two very different views concerning the relation between thinking and logic,
each deriving from a particular stage in the development of logical theory. The first is the
Aristotelian position. Thinking, for Aristotle, was treated under the term "logic." Aristotle
regarded logic as a sort of final tribunal to which all thought must submit and to which ap-
peal can be made in order to decide what is thinking, what is rational, and what is not. Logic
endeavored to articulate the pennanent structures, the formal relations, underlying all thought
whatsoever. Logic was understood as explication of the formal structures and rules of thought
and, as such, logic assumed the mantel of the ultimate, that is, the most central and least
likely to be revised, part of the systematic conceptual structure in which reality is present
to us. Logic set forth the rules which govern inferential reasoning, the laws for uniting con-
ceptual representations.
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Since Aristotle, however, a second view has emerged which thoroughly contests the assup-
tion that logic manages to capture the structure of thinking. So, for example, modern sym-
bolic logic abandons any claim that its constructions inhere in the permanent structure of
thought itself. The pulpose of symbolic logic is not the determination or establishment of
what constitutes right thinking, but rather the creation of formal systems of implication by
means of functionally definable signs. Modern symbolic logic holds that logical method begins
with axioms, postulates and transformation rules which are in no sense necessary but that,
once adopted, determine strictly in advance what sign operations may or may not be per-
formed. What is "logical," in other words, is wholly dependent upon the particular axioms,
postulates and transformation rules, which happen to have been accepted. Logical method
demands strict consistency but logic alone is incapable of deciding which among alternative
axiomatic systems is correct or preferable. It is for this reason that a modern logician, such
as Lukasiewics in his book, Aristotle's Syllogistic From the Starulpoint of Modern Fotmal
Logic] says that the notion of formal logic as the laws of thought is a "psychologistic confu-
sion exhibiting logic in decay."t Logic is not any permanent, neutral tool by which to iden-
tify what is thinking and what is not.
The inadequacy and inappropriateness of holding up logic as the measure of thinking can
also be shown by examining what logic seeks to achieve and what, in consequence of its
goals, it overlook and avoids. The construction of logical systems is motivated by the recogni-
tion that the language we ordinarily emplcy fails to exhibit logical precision. Everyday language
is, for better or worse, filled with imprecisions, ambiguities and exceptions. In the formation
of logical systems, the effort is made to construct an artificial language which is better suited
to the demands of formal clarity, in other words, to achieve a language in which these elements
of imprecision and ambiguity are eliminated as far as is humanly possible. The task is to
construct a language of exactitude.
It is important to be mindful of what is sacrified in order to achieve such exactitude. Fûst,
logic sacrifices a great deal ofthe temporality of language. Logical propositions tend to abstract
from the time and place of the utterance, as well as the identity of the speaker. A mode of
speech modeled upon the propositions of logic will avoid reference to the historical world
and will gravitate toward the present tense of the timeless or tenseless assertion. Second,
besides excluding temporality, logic deflecs or systematically ignores other dimensions of
linguistic experience; namely, the moods and stances of the Might, Ought, Should and Would.
The interrogative, imperative and subjunctive are by-passed and the sole real focus of mean-
ingfulness is restricted to the assertive mode. To be sure, there have been attempts to design
modal logics, but these modal logics still cover the ¡ichness of linguistic possibility only
in the crudest way. Third, from the standpoint of logic, ambiguity reflects a defect in the
character of notation, an inexactitude to be remedied. For language generally, however, and
for poetic language in particular, ambiguity is a fundamental constituent of meaningfulness.
It functions for the sake of meaning, not in opposition to it. The depletion of linguistic am-
biguity serves the goal of conceptual precision but it sacrifices the plurisignative richness
of our linguistic heritage.
These comments upon logic have not tried to suggest that logic is to be rejected or discard-
ed. It is not that logic is worthless, an impediment to thought, a 2000-year old mistake, or
anything of this sort. What I have sought to undermine is the assumption that logical preci-
sion and consistency define what thinking is. Logic is an approach to thought; it is not a
privileged approach or in any way the only approach to thought.
106
Thus far, I have tried to establish that what thinking has come to mean places great emphasis
upon the dual activities of mapping and logic. These characteristics, however, are still in-
sufficient for making clear the dominant model of thinking we tend to presuppose. Since
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a particular method of thinking has assumed a
predominant role in modem culture. That method is known as the modern scientific method.
The hegemony of modern scientific method in contemporary culture is so virtually com-
plete that to call a way of thinking "unscientifiC' is tantamount to derision. The aspiration
to be scientific underlies the thinking behind our æchnology, our public policy, úe manage-
ment of organizations, and, to an enormous extent, our educational system. We are very
close to assuming that to think is to practice science. Hence, specification of the dominant
conception of thinking today entails close examination of the distinctive character of modern
science.
Hints concerning this distinctive character can be found in Galileo's claim that "the book
of nature is written in the language of mathematics" or in Kant's often-quoted statement "that
in any particular doctrine of nature only as much genuine science can be found as there is
mathematics to be found in it."5 Such quotes suggest that the fundamental character of modern
science is rooted in the mathematizing üendency of the human mind. To characterize all of
modern'scientific thought as basically "mathematical" may seem, at least at first glance,
a curious contention. In order to see why this is justified, we must try to grasp what is meant
by the term "mathematical" and how it happens that it has become the foundation of modern
scientific thought. When the term "mathematical" is used, one ordinarily associates it with
something having to do with numbe¡s. Howeveç the meaning of the term "mathematical"
cannot be taken from the science of mathematics alone because this science is only a par-
ticular form of the mathematizing power of the mind. Numbers are not identical with the
mathematical; ttrey are, rathe¡ only the most obvious instance of it. The word "mathematical"
derives from the Greek work Ta Mathemata which means "that which has been learned and
taught." At least in its Greek derivation, then, the mathematical was not confined to the science
of quantitative measurement. Ta Mathemata had the sense of something already learned,
i.e., something knovn in advance. Thus, in our daily dealing with the things of our experience,
before we can know plants or animals, we must first have a notion of "bodyliness"; before
we can know plants or animals, we must first have a notion of "plantness" and "animalness."
The mathematical is, therefore, what is known in advance of our contact with the thing.
Numbers, too, are an example of the mathematical. For example, when we see three apples
on ttre table, we recognize that there are three. But to do this we must previously have grasped
what "threeness" is in order to be able to recognize that this is an instance of it. But the
mathematical is not exhausted by the numerical, rather the mathematical is the known-in-
advance which makes knowledge of a given thing, as that kind of thing, possible.
Now, in what sense is modern scientific thought pre-eminently mathematical? The
mathematical project is a kind of ground-plan or blueprint (a map) of the structure of things
which is sketched out in advance. It is a determinate projection of what the things are which
are under consideration, a projection which opens up a domain, a conceptual space, in which
only those things may appear and only those aspects of things which are already prefigured
in the projection. In the mathematical projection there is posited in advance what things are
and how they are to be evaluated. When, for example, nature is assumed to be analyzable
in terms of what is already known, then sciences which make this assumption, become essen-
tially mathematical. When instead of presupposing the need to let nature manifest itself to
thought, nature is submitted to an interrogation in which the type of answer received is deter-
mined strictly in advance þ the conditions laid down in the questioning to which it is sub-
jected, the mathematical project is firmly underway. In the origins of modem science it is
lüt
precisely this mathematical determination of nature which is so evident. Nature, for modem
,"ien.e, i, no longer an inner capacity of a body. Nature no longer is projected as having
purporér, intentio-ns, spirit, mind, etc. Nature is simply extendedmatter in motion. Bodies
'no longe.huu" qualities beyond those projected in the mathematical projection itself. Natural
bodies are nothing but whãt they show themselves to be within this mathematically projected
realm. Their entùe mode of being, their thingness as such, is determined by space and time
determinations, masses and forces. Nature is grasped for the first time in history as something
essentially calculable and science as that which alone furnishes the key to the resoluiion
of its mystery.
The crux of these considerations is this: to the extent that we conceive thinking as mentally
mapping and logically connecting what we experience according to the modern scientific
-eihodl *" musl realize that this scientific method is not merely a neutral set of procedures
used to organize and clariff thought, rather, the modern scientific method presupposes that
a determiñate conception ôf what things are has already been opened up and established.
Modern scientific rnèthod entails that a blueprint, a conceptual map, of what things are, has
been established and accePted.
The frct that modern science operates with a mental map is nothing new; indeed the preceding
pages have contended that anttime there is thinking there is reliance upon a mental map.
Wñut ir revolutionary is that in the origin of modern science there occurred a fundamental
alteration in the status and role of the mental map' What we see happening in the rise of
modern science is not simply the emergence of a new map, but the radical assertion that
this map is the foundation òf a[ that can be known of reality. Reality become-s the picture
of it projected by the map. The map has destroyed the territory by setting itself up as deter-
minate ior whai is to count for being a thing. What cannot be established scientifically is
not knowable. The world becomes our picture of it.
Now, before you respond to this by saying that the last point is embarassingly exaggerated,
that we, 
"rp"tidly 
in education, are not nearly as confident or as mentally imperialistic as
has been impliedãnd that today there exists in education a remarkable openness to a wide
diversity of mental maps and a definite recognition that none of these maps, least of all that
of modern science, captures reality in its picture, let me ask the following questions. How
does it happen that so many eithei engage in or tolerate the transformation of nature into
a vast pile ôf resources to serve the dictates of man? How do wildernesses get transformed
into cuj¡¡ral amusement parks? How do animals by the millions get killed each,year as fod-
der to our enorïnous appetites? How do our cities become each day increasingly more like
one another? How do our universities increasingly exhibit a uniformity that is almost
unimaginable? How is it that our businesses so often manage people into an unending tread-
mill of"replaceable parts? How do the public policies of virtually all countries on.earth come
to exhibiian underlying sameness, so much io, that heated debate about alternative political
systems tends to degenãrate into an almost irrepressible yawn? Why the underlying unifor-
áityf Wny the oveiwhelming drive ûowards the manipulation,. control and exploitation of
theíorld ábout us? I have ."uóhed th" conclusion that all this exists because modem culture,
and pre-eminently the institutions of learning, succeed with a vengeance in promoting a definite
and þarticular cónception of what it means to think. We do teach thinking and 
this concep-
tion of thinking is awful. Our thinking is putting rockets on the moon, but it is also creating
a world in whiðh human survival is directly threatened. We have learned and have been taught
what it means to think in the modern world. And that thinking is killing us' If we, as educators,
deny our responsibility for the world we increasingly inhabit, I can only suggest that one
of tíre most basic things which all our so-called leaders share in common is their having
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passed through and, in many cases, stepped to the proverbial head of the class of our cur-
riculums in thinking. It is a terrible judgment to render that our conception of thinking is
killing us and it is important that this judgment be rendered carefully. I would be the last
to deny that use of the modem scientific method has not brought about discoveries for which
we should all be proud and grateful. Modern science is no Frankenstein. What is dangerous
is the assumption that modern science exhausts thinking or that modern science presents
us with an adequate picture of what thinking is. There is that danger that science becomes
mere management or even mere business, if, in its methodical procedures, science does not
keep itself open and free by continuously and originally examining its basic projection time
and again, but rather leaves this projection as it were behind itself as an unquestioned given
which does not require any further ascertainment, in order to focus exclusively on results
and their further development and application. The very success of our thinking in produc-
ing technological miracles contributes to a familiar pattern: success breeds confidence, con-
fidence breeds empire, empire breeds insolence and insolence leads to ruinnation. Avoiding
this pattern demands questioning of the mental map of modern science and, perhaps what
is more difficult, demands that we recognize and come to grips with the deep-seated emo-
tional and spiritual motivations underlying the pursuit of our conception of thinking in the
first place. Einstein once said that the disposition of the genuine scientist is most closely
linked to the attitude ofthe religious worshipper or lover. I have come to suspect that, regardless
of whether Einstein is correct, his remark is belied by the attitudes, the fundamental disposi-
tions, evidenced in a great deal of what we call thinking. Not infrequently, the desire which
motivates the pursuit of "thinking" is the desire for security. It is the desire to control, to
dominate, to master, to subdue. If this judgment seems perverse, I would ask you to con-
sider why so many of our metaphors for the activity of thinking consistently stress control,
mastery and domination. We speak of "mastering a subject matter," of "being on top of an
issue," of "conquering a problem," of "nailing a question down." The insistence of military
metaphors for our process of thinking is not accidental. "Thinking" is practiced as a war
to subjugate something to our mentral map and the process feeds upon itself. Thus, there
is a circular tie between the desire for control, advocating the adequacy of a map, and con-
finement of thinking to working within a map, fostering the dream of control. "Thinking"
really is a struggle, a struggle for security and control. Hence, we speak of 'Tefending posi-
tions," "attacking ideas," "wrestling with concepts,""devising strategies." Intellect itself is
metaphorically imaged as a weapon, often a knife, which "cuts through difficulties," "slices
up problems" and "carves out new fields." We want minds which are "sharp," which are
"at the cutting edge," which are "incisive as all hell."
What we teach as "thinking," I would like to call: "ratiocination." Ratiocination essentially
consists, as I have tried to show, in emphasizing and privileging the processes of 1) the for-
mation of ideas (mental mapping); 2) the systematic interrelating of these ideas (ogic); and
3) basic adherence to the method and framework of modern science. I would not contend
that ratiocination is always taught well; my claim is that when "thinking" is taught, it is
ratiocination which serves as its model. We school people in the formation and interrelation
of ideas. By and large, they are not initiated to the deformation, the questioning of ideas,
the imaginative generation of new ideas, the personal, emotional, emotional impulses which
are necessary to the surpassing of our ideas. We practice ratiocination as if the questioning
of fundamental assumptions, as if imagination and feeling, were not integral to the thinking
process. We deform "thinking" by pretending that ratiocination is synonymous with it.
u
"But to tear down a factory or to revolt against a governor or to avoid repair
of a motorcycle because it is a sysrem is to attack fficts rather than causes;
and as long as the attack is upon fficts, not change is possible. The true system,
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the real system, is our present construction of systematic thought itself, rutionali-
ty itself,'and if a factory is torn down but the ,rationality whích produced..it 
is
íejl ståndíng,- thàn thai rationalíty will simply produce another factory''E
Before we can uphold the dual claims that ratiocination does not exhaust thinking and that
the reduction of thinking to ratiocination produces awful consequence, the limitations of
ratiocination thinking must be clearly appreciated. The first limitation is that no map' no
matter how detailed ãnd refined, is capáble of doing justice to what is. Going back to the
earliest example: to say that I was listening to music identified what occupied my attention
as of a kind. Iì pointed out that what I wailistening to shared certain features with a whole
"ùr, 
of other particulars. Thus, when I call something "a piece of music," I am aware of
tt 
" 
lnuO"quu.y of this name: it tells me indeed that what I heard was not a stone' nof a flowef,
no, un uni*ui, but the particular ineffability of my just hearing this flow of sound is lost.
of course I may refine my language: I may say that I was listening to Mahler's Fifth sym-
phony, the third movement. I may try to turn to mofe evocative terms: that the music was
à rivéi of sadness. yet the same inadèquacy reappears. And though I can go on refining my
language, finding ever more evocative attributes, I will never find a perfect name. This ultimate
nuã.q-uá"y of aIl names and concepts is rooted in the fact that they presuppose the context
in wtrich t'hey operate; the objects àr" not ...n as they are in themselves,.but as felated to
things whicú they are not. Iä other words, the name or concept describes what I hear
not iî ltr individuãlity, its uniqueness, but in its universal aspects' as falling into a linguistic
o, .ãn."ptuut ,pu.".'Éut this irnplies that I see it as one of many possible instances of these
;;n-;"ir. The particularity and uniqueness of the music escapes me. The ideal name, that
ir,ìft" án" which would do complete justice to the intended reality, is then the one which
õ;"r no longer within the coìtext-of language, a name which is beyond all languages'
ó'"fV r*tt u nurñ", and it is evident that this implies a contradiction, could do justice to the
inefiable reality which I confront. Yet although human understanding cannot know such a
nuÃ", *" can iecognize the inadequacy of all our efforts to catch reality in the net of our
.ã".ãp,r or names."And in doing tó, *é f.." our intuition to reach the reality, of which our
unãàtitunaing has fallen short. 
"Suddenly 
the sound stands before us, not as an instance of
;;;;;;"", õr ,peci"s, but as jusr whai it is. The uniqueness,,theparticularity of that to
which'I was listéning to will forever escape the language of reflection' This is not a fault
of language, but its vãry point. The dangei arises only if and when reflection forgets itself,
forgets its limitations.
The second limitation is this: As long as I am reflectively analyz\ng something by means
of a mental map (whether that map be ñrusicology, of acoustics, history, etc.), the map 
already
pr"ruppor"r, äs'we have said, a determination of what the things are with which the map
is concerned... music as the éxpression of the life of its composer' or_ music as the formal
putt"rn or sound through time. ìn other words, the map fundamenølly opens up a sphere
åiun¿".rtun¿ing, within which things are determined as things. Reflection deals with things
ã, .ù:..tr, in oîher words, as gturf"d and fixed within the perspective, opened up by the
-up. fn" proUlem is that túe peispeitive or understanding opened up 
by the map never itself
;;;;. an object which is capable of being studied by that map. Thus, for_example, historical
."i"n." may túoroughly 
"^pl,or" 
a period in every. possible respect and yet never explore
what history is. lt cannot do so scienìifica1ly. Ratiocination presupposes the nature and origin
of its map. ieflection cannot study these maps themselves without ceasing in a certain sense
to be scientific. Science cannot sóientificalþ investigate the scientific method' 
It is an im-
possible boot-strap operation. Logic cannotiogically prove the importance ofbeing logical'
ir 1""g as thinking ii confined to-ratiocination, it must remain in the dark about the nature
and or-gin of its own maps. Another way of making this point is to say that ratiocination
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is exclusively focused on that which appears as definite and definable within one's mental
framework. Ratiocination concentrates on that which has been grasped as object. What escapes
ratiocination is twofold: first, the questionableness of these frameworks themselves and se-
cond, the reduction of what is to what is objective. Robert Piersig puts the point this way:
"at the cutting edge of time, before an object can be distinguished, there must be a kind of
non-intellectual awareness. You can't be aware that you've seen a tree until AFTER you've
seen the tree and between the instant of vision and instant of awareness there must be a time
lag. We sometimes think of that time lag as unimportant. But thereh no justification for thinking
that the time lag is unimportant, none whatsoever. The past exists only in our memories,
the future only in our plans. The present is our only reality. The tree that you are aware of
intellectually, because of that small time lag, is always in the past and therefore is always
unreal. Any intellectually conceived object is always in the past and therefore unreal. Reali-
ty is always the moment of vision BEFORE the intellectualization takes place. There is no
other reality."
Ratiocination discards the presence of this pre-reflective encounter with what is as unim-
portant. Ratiocination leaves the pre-reflective as the wholly unthought. If thinking is to
change, then return to the unthought is one ofits frrst obligations. In short, to re-determine
what thinking is, we must first determine what evokes thinking, what calls it forth, in the
first place. Encounter with what is unthought, encounter with the awesome richness of pre-
reflective experience, is, I think if we are honest with ourselves, what calls forth thinking.
The traditional conception of thinking is predicated upon thinking as the forming of represen-
tational ideas. The danger posed by this manner ofthinking is that reality gets increasingly
reduced to that which is representable. If we are not careful, the tree which is encountered
blooming in the meadow is explained and accepted as, in reality, a void, thinly sprinkled
with electric charges here and there that race hither and yon at enormous speeds. If thinking
is to change, the thing that matters first and foremost, and finally, is not to drop the tree
in bloom, but for once let it stand where it stands. If ratiocination is to be overcome as the
measure of thinking, the place to start is re-examination of the disposition which lies at the
heart of much of our reflection. It has been argued that the emotional disposition which lies
at the heart of so much of our relection is desire for security, the desire to be in control.
What seems to matter so often is managing to have the world conform to our conceptual
framework. If a metamorphosis of thinking is to occur, this disposition must be radically
undercut. Thinking must become predicated upon loving, not upon control. Thinking must
embody that attitude of love which all the great teachers of mankind, all the way back to
Plato and Christ, have insisted is the only way to salvation, which as I understand it, is the
saving our ourselves and this precious earth. The project to control and the project to love
seem to be distinguished in this: control seeks to have the other (be this other a thing or
a person) conform to one's ideas, whereas love is being mindful of the difference. The lover
respectfully inclines to the other; the seeker of control (the manager) wishes everything other
to serve his inclination. The lover is marked by rebognition of the other. The manager, on
the other hand, succeeds when the other is most completely denied, when the other has become
a factor in the process of planning, when the other has become nothing more than an exten-
sion of self.
The overcoming of ratiocination, the real possibility of a change of mind, fundamentally
involves a change of heart. To begin thinking differently entails cultivation of receptivity,
a heeding, a listening, an attending to what things convey to us' Receptivity, as I see it, is
what is so awfully lacking in ratiocination. Receptivity demands attention not to what we
already have in mind, but to the awesome presence of things, that presence to which no map
does justice. The cultivation of receptivity is impossible without long preparation; it requires
lll
schooling in the disciplines of patience, carefulness, devotion, attention to detail, 
peace of
mind, anã unhurriednèss. It seems to me that the goal of receptivity is to inculcatethe capacity
to be immersed in things. Receptivity happensihen we are bowled over by the splendor
of the simple. Only whãn *" u.. ."uily immersed in what is to be thought, can we reveal
the wondei of anyt-hing, no matter how commonplace. Only then can we avoid our habitual
ways of grasping something as it is for us-subjectively'
The alternative to ratiocination, or what I would call meditative thinking, is quite literally
and fundamentally the event of responsibility: the ability to respond. In contrast to ratiocination
which reflects upon things as they are graiped within a conceptual framework, meditative
itri"il"g is peruåded and-sustained by túe encounter with the presence of things before this
pr"r"n.". hås been made conceptualiy artic-ulate. The contrast is between a thinking about
itrings unO a thinking towards itrlngr. ttt. former presupposes that the things. about which
it tfrInrc are already grasped, the lãtter is rooted inthe recognition that what things are, the
being of things, t ätluyr what remains unthought. Meditative thinking is responsibility to
what"is untho"ught. The more original this thinking, the richer will be what is unthought in it'
It might seem that the proper name for this realization of the unthought is sheer stupidity'
But tlhis would be a mliøte. It presupposes the perspective of ratiocination within which
ihe undefined is the unimportanf. Ir¡"åitutiu. thiniing;s appeal to what has not been thought
can be dismissed only by-taking for granted the adequacy of our conceptual framework' 
In-
deed, one of the key-impulses of meditative thinking is to make possible greater openness
ãi tfróugnt ry subjeciing õonceptual frameworks to criiical questioning. Willingness 
of thought
to unOJ.go critical seiÊscrutùy, willingness to try to identify and examine the 
most basic
f."ruppõritions of our mental map, is ñrtimately à part of 
meditative thinking's cultivation
ãf ..""ptiuity. Without criticd qúestioning of our. most basic presuppositions, we cannot
hold ouïselves open to the presence of thingsì instead things are snapped up into the 
lramework
of ãu, thought without thã slightest sensã of the violenie and concealment taking place 
in
the articulat"ion. It is for this rãason, this constant suspiciousness of-one could almost say'
atonement for-our ideas, that mediâtive thinking is capable of so little progress' Meditative
tt intinj i, m.omparably poorer in what it has to oifer, if compared to ratiocination' Meditative
;ñîrË, rather than givìng, is centrally an activity.which takes away: takes away our selÊ
assurity, takes away our selËconfidence, takes away the presumption to co^ntrol. 
In meditative
ffiñÉ we become learned concerning our ignorance' Another way of putting this is that
üi" 
""rí 
rignt within which we see andionceÑe things meditative thinking puts into 
ques-
tion. Iirefises us the possibility of taking this light for granted. The spheres of reflection
*ittrin *t i"f, *" inu"rìigat" thiigs come-th"mr"l-ues to éxamination. The essence of these
spheres-history science-, u.t, r"tigion, etc, is-the concern of meditative thinking' Meditative
;ñi"ki"g is reflóction which refus'es to take the reflective standpoint for granted'
The curious title of this essay seeks to indicate the change of thinking^which, I am convinc-
ed, ,o derp"rat"ly needs to taie place in education. I have argued that ifthinkingis to become
less awfui, whaimust occur isìhe cultivation of responsibility, literally, the ability to res-
;;;Ji"ih" presence of what is and its incredible mystery. Another way of saying 
this is
ifrJ tfr" porrltitity of meditative thinking depends upon the maintenance of awe, the sus-
tuinin! oi*onO"r-*tti"tt, u, I see it, is tnãt sàte in which thinking is most receptive' Awful
tfrintiig must become aw"n t tttint i"g. There is.nothing new is this realization' Already 
Plato
unJ n.îrtott" had called attention tJthe vital importance of wonder as the state of attune-
Ã.nt to the being of things in which thinking is evoked. "For this is particularly the PATHOS
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of a philosopher, to be immersed in wonder, for there is no other beginning of philosophy
than this." The word "beginning" (Arche) means here not only the starting point, but also
that which governs, carries and pervades the entire movement of philosophical thought. Aristo-
tle said the same thing inthe Metaphysics A,2: "Through wonder men have reached now
as well as at first the determining path of philosophizing."
ilI
"It was late afiernoon and our long conversation about education was draw-
ing to a close. As he was leaving, the student stopped at the door and saidhe
wanted to leave me with a true story. 'For quite some time I worked as a mer-
chant seaman out of the South American port of Valpariso, Chile. On leave,
I used to visit a bar ín the dockside area. Avery rough spot, so rough you wouli
have trouble ímagíning. At night the police would cruise around the bars in
order to carry out the casuahies of the fighrc. Ilell, one night while I was at
this bar, a young man jumped up on top of a table and announced that he had
.just composed a poem. The whole uproarious roomfell immediately and com'
pletely silent. People hung on every word. Afier the poem, comments began,
criticisms were made, applause given, until the fighting broke out once again.
I tell you this story because in all nty schooling I never witnessed that rapt silence
in a classroom. Can you tell me whyT Are we unprepared for the urgency of
listening? Or have we come to expect that so little is really being said?" t
In the final section of this paper, I want to trace out some of the practical implications of
this change of thinking for educational conduct. The first implication is need for a fundamental
re-examination of what is meant by teaching. As long as meditative thinking is not grasped
as essential, then the teacher can be considered a dispenser of knowledge, a manager of in-
formation, a disciplinarian. All functions, it should be noted, which increasingly can be per-
formed by clever machines. But if thinking be meditative, then the teacher is the irrevocable
learner, not merely a fellow learner, but the learner par excellence. Teaching is even more
difficult than learning, because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The teacher is
ahead of students in this alone: that he/she has still far more to learn than they-he/she has
to leam to let them learn. The teache! therefore, is far less assured ofhis/her ground than
those who learn are of theirs. Hence, if the relation between the teacher and øught is ge-
nuine, there is never any place in it for the authority of the know-it-all or the authoritative
sway ofthe official. For the teacher is marked by reverence for the questionable; ttre inclina-
tion to teach is the bent, not towards what has been said and clarified, but towards what re-
mains unspoken and concealed. The teacher, as irrevocable learner, is, above all, mindful
ofwhat has withdrawn, what has been left out, what has been overlooked and unheard, in
all the talk. Indeed, the gift of teaching is ability to recall oneself and others to memory
of the unthought. This is but another way of saying: the teacher is the provocateur of wonder.
Mindfulness of what is unthought. unapparent. is what calls thinking forth in the first place.
The one supreme obligation of the teacher is to be a brilliant midwife, delivering us to wonder.
From this understanding ofteaching a number of suggestions can be drawn concerning how
such teaching is put into practice. These suggestions, I believe, run counter to general
pedagogical conduct. My list does not pretend to be complete and my effort to formulate
them into somewhat pithy maxims is motivated only by the desire to stake out a few signposts
and not to contribute to the illusion that learning any set of maxims can a teacher make.
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Ð THE SUBORDINATION OF TEACHING TO LEARNING. The last thing a student is
prepared for is teaching in the sense previously discussed. Students are used to being given
maps, expected to learn maps and repeat these maps when called upon. If they have been
in éducatìon long enough, students instinctively look to the funny creature at the head of
the class to provide sucñ maps. Students expect that teachers know more and are habituated
to classes largely occupied with teachers trying to demonstrate this fact abundantly. Not on-
ly is this the ðxpectation of students, but, on the part of educators, this is often a very seduc-
tive, gratiffing role to perform, to which they are only too willing to accede. The role of
the knowledgeable expert provides enofrnous amount of ego-satisfaction. In the vast ma-
jority ofclasies, the tèacher is literally and figuratively the center ofa1l attention and con-
itaniy looked up to. In my own experience as a teacher, I know that for quite some years
whati was essentially doing in the classroom was proving myself, showing to a receptive
audience (or at least an audience well schooled in disguising boredom) that I richly deserv-
ed the position of being listened to constantly. Their test was to see if they could show me
that they had learned what I had learned. Schools æach one to imitate. In college, it is slightly
more sophisticated: one is supposed to imitate the teacher in such a way as to convince the
teacher that one isn't imitating.
A teacher matures, I hold, essentially with the realization that one is not in the classroom
for oneself. Proving one's brilliance in the eyes of students only too willing to be dazzled
by others' brilliance is but a crude form of self-absorption and aggrandizement. This insight
is useless unless it ripples into some of the deadly truisms, the conventional baggage, con-
cerning how to teacli effectively. I had been schooled, for example, to the idea that course
planniig is one ofthe essential keys to good teaching. Surely, there is a sense in which this
ir.o.r"õt, if by "planning" is meant intense involvement in the questions raised by a course,
intense imaginative effort to situate ourselves in the position of students fìrst encountering
such questiõns and great care in the manner in which questions are unfolded. Unfortunate-
ly, course planning is often conceived quite differently from this and amounts, instead, to
tüe formation of a highly articulate syllabus and the extremely detailed elaboration of how
this syllabus will be ðxecuted. In other words, course planning bec-omes synonymous with
the imposition of a very rigid, pre-determined framework. One of the hardest lessons for
me to lèarn has been the abandonment of planning in the current sense makes for better leam-
ing. Course-planning, as we commit it, is a sure-fire device for foreclosing any element
oñurprise, sieadfastþ avoiding the possibility of anything emerging in the classroom which
is uncãlculated or noi in the prepared text. It is part and parcel ofthe project ofcontrol and
teaches students an unforgettable pedagogical lesson: that they must learn to be obedient.
Education, as we know it, is organized by discipline in all senses of the term, not the least
of which is training to obeY.
2) THE AWAKENING OF CARE. Whatever the ostensible title and subject matter of a course,
túe real, hidden educational agenda should always be the same: the learning of thinking.
Yet no one starts out caring about thinkingper se. Rather, care emerges out of very con-
crete, personal concern wiih particular things. I start caring about why the mugo pine in
the baôkyard is wilting, or why my son is frustrated with his forehand volley, or why Kafka
excises drese particulãr wordi from his novel. To come to care about thinking, the issue of
thinking musi first engage in the context of caring about some very definite, usually per-
sonal, things.
Of paramount importance, then, is that education operate from the insight that the first and
prl-ury teaching task is to get students to OrüN a problem. Whatever the problem, it must
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be thoroughly appropriated. owning problems means not only that problems must be quite
definite and specific, but also that the problems be presented such that students are provok-
ed into personal response. The "academic" versus "non-academic" distinction must begin
to collapse. Whereas students' non-academic life is a felt life and their academic life is feil-
ing deprived, this dualism between living and thinking must be undermined. ln the problems
they are asked to face, students must have the problems take life within them. In the pro-
blems they must come to have a stake. The observant teacher knows precisely when the pro-
blem has hit home: voices take on intensity, bodies hunch forward, laughter .omes close
to tears, hands stop getting raised and impromptu harangues begin, desks start getting
thoroughly deranged. care is the key. If one comes to care about a particular problem, theñ
one inevitably will care about the thinking with which the problem is addressed. Now, I
admit that care is not something which can be imparted or conveyed into another. The most
thatis possible is that problems are posed such that the opportunity to care is utterly available.
Students learn to care more deeply in witnessing the care of the teacher.
This essay has tried to raise the question of what is meant by thinking. In the guise of a con-
clusion, let me say this. This essay has tried to highlight the importance of oui way of think-
ing and the need to question the way of thinking predominantly emphasized in educational
practice. If a way of thinking has such power, then its danger, its threat, to us is evident.
Political propagandists and advertisers have realized the connection between thinking and
control far more acutely than many of us. control the way in which people think anã you
control their lives. The submission of people requires no great armies or police; submission
is_far more effectively brought about through the subtle maintenance ofã way of thinking.
The best strategy to get people into jail is to structure their thinking so they ãre convincJd
there aren't any jails. Give people their ideas and they are yours. whereas physical coercion
is easily recognizable and, therefore, can incite opposition and proûest, the violence of a
way of conceiving things is hardly noticeable. One implication of this insight is the extent
to which enormously destructive actions and policies can be unintentional, fostered not by
a desire to hurt but by unquestioned acceptance of the way of thinking churning out these
actions and policies. In other words, the manipulation of people through disciplining their
way of thinking may not even be malicious and this is more dangerous and disturbing than
willful criminality. The worst manipulation takes place when the manipulation goes
unrecognized both by the manipulator and the manipulated. Hannah Arendt, in her bóok,
Eichmann in Jerusalem, developed this theme of the banality of evil. My essay has address-
ed the same theme from the other side; namely, the evil of banality, where banality fun-
damentally involves complacency about what it means to think.
we can be held captive by a way of thinking...a theme as old as plato's myth of the cave.
we recognize this possibility when, in colloquial language, we speak of "tunnel vision" or
"the one-track mind." Tunnel vision is easiest to recognize and criticize in others; it is ex-
tremely difficult to recognize in oneself. But when a way of thinking has become collective,
the questioning of the obvious seems an idiotic onterprise. In a world where ratiocination
has a powerful upperhand, thinking rooted in wonder is not only an awesome responsibility,
but a dreadfully frightening experience. To open students to the possibility of awè in a world
terribly busy in oppressing such thought, to nourish the possibiiity of oui responding to the
world, is one of the ways in which screaming may take different forms.
Jeremiah P Conway
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TEACHING SCIENCE AS A MODE OF THINKING
Gale Rhodes
Robert Schaible
The most difficult concept in science is science itself. The most challenging task of instruc-
tion is to depict science aì a dynamic process rather than a static body of knowledge. Those
who teach ,.i.n.. or other diiciplinei that treat science's history, sociology, or philosophy
can greatly enhance student undèrstanding of this process and of scientific thinking if they
makã careful use of three terms that scientists use frequently, but often too carelessly. These
three terms are fact (or datum, the result of an observation or measurement), law (a descrip-
iiãn oiu putt".n or tiend in the facts), and theory (an attempt to explain-why th.e^.laws hold).
Each ter;, when used as defined here, illuminates a specific aspect^of scientific thinking'
ny uring túese terms thoughtfully in categoizing different aspects of scientific knowledge,
iti" t.u.t.t can depict scie-nce as ã form of thinking that gradually leads to a. more coherent'
consistent, and cornprehensive picture of nature. Such an approach can help the student to
understand why scientific truth changes or evolves'
In this paper, we will define these three terms thoroughly, discuss the aspects of scientific
ittoultri tËut ittey illuminate, and give examples of them in widely taught scientific concepts'
W" tíilf also suggest that th" typ.i of thinking revealed in scientific facts, laws, and theories
have at least ro-u-gh parallels in literature, and that consideration of these para1le1s can be
usen t to studentitaking courses in both science and literature and seeing no significant con-
nections between them.
If you treat science in any facet of your own teaching, we encourage you to consider the ad-
uìíàg"t of O"nning and using th"rê t"rmt as we suggest; if you use these terms consistently,
u, à"finø n"r", yoi will be g-uiding your students toward a better understanding of scientific
tft""gttt, of the process thaimakei-a unity of the contradictions between what you taught
tast ieai and whit you teach this year. In áddition, an appreciation of the-parallels 
we will
ãiu* fnlgfr, ufro, by revealing a kinship between scientific and literary thinking, help to alter
u .o*ãn misconception oi sciencei that it is a source of absolute, unquestionable truth'
Our view emphasizeô that scientific, like literary, knowledge is notabsolute, that both fields
are human activities, carried out by fallible men and women facing inscrutable reality'
First, fact. A fact, or a datum, is the result of a measurement or observation' If we measure
th" pi"r.u." ofa certain mass ofa gas, like air, and record our reading ofthe p¡essure gauge,
iiis'tt en a fact that this gas, under the specified conditions, exerts such-and-such a pressure
(Figure 1). Theories pott.rt ¡uo aspects that are too often overlooked. One is that each fact,
to t" .oÁpt"p, ru.i ir,.lud" a detailed description of how it was obtained, or mofe to the
poin,, fro* it côuld be obtained again-checked, that is. So the conditions of the measure-
,n"nt, in"lrding all factors-the teÃperature, for instance-that are known to affect the result,
must be includid if we are to know the fact completely. The second aspect, cfucial to our
understanding of the fact, is a statement of its unìertainty: just how accurately, or to what
;;.il;, doïe know it. An engineer would call it the tolerance in the measurement' "The
;;;;;;;; is DJ pounds p". ,q.úr" inch, plus or minus 1.1 pounds." Erøery scientific fact
wears this halo of uncertainty about it, and we simply do not know what we know if the






















































change. An essential part of every scientific law is a statement of its range of applicability,
and we simply do not know what we know if the range of our law is concealed from us.
We seek laws that reach as far as possible, but as always in science, we'll take whatever we
can get, for laws are enormously useful and practical. They let us predict. If we want to
design a tank to hold a gas, we can use this law to help us design the tank so that it will
not burst when a certain volume of gas is squeezed into the smaller volume of the tank, the
pressure of the gas, predictably, increasing.
So a law describes a trend or pattern in the facts, often in the form of an equation. The sim-
ple recognition of such a pattefn is useful; with this knowledge, we can know the results
of experiments untried, and we can recognize some of the potential for danger in a new design.
To understand the nature of scientific law is to understand an important aspect of scientific
thinking, to which much of science's predictive power is harnessed.
While we are using the laws to gauge our expectations, we tend, as we do with facts, to look
beyond them, this time asking, "Why? Why do the laws hold?" For a few centuries now,
we have assumed that such queries are answered by descriptions ofunderlying of prior con-
ditions. When we ask why the gas pressure increases as we decrease the gas volume, we
are asking for a theory. A theory is an attempt to explain why the laws hold, why the facts
fall out in some sort of orderly way. In effect, we are asking, "How does this behavior il-
luminate the underlying nature of the gas?" or "What is a gas, that it should increase its
pressure when we decrease its volume?"
There are two aspects of theories that are too often forgotten. First, the answer, the theory,
will be tentative, for we are asking how the unseen gives rise to the seen. Second, to be useful,
that is, to advance our understanding, the theory must be testable: \¡r'e must be able to look
for the entities or effects we use to explain the laws. Otherwise, we have no basis for developing
any confidence that our explanation is reasonable.
The most successful theory of gas behavior asserts that a gas is composed of many tiny par-
ticles moving at great speeds, colliding with perfect elasticity with each other and with the
walls of their container. In this view, the pressure that causes the gauge to show its reading,
or the pressure that stretches the skin of a balloon, is the constant rat-a-tat of these particles
against the barrier that encloses them. If the volume of the container is decreased, these
particles will strike the walls (and the pressure detector) more frequently, and thus exert
a higher pressure (Figure 4). This theory provides an explanation for the gas's lawful behavior.
Scientists did not spring immediately for the nonintuitive notion that these collisions should
be perfectly elastic; after all, we do not see this perfection is everyday collisions. But the
gas pressure persists, so the particles are not gradually running down. The idea that the col-
lisions are elastic is forced on us þ the facts,4nd laws. Each element of the theory is necessary.
We want to explain as much as possible in as few words-so to speak; actually with as few
assumptions, as few hypothesized entities and effects-as possible, and we want to be able
to test those assumptions. The goal here is understanding, which can give us greater predic-
tive power than we can get from laws. From laws we can predict facts, but from theories,
we can predict laws: we can anticipate patterns or trends we have not yet recognized in the
facts. If we find these patterns, we look upon our theory with increased confidence.
So the theorist attempts to deepen her or his understanding of nature by formulating a
mechanism that explains why nature behaves the way it does. A good explanation is one
that postulates underlying entities or effects that we can actively seek in order to see ifthe
explanation is valid. The theorist's ultimate quesion is "What is reality that we should find
t2t
Fig¡irË 4
these consistencies (laws) in it?" The authors believe that our only basis 
for confidence in
,i;;";**";r to these questions lies in the coherence' consistency, and comprehensiveness
;¡ th";àifi." built of àur f;;, i;*r, and theories. There are no answers in the back of the
book of nature. When we seaich nature scientifically, we do not 
reveal naked realit¡ any
more than when we search our souls for the answer to a moral question. 
ln both cases, all
we can do is ask whether ,tr" unr*", seems fitting. To understand the nature of 
theory is
to understand un i.po.tuntä.pe"ioiscl"ntiti" thintng, one that more than 
any other reveals
;h";;t";; and the iimitations of this powertul but human mode of inquiry'
you should note that each of these elements of science has its own logical 
form. A fact says
that a measurement, madeln a specified manner, and with a specified 
precision, gives a
ouitilufu,. result. A tu* i, u à.r.tìption ofa trend or pattern in the.facts' A theory 
is an at-
ä;ì ;;ñi;in *ty tr," laws hold. A result of measuremenr, a description ol.a pattern,
an explanation of the patte;;b cause; each has a different :tructure'-:o-jley^are 
not inter-
"t 
ung'"u6". A law doós not become a fact, no matter what its range or 
precision. A theory
doesîot become a law or a fact, no matter how great our confidence 
in its explanatory power'
Even if in some manner *ã "åurJp.ue 
the tieory correct, if we could demonstrate that
ã"t 
"-pf*"ti""is 
valid, it is still noi, 6' th" dtfinitions used here' a fact' A theory 
possesses
a different kind of logical ;;;t";. it'an ¿oe* a fact' We might say that whether a scientific
statement is a fact, law, or theory depends as much on its form as on 
its content'
we promised to use these matters to draw some approximate 
parallels between the activities
ofscienceandliterature.ourcommentsherearemeanttobesuggestiveonly,andtohelp
students find bridges between what must seem completely disparate 
activities' our search
"flr;;;ãbi., 
therãfore, fo"urå, not on the rigors of receniliterary theory or the 
philosophy
;ïJi;;, úut rather on ttr".or. available ñratters that might draw students to science and
literature in the first ptuc"i to *"i"nce, a desire to understand nature 
and their place in it;
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to literature, a desire to understand themselves and their relationship to others and to the
wider cosmos.
Consider the scientist's search for explanations. There must be some parallel search that
we all make when approaching a work of literature, a work that is, in the widest point of
view, as much a partäf nature a-s are the spider's web and the beaver's dam. Thking the terms
p;;;ifiy u, *" îruu" defined them, let ui use Walt Whitman's poem, Song of Myself' tn il-
iustrate the parallels (See Whitman, 1959).
we would say that the primary facts of the poem are the individual words; the groups of
words forming distinct irnages, perceptions, ànd ideas; and the sounds and rhythms produc-
ed by these wîrds. Thus, úe frrst wõrd in the poem, "I," is a fact of the poem. The first
.o.irf"t" idea expressed, "I celebrate myself," is equally a fact of the poem. From section
2, suïh phrases aä ',the smoke of my own breath," "rhe snift of green leaves and dry leaves,"
un¿ ,,tnå feeling of health," u.ong many others, are also facts. The reade¡ then, is faced
iirst with these þarticular entities, the facts of the matter. He observes and 
takes the measure
of these facts with the instruments of eyes, ears, and mind'
If called upon to provide a detailed description of how each fact was discerned, the reader
*out¿ ttuuè to ,*pluin the definitions and ìmplications of each word, the grammatical and
ry;tu;ti. relationships within each significani word group, and the influence of his own ex-
p*i.n"" on ttr" words and ideas beforã him. So any fact of literature, like any fact of science,
iuears a hato of uncertainty simply because every substantive word has more than one defini
tion, eacn of which has itr 
"omitóm"nt 
of impliôations, and the complete measuring of each
fact must take into consideration ttt" ittflu.n." of neighboring facts and the reader's experience'
Such halos notwithstanding, the reader can estabiish, with reasonable precision, the facts
of the poem.
Simply observing the facts, however, is usually no more satisfying in literature than it is in
s"i"nc". The reaãer will try to make sense of the poem, to find trends or patterns among
the numerous verbal and.åntory facts. In short, the perceptive reader will seek an inter-
pretation of the poem; and this interpretation is, _in our view, lawlike. 
Without such an in-
Ëf."tution, which must span the wñole work, the isolated facts of ,long of Myself do not
"tti".r; 
indóed, many of them clash with each other in a chaos of contradictions' For in-
stance, Whitman's uies of the words "I" and "self ' seem at first quite quzl]ing. Studells
often say that the poet must be disgustingly arrogant to "celebrate and sing" himself with
such assertions as
...I am silent, and go bathe and admire myself' (Section 3)
...I find no sweeter fat than sticks to my ownbones' (20)
Divine am I inside and out...(24)
If I worship one thing more than another it shall be the spread of my own body
or any part of it'..(24)
I dote on myself, there is that lot of me and all so luscious"'(24)
...And nothing, not God, is greater to one than one's self is"'(48)
...Nor do I understand who there can be more wonderful than myself. (48)
But students frequently find other passages that are inconsistent with this notion of an
egotistical Poet:
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What is commonest' cheapest, nearest' easiest' is Me"'(14)
I am...a learner with the simplest,"', A novice"'(16)
Whoever degrades another degrades me"'(24)
...I project my hat, sit shame-faced, and beg' (37)
...If you want me again look for me under your boot-soles' 
(52)
Thesetwosetsofliteraryfactsseemcontradictory,butthecontradictioncanberesolved
if ..I,, and ..self 
, are interpi"iø i" Á"", ,omething larser. something broader. than the 
per-
sonal self. If the reader de-*il., trt^, ,rte self of ihe piem means a universal 
self in which
all matter and mind partatel^;il; th;;; t;"tradictory pu"ug"' cgheyt 
a¡! the,reader moves
toward a consistent interpre;tion of the poem. Because 
developing this interpreøtton means
finding a panern in th" fr";ì;;ärl'iniug.r, un¿ so forth) of the po.n', 
its discovery is at
least somewhat like the oiià".îor " 
krw. The reader checks the interpretation for con-
sistency and range, ¡"rt u"äätåä;il;;;l" 'he 
law' before he or she iscontent with it'
For example, the reader *ü-f"-;;;;itially on the top set of quotations above 
might well
form an interpretation ,h.;;;ï; celebrátes lF l"i of ego-centered 
hero that intellec-
tually aspiring ,oprto*or.r'uîJrã"ä"ã rtt irtt reoo l¡n 
the põpular novels of Ayn Rand' As
our hypothetical reader tests'tiris interpretatior a^gainst 
otñei facts in the poem' however'
he or she will soon dis"ou"-.ìt. ii-iøtion* und be fórced to revise 
it in order to make it com-
patible with the wider ,""; o; i;;;;. +he reader is tnen aúte m approach a^new 
and difhcult
oassase with a measure ot5;;åffi Ñ;;ii* .*¡¿.*e thaiihe new 
facts willconform
in ,oã. manner to the established interpretation'
Ifttreinærpretationofthepoemisinsomerespectsparalleltoalaw,whatisleftinliterature
to equate with theory in scilence? In science the theory 
reflects our quest to understand nature'
In approaching literature, îJ-s;"k;;;t" personaf understanding: of ourselves 
in relation
to others as well as to trr" .orÃãr tttut housei us. ln science, 
the theory is an attempt to answer
the question, "What is *;liti#tlt; þws,str.ouro hold?" In 
literature' we may stâte the
question this way: "W¡uil. tu,nun reality that our interpretation of this 
poem should (or
s.tt."iäir"ïi'otü"ii""," ,r,.ì ;;iî,y il ,h;''seem fittins to us?" It is our theory of this human
reality whichdetermines whether the poemmoves 
u" and seems valid and fitting' If, for
example, our theory ot rr"ii v i.'ãn"'ài ia¿icat mat"riuiirrn or radical 
behaviourism, we will
most likely be unmoved ü'í# ;iil ;. 
'n"J-i" 
wrtit an's poem. If, on the other hand ,
our rheory of realiry t"d.J¿, ,h;ä"biit,ñf " 
;;""r*dent unity-individual to individual'
non-life to life, life to mind, mind to something greater, 
then we iind thatthe poem is fitting'
thar its fact and laws ,d;;;i h ;rr undersîa-nding óf hu*un reality. 
In either case' just
as the scientist chect<s his theory against the data, 
we tÉst our understanding (theory) of human
reality against the lâcts ""å-lu*t 
3i ft" poem, lookine for coherence, consistency' and com-
prehensiveness. When *"ìã not ¡nOìhese attributõs, we either reject.the 
poem and turn
to another ser of facts (.";th;.;;;i amenaUte to a different interpretation; 
or, if the poem
is compelling enough. *" '"toit'iO"'and 
perhaps modify our theory; that is' we revise our
understanding "f 
rlr" huj;;';;;iã-in tn. ru"" ôf tt".utú.. that is suffrciently compelling'
Webelievethatanimportantelementinthehumansearchisthequestforunderstanding.
In the natural *o¡¿, *" ur't, 
iil¡tái'i, t"urlry that nature's laws should hold?" More per-
sonally, but still scientificalli, we ask, "Wnai am f , itrat 
nature's laws should apply to me?"
rn literature, *" u*L ir,*,Jíå,t:'ù;ä h;;;rìi;vti' or "who am I, 
that experience' in-
ã"åG tn" .*perience of literature, moves me as it does?"
Tosummarize:thescientificfacthasatleastaroughparallelinthephysical.work,theprinted
symbols, of literature; th" 1.*,;;;;gh farallel in utiint"rpr"tution 
ôr tne titerary work; the
a4
theory a rough parallel in the reader's vision of why the work is fitting in the light of human
experience. All the activity of the human intellect grows out of the same organ, the brain,
and its interaction with the world. Vy'e serve students well if we suggest to them that there
must therefore be deep and interesting parallels that span even the widest gaps of our
knowledge, and that reveal the wholeness of humanity's collective vision.
We conclude with another examination of logical form, this time the form or construction
of these questions that theory purports to answer. We did not first find this formulation in
science, but rather in quite well-known and beautiful literature, and it seems quite naturally
to fit science also. The form is that of the Psalmist's question @salm 8:4), "What is man,
that Thou are mindful of him?" The Psalmist (probably David) believes, on evidence from
the particulars and trends (facts and laws) of his own life, that his God is aware of us; in
fact he goes on the assert (an assertion at which today's environmentalists blanch) that God
has set us just below the angels, and given in dominion over all the earth. To the Psalmist,
the facts of life cohere in the patterns of his God's intervention. But then the Psalmist, no
doubt a theorist, compares humanity with all the seemingly more spectacular wonders of
God's heavens, and muses, "What do these signs, implying that God is mindful of me, tell
me about myselfl" or "Who am I that God should care?" Whether we believe as the Psalmist
does or not, we cannot miss here that the Psalmist is inviting us to seek an explanation for
life's patterns, to theorize, and thereby to enter into the powerful mode of thought through
which science commands nature, and we command our own lives.
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CRITICAL THINKING AND THE REAL WORLDS: THE
USM SUMMER INSTITUTE EXPERIENCE
Slawomir Grzelkowski
Mark Hineline
I. Introduction-Teaching and Learning of Critical Thinking
In recent years, a flurry ofnational reports has described an apparent malaise 
in.the American
,yrì"r, ãíp"Uiic educätion. ApropoÂ of these r?orp, declining levels of students' abilities
to .,think critically" fruu" b"en identified as a d-ominant manifest¿tion of a 
larger crisis of
ã"¿iå".rty in education. The result, notes an expert in the field, is that "probably 
never
u.ror" in íh" hirtory of educational practice has there been a greater push to teach 
child¡en
. it i"t.ii i""lly;' isternberg, 1g85å p. 194)_ In this paper we discuss the design, *!t-"::î:
ãrø", 
""0 
evalúation of an ãducational activity which might be interpreted as an 
entry ln
tf," ãiåiàrn"rtion"d "purh; to teach critical thinking. We say "interpreted" 
because the ac-
tivity was not specifically conceived in this way'
Although the design for the activity is borrowed.directly from.the literature 
on critical
ttintinË-rp".ificãtty, Robert Sternberg's (1985a) "Critical Thinking-Are We Making
Critical Mistakes?'-and while, in hindsigút, we recognized several affinities 
with other critical
thinking progra*., ft," r..¡ìãi[y er,"i,nltnlf"till'y (TAA). discussed in this paper receiv-
"A 
it. ,îngf""t.ial not as un utt"ilpt to "telcl'.' critical thinking,, but.rather as an effort to
;;;;;;d"rh.. the loose."Jr "fä 
successtul but didactic interdisciplinary course entitled
;;i""frnoîogy and Culture.- The significance ofthe difference between intention and result
will be drawn out in our conclusions'
overaperiodofthreeyears,..TechnologyandCulture''evolvedfromitsbeginningasa
..standard,, core .urriculuä óourr" ut theiÚniversity of Southem Maine (originally 
"Man,
Sã"l.iV, ."¿ f".hnolog'i-unã "rf,ninut"¿,in 
two oiferings for the Summer Humanities In-
stituæ for Gifted an¿ rateníJ rtùn s.rt""l sr¿ents, in 1915 and 1986. In its 
regular academic




consisting of Johnzaner (Department of Industrial
Education and Te.t norogviJuá1ür Drew (School oTNursing) and 
one of the^authon (Slawomir
Grzelkowski, o"pu.t*"nlãiSo"iofog'l. Àfourthmembeiof theoriginal faculty, 
JackHanna
óãlu.trn"ní of Ènglish), retired aiihe end of the first semester 
of the course'
Fromthebeginning,thefacultymadesome.importantdecisionsregardingthenatureof
materials to be used in tne course: the three themes of communications, 
mass production'
and bio-technotogy *"r" ,Ll""ted as most suitable to interdisciplinary discourse on the 
social
and cultural context of technology. Some vague need for an experiential 
activity on the part
of the students, *r,i"r, *ouiãliJát irt" routiies of the lecture/presentation course and 
allow
i;.-;;;; r*ã"nt inuofu"Ã"ni, *ur ufro recognized. The tèaching team struck upon the
notion of class activities JÑing ttuO"nt projecdand analytic papers having to do with adver-




.urr proáuction and its impact on,society. The inter-
äì*iprìr".y 
""torË 
or trre.ãurse índ ic tËaching team virrually assured that it would con-
tinue to remain functionally inchoate from semester to semester. As 
a result, the team welcom-
ed an invitation to moairy the semester format for the Summer Institute 
in 1985.
Thisdevelopmentnecessitatedsomemajorchanges,someofwhichwere.in.thenatureof
;;";;"1.ô"e of therninvolved including on the faculty team a Brirish 
scholar, Professor
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Perry, who was a specialist in design. Another included the hiring of Mark Hineline whose
role-ranged from ãcademic functions to "camp counseling" of the students-in-residence'
In plannlng the first summer's program, it became readily apparent that the focu.sed format
foithe Insiin¡æ allowed and even demanded greater student involvement in the intellectual
content of the program. Field trips, several hands-on activities and various forms of role-
playing were bìiliinto the program. These activities met with varying degrees of involve-
-"nt u'n¿ success, but still ãid not provide a vehicle for a more-integrated, qynthesiz\ng ac-
tivity of longer duration, which would cut across all of the academic units of the Instin¡æ
and provideìts experiential focus. Therefore, in preparation for the 1986 Institute, we began
to search for a móre meaningful activity which would not only provide for greater involve-
ment on the part of students, but would also challenge their critical abilities as future decision-
makers coping with real-life problems of technological civilization.
A paraphrase of Robert sternberg's ideas (sternberg, 1985a), provided b.y a quick skim of
the article several months before, aided in the process of search, but only in a general sense;
the importance of it all was driven home later. Sternberg has suggested (and we agree), that
p.ogru.r designed to teach critical thinking often lack necessary rational assessment oftheir
iimi-tations orliubilities. Ar^rong these limitations and liabilities is the tendency to design
programs that teach "critical thinking" through problem solving activities that are divorced
iroñ1 real life problems and life experiences and from the aspirations of_studens, both in
their roles as itudenß and as incipient adults. Sternberg has drawn up the following ten-
point indictment of "academiC' problems, as opposed to their real-life counterparts: (1)
iecognition that a problem exists is a large part of its solution; (2) it is often harder to figure
out ñhat the problern is than to find its solution; (3) everyday problems tend to be ill-structured;
(4) the natqrè and sources ofinformation are usually unclear; (5) real life problems are con-
tátual, not isolated; (6) no one right solution or best solution might exist; (7) informal,
tacit knowledge is often as important as formal knowledge; (8) everyday problems have con-
sequences thaì matter; (9) everyday problems must often be considered in group rather than
indlividual contexts; (10) such problems can be complicated, messy and persistent.
We emphasize that our use of Sternberg's descriptive criteria of "real-world" problems
reflected our need to allow the students in the 1986 Institute to synthesize their learning in
a way that the students of 1985 did not. We did not set out to create a "critical thinking"
program.
II. The Design and Implementation of the "Technology Assessment Activity"
As a model for TAA, we chose early on to reconsffuct a legislative process. In response
to Sternberg's critique, we eschewed the 'bivics class" approach to legislative activity, prefer-
ring the.õt" open-t"*tured roles oflegislators, lobbyists, reporters, and editorial pundits
to ihe simpler and more cleanly available rolés of legislators acting acontextually. More im-
portånt, we chose to leave the matter of problem selection entirely in the students' hands,
iequiring only that the problems chosen reflect some technological aspect of modern socie-
ty.-Below is a schematic account of the activity and its requirements.
Eight students were selected by their peers to serve as legislators. These students were ask-
ed"to research and draft four bills, with input from the balance of the Institute participants.
Students were provided with an orientation to the university's library a¡d were expected to
develop a "brÑsing familiarity" with current editorials, letters to the editor, news and notes
sectioÅ, and generil articles in scientific and technical journals. Although these early phases
of TAA tookllace in something of an information vacuum' a glimpse of the construction
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of the activity was provided through discussion of a case study of the u.s. Army corps of
Èìgin"".s' darrisoi Dam Projeciand its effect on three viable Indian cultures' Through
thiJdiscussion, the roles of constituencies were explored'
Every student was required to produce a minimum of two pages of written work, which was
to be duplicated and á copy máde available to every student and faculty member. Reporters
iáli"*"á g"n"ral journalistic style in a "newsroom" environment, created in computer lab'
L"UUyl*s""".bined newly gain-ed technical expertise with persuasive techniques. Legislators
pr"Oí.ãã Uifi. in draft foñ; and editorialists had free reign to express opinions in an effort
to influence the decision making process.
A state legislator known for his charismatic style and experience as a.lobbyist.delivered a
t"ft á" iftã legislative and lobbying processes, which served as an antidote to the standard
;;"iui", 
"lur.; 
presentation of åerioiratic processes. Two issues were stressed in his talk:
trr" ilnportun." of problem articulation ("framing the question") and the role of obfuscation
fir yóu make the issue sound confusing enough, no one will vote for it").
The process by which the roles of lobbyists were selected was one of the few instances 
of
¿ir".i int"*.niion q, faculty and staff. Á single example will illustrate: two legislators wrote
a bill mandating the use of seat belts in passenger vehicles. Lobbying positiors for the bill
included the .,Ùnited Chieß of Police oi America," an insurance companf the "Coalition
for Local Freedom of Choice," the United Auto Workers, and General Motors. While the
iouuyinj positions included, ideally, trvo pfoponents, two opponents,. and an ambiguous 
posi-
iion, .tíä"ntr discovered eu"n fnór" amUigulty in the roles than the design dictated'
All of the above activity was aimed at preparation for legislative.hearings. on each of the
iåu. Uilfr, to be followeá by a redraftinganã amending process and a final debate and vote'
i=iff. ,pãnror.a by other legislators inctu¿e¿ a proposed increase in funding for fusion energy
ãr.rifr; a bill io prohibiîthe use of lie deteitors and drug testing in the worþlace; and
a bill designed to deal with acid rain.
While some time was specifically allotted in the schedule for the activity, the intensive 
nature
of the two-week institu^te tacitly demanded that students make choices about how much 
(or
how little) of their free time to devote to the activity'
In each hearing, time was allotted for a presentation by the sponsol of the. bill under con-
,i¿..utlon, follolwed by time for the presèntation of "friendly" testimony, balanced by an-
tugãnl*i" p."rentation. "Public" comment followed; the hnal hour was tafen-up by 
ques-
tiãns from the press. Reporters chose from a list of media with predetermined ideological
slants as we[ ás represeìþtives of the "neutral" mass-media'
The students found that the hearing procedure partially restructured both the texture 
and
the content of subject matter under-cïnsideratión. They also discovered that presentation
ái * u.gu*"nt wãs at least as important as the validity of the argument' Faculty and staff
noted añ increase in the sophisticìtion of presentations from each hearing to the next' 
In
purti"utu., students learndto field øctics such as "character assassination" adroitly; they
ãfr" á"".1"p.0 tactics for subverting the authority of the moderator, an activity in which
they were usuallY unsuccessful.
In the final vote on all four bills each of the students represented a state, and was instructed
to vote their conscience unless a state or regional issué clearly precluded their predisposi-
tion on an issue. Prior to each floor vote, a shórt period of debate and summation was allowed'
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Apart from the above requirements, there were to be no "rules." Alliances were to be en-
couraged; similarly, illicit activities, such as bribery through small favors (such as sodas)
would not be discouraged, since such activities would almost certainly be corrected by the
activities ofjournalists and opposition lobbyists and legislators.
It may be helpful to underscore the context in which the TAA took place. The most signifi-
cant aspect ofthat context, perhaps, was that the TAA was an addition to the Institute pro-
gram of the year before, which was itself the presentation of a full-semester college course
in a two-week period. Few, if any, of the lectures were eliminated or restructured, although
some were shortened somewhat. Accordingly, TAA intensified an already intensive educa-
tional format. Some students responded by going without sleep; others cut back in their at-
tention to either the TAA or other segments of the academic program.
An interesting and not always desirable carry-over from the traditional context of schooling
was the fact that some students responded to their increased freedom of discovery by ex-
cessive competitiveness and secrery, in the process disenfranchising some of their less ag-
gressive counterparts. Competitiveness might be regarded as desirable in the context of self-
directed student activity if kept within moderate bounds. But excesses of it were sometimes
noticed by faculty and participants and appeared to undermine the cooperative, collective
nature ofproblem solving emphasized by several writers (Sternberg, 1985a; Meyers, 1986).
There was also a sense, again shared by faculty and several students, that student-selected
problems might not be "as good" as they might otherwise have been (e.g., "as good" as
problems as articulated by faculty). In other words, we ran the risk of devoting a signihcant
portion of the Instituæ to "trivial" problems and solutions.
We argue, however, that it is the process of problem recognition, articulation, and resolu-
tion that matters, and not the outcome. [n this sense, some amount of constructive "bacþedal-
ling" by the students who found in the TAA process that they "could have done better" was
actually desirable. (This happened, as described above, in the case of two bills which were
recast at the students' behest.) The literature on critical thinking and problem solving seems
to stress that the process of self-discovery afforded by such activities as TAA, and insights
generated by evaluation of participation in them, are often more important than their con-
crete outcomes. From this perspective, the TAA could be regarded as pedagogically suc-
cessful if it: (1) increased students' thinking skills; (2) increased students' insight into the
connection between TAA and "real-life" problem solving; (3) increased, more important-
ly, students' insight into what real-life problems and their solutions are like.
Here we must state and emphasize our crucial pedagogical assumption in designing and im-
plementing TAA, which takes us beyond the Sternbergian approach and which constitutes
the main theme of this paper: in order to create an environment in which critical think-
ing can take place, a large degree of the pontrol commonly enjoyed and maintained
by the teacher must be relinquished, some to her or his students, and some to thin air.
There simply is no other way. To do otherwise means that one poses a problem so artificial
that little or nothing oftrue value can be learned from it. Moreover, just because that control
is relinquished, and because it is seized by people who are in the process of learning to use
it, many aspects of the critical thinking cease to be "ideal." This, we propose, is a good thing.
We regard it as a good thing even ifthe pedagogical benefits ofthis design for learning critical
thinking are juxtaposed to its costs and liabilities. High on the list must be mentioned a signifi-
cant degree of teacher and student anxiety generated by the relinquishing of instructor con-
trol. Retreating from the customary front of the classroom and allowing students ûo define
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the subjects of legislative bills and flesh out the content and form of specific activ ities was
difficuli for the instructional staff of the institute, a certain amount of tension between the
faculty was generated in response to concerns as to what the kids were doing or if they were
doing anythlng at all. For their part, the students were stressed by lack of traditional role
"*p"ãøti,onr. 
lvhil" ro*. responded well to a demand for selÊdirection and the high degree
ofìmbiguity built into the design of TAA, others had a more difficult time "getting going"
and coniinuãUy sought direction from the søff. Our unwillingness and inabilility (because
we did not have the answers, either) was not always credible and caused some resentment'
Whether these difficulties in implementing TAA were significant or mere glitches, and (more
important) whether TAA served is primary functions,.remained unknown for several months
foliowing'the close of the 1986 Summer lnstitute. The authors of this paper attempted to
urr"r. th"ut process of evaluation and insight discovery by collecting information from the
participantsï the Institute regarding their retrospective evaluation of TAA. Some, þ definition
u"ry gàn"tul, evaluation of TAA oõcurred at the termination of the Institute. What is signifi-
cani is that though the TAA was evaluated as but one part of the fabric of the lnstitute pro-
gram, it *a. ,po-ntun"ously mentioned by practically all of the participants as an important
fart of thei6u.m"r experience. Given that salience of the activity in the students' minds,
we decided to follow up with an instrument specifically designed to solicit information about
the TAA. A brief mailèd questionnaire was sent, along with a cover letter, to all participants
in February of 1987. All ôf the questions were open-ended, allowing for independent for-
mulation oi."rponr". by the stuáenß, although some probes were also built into the instru-
ment. Sixteen responses, or 38% , of the mailed forms were retufned to date. The next part
of the paper reprósents a thematic analysis of student opinions about the TAA and its con-
tributions to critical thinking on their part.
III. Student Themes-Participants' Evaluation of TAA
Four themes stand out in students' evaluations of TAA in mailed questionnaire responses.
These are (1) indeterminacy of the design of TAA; (2) selection of topics (billÐ; (3) real-life
nature of pioblems; and (4) overall aisessment of the activity. In the follow-i¡g analysis,
represenbìive quotes from the students' answers to our questions illustrate these themes.
We were interested, hrst, whether the students understood why the goals of TAA were left
initially vague. Fourteen of the 16 respondents indicated that they did know the reasons for
indeteiminãcy of design. One studenì wrote: "Utl allowed us to develop ideas that might
have been ,nuff"d ouiin u unambiguous atmosphere;' while another said:
At first I was confused about why the TAAs goal was so hazy-I was so used
to being told not only what to do but exactly how to do it that I didn't know
what wãs going on. Then I realized that the activity was to be directed. and ¡un
primarily-þ iurselves-instigated not þ the higher-ups-as the teachers had
àtways Uien-the responsibility of really doing something out of nothing (or
practically nothing!) was actually very liberating.
The issue of when the design became apparent produced responses of this kind: "The design
became clear after my quéstions werèiontinually rebuffed. I figured out they wanted us
to decide for ourselvei what to do within their guidelines." Another student wrote, "During
ih" ,"rrion, (hearings) when I observed all of the people throwing everything they had into
the defense or offenie of the various problems, I realized how cleverly the TAA had been
constnrcted. We were allowed to sharpen our own skills of formulating original thoughts."
Indeed, the majority (9 out of 16) had a clear idea that it was their design that prevailed (only
on. rtud"nt inäicaied that the design was that of the faculty; the rest of the students gave
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ambiguous answers). one student stated that "The design was obviously ours. Thebare
outlines that were given were just enough to get us started," and another that ;'we were allowed
to design our own solutions to the problems at hand having nobody tell us if we were right
or wrong. It was stimulating to be allowed to be our own judges of right and wrong."
That feeling of 'bwnershþ" extended itself even further. Even though the students gave divided
answers to a question of whether they would have chosen the same topics today, a significant
|ajo1i.ty (14) felt that they were satisfied with the scope and significance of the problems
they did choose.
As we have argued above, selection of problems is a central issue in critical thinking. One
of our major pedagogical strategies for reducing teacher domination over the process of lear-
ning.critical thinking involved an assumption that choosing a problem was às important as
solving it. Fifteen ofour respondents agreed. Many felt that problem choice enhanced stu-
dent "interest." One student discussed the relationship between articulation and solution:
"You can't effectively solve a problem to the best of your ability if you are not interested
in it." Another felt frustrated by the lack of time available for research: "choosing a pro-
blem is k¿'J. I think one problem with the process was the lack of time and research there
was in choosing the issues."
It appears, however, that insights about the relation between the determination of problems
and critical thinking as a process came to the students hard and only in retrospôct. only
seven of the respondents indicated that the principle was clear at the time of the activity.
It.is possible to argue that their previous life experience, including the large part of it con-
stituted by schooling, did not prepare them to understand this issue. ThJfoilowing quote
illustrates that well: "school breaks down into components so much that it's hard io get a
"big" picture; and the kinds of problems we dealt with at usM were paÍtof the big piciure.
The fact still remains that the participants, unaccustomed as they were to the lack of clarity
of expectations, found it to be a beneficial part of rAA. Three-fourths found the fact thãt
they were not told precisely what was expected of them profrtable: "part of what made the
activity so good was the uncertainty-rror knowing what was expected of us." Two thought
otherwise: "I hate to say it, because I think it contradicts your goals, but...the confusi,on
about what I was supposed to do and how to get it done took away from the time I could
have spent to make my final product better." Two students provided ambiguous answers.
The third prominent theme in student responses to our questionnaire centered around the
real-life nature of critical problems. We asked our students to reflect on Sternberg's formulation
of the nature of reallife problems and followed up with a question as to wñether his was
a,good description of the problems they face in their lives. Three quarters agreed, ..pro-
blems I have been given in school usually have a correct procedure which musi be followed
precisely and result in a correct answer. very few problems (such as a relative's death) in
my life have fit this form." some of the ansrers, though they affirmed the description, in-
dicated some disappointment or exasperation: 'Although I do not always wish that the world
is the way it is, I would have to agree with the description." The rest gave answers that do
not lend themselves to simple interpretation.
Even more (there was one exception) saw Sternberg's statement of critical problems as a
good description of rAA. one student wrote, "we were forced to grow up, reach the real-
world-type problems. And these fit the description of sternberg's exactly." Another stated
that "If I had been asked what I had learned about facing issues ãfter the 'iAA, I would have
written the same as Mr. Sternberg." These statements seem to indicate that the students ap-
preciated Sternberg's formulation of problems as conducive to fostering critical thinking.
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åf realism and for most of the students (three-fourths of them) did. not detract
i.ã1f*i. appreciation of the Instituæ and the activity itself. Here is a typical response:
:Aiûr""Ch ui it r ti." I disliked the intensity, now I realize that it was both necessary and
n*¿. lîu, forced to work very hard, andi think I grew as a result." A majority (10 out
ãiiäj 
^fr" 
f.fîrfrã, *"ll-informá decisions in the "real" world can and must be made under
"ir.í*.tun"", 
of equal intensity (one student disagreed, five provided amb.iguous anwers) '
ilü;;t"" *Á more difficulito unr*"t simply, but the responses reflectthe thoughtfulness
åi1t Jr" young people: "In the 'real' world wàve only got 'real' people and the 'real' 
people
ãi"nt n.""*ã'.ily ieally' perfect," one student wroie.-Another suggested that "' "the 'real'
world has even more intensity uíd thit Institute just prepared us for that understanding 
of
how things really work." And a third felt that:
sometimes the intensity of the activity was a little overpowering...it was hard
tok""pyou.headstraight,butquietvisitstothelibraryhelped.Theintensity
,pu.rJàit"utluity but s-ometimeì overpowered-nevertheless, in retrospect, I
would have madé the same decisions. So yes, I do think "real" decisions can
be made in that atmosPhere.
The final theme identifiable in the student responses is that of the overall evaluation 
of their
" 
p"ri"n.. with TAA. We asked them both i structured question and an open-ended one'
Most of the student responses fall into three categories. TAA was regarded as a) a 
pleasant




too unsettling to have been either enjoyable or useful. The illustrative comments
read as follows:
Because I was so enthusiastic and involved with the activity, it is hard for me
toexpresshowmuchtheactivitymeanttomeexcepttosaythat\twasgreat-
absoibing, enlightening, and personally satisfying'
It was pleasant and a distraction from the other components of the institute,
but I enjoyed the others just as well'
...as I'engaged' in the activity, I was having more fun and meeting people
thiough it."N-ow I feel that the úck of direction was a help. It helped me ø start
rtnd.iiy myself through the finding of others'
These responses seem to indicate that TAA did its job as an integrating.and.synthesizing
purt of tfró In.titute, even though it seems- that its contribution to students' abilities 
to think
ãnJ to ,otu. challenging and cr-itical problems came largely in retrospect. The last response
ã"ãiJp"¡o atso iñ thã Jirection of a real possibility that these bright, well 
motivated and





i""ti*'tlite uno engaging activiry to occupy part of their_summer. This, indeed,
niight b. u **t of u post factãsirvJy, but on the balance of it, we thi¡k the students' rcsponses
to Ée a forthright and thoughtful evaluation of TAA'
IV. Conclusions and Interpretations
in *,ã intro¿u"tion to this pup-"t, it *ut noted that TAA was not initially designed as-a 
"critical
iüir[itrg; p.àg.u.; in.t"ád, it i* to ,"*" as an activity thro-ugh which sn¡dents of the USM
i".rr"î firtitîte could syntiresize some Íiagmented aspects of a course concerning technology
ã"J,á"i.ìv. Nevertheless, the conception-of the activìty contained 3-----------------lefergnge to Robert J.
i't"*ùåig."o". concluding remarks will extend that reference, and will break down our func-
tional critical thinking/synthesizing distinction'
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Sternberg has developed a useful critique of critical thinking programs, but his own pro-
gram of solutions, "Intelligence Applied," seems to fall victim to the very pedagogical traps
he identified in the first place. The examples given seem to illustrate a set of fragmented,
idealized, often trivial and always externally imposed (e.g., imposed by the teacher) pro-
blems (Særnberg, 1985b, p.779-280).Indeed, the very fact that Særnberg's work frlls within
the tradition ofteaching critical thinking through logic and problem solving, would appear
to deny him the claims to realism and relevance demanded of critical thought with everyday
life and the discipline-grounded context of most of good and usefu1 thinking (Meyers, 1986,
p. 1-10). Meyers would argue also that that tradition excludes some forms of critical thought
(e.g., esthetic experiences and their analysis, playful examinations of ideas or simply pos-
ing incisive questions) and assumes that all instances of grappling with a problem will pro-
duce a solution. We would like to add that pursuing critical thinking within the parameters
of formats predicated on expectations of discrete step-like results, ultimately leading to
"testing"of some abilities and achievements and within the parameters of teacher-imposed,
externally defined problems to be "solved" by students can only lead to contravention of
critical thinking. Individually and collectively,, these concerns raise a powerful issue: is it
possible to speak of "teaching critical thinking" or is such a phrase a contradiction in terms?
Might it not be more appropriate, even if pedagogically more difficult and more humbling,
to speak of faciliøting the learning and practice of critical thinking or creating academic
structures and environments where critical thinking will occur? This hypothesis might be
interpreted as the guiding theme of our conclusion.
Our experience with TAA seems to indicate that if critical thinking is to mean something,
it must be predicated on an active posture of the learner, and a variety of conditions stress-
ing the collective, social aspects of critical problem solving and thinking (Meyers, 1986;
to some degree Sternberg, 1985). The teacher must relinquish traditional control over the
process oflearning and actively resist students' demands for continual guidance. The teacher
must be willing to "sacrifice" content for process, to accept student determination of pro-
blem selection and its solution, even in spite of his/her feeling that a better set of problems
or outcomes could be found if only teacher control were reasserted. All this does not mean
that the student-controlled process will lack rigor; rather, the ultimate rigor might reside
in careful planning and structuring of a context for interactive learning (Meyers, 1986). Ac-
cordingly, our pedagogical energies might better be directed toward careful designing and
planning, rather than the continual control over and direction of every phase of the learning
process.
One of the hotly debated issues in the field of critical thinking is the division between those
who insist on the generic and transferable nature ofcritical thinking and those who emphasize
its discipline-bound character. The discussions at a recent conference on critical thinking
attended by one of us seem to indicate that that division also translates itself to divergent
pedagogical approaches to teaching critical thinking. These are either cross or interdisciplinary
or are discipline-specific and thus focus on induction ofthe novice learner into that discipline
and its community of discourse. The interdidciplinary nature of the Summer Institute and
the sternbergian inspiration of the TAA would seem to place us on one side of the issue.
But it is also possible that there is a problem of misplaced emphasis here-such is the nature
of most dichotomous thinking. We might be able to escape a rather sterile debate between
generic vs. discipline specific camps if we insist simply that critical thinking be substantive.
By saying this, we are in agreement with Meyers' (1986) critique of teaching critical through
the math/logic or narrow problem-solving strategies. we are also in agreement with John
Dewey's analysis of the critical thinking process, or inquiry, which holds that critical think-
ing is problem-specific as opposed to either generic or discipline-bound. By stressing the
substantive nature of critical problems, we are addressing their "real" life, adult nature; their
contextual, non-trivial character; as well as their extremely important subjective and nor-
mative components.
In retrospect, it appears to us that proper evaluation, de-briefing and follow-up are very im-
portant óoncerns-in designing a good program in critical thinking. Meyers (1986), whose
Look summarizes reflection on teaching of critical thinking, also feels thqt this is a crucial
factor. In this regard, the faculty of the Summer Institute were probably guilty of having
missed the boat. After the final hearing, we proceeded to take turns in sharing with the par-
ticipants our observations on what went well or not so well with TAA. This was not a ter-
ribþ creative evaluation mechanism, and while it might have suggested some points not
perðeived by students, it did not compensate for engaging them actively in a systematic and
thorough evaluation of their experience. The students did evaluate the Institute briefly, and
rather politely. The fact that TAA was mentioned spontaneously þ most, if not all, of them,
is a testimonial to its success and salience in the student's overall perceptions of the totâl
program. Similarly, we can rationalize that the present research instrument provided the par-
ii"ifuntr with a viuable mechanism of evaluation, aided by a useful i¡terval' But none of
theie can really be regarded as a meaningful equivalent of an immediate and extensive port-
mortem on TAA. Given the intensity of the activity, an equally intensive evaluation and de-
briefing should have occurred. We cannot help feeling that an important opportunity for lear-
ning wãs lost. We would stress that systematic reflection is an integral part of a good design
of programs aimed at stimulating critical thinking'
In conclusion, we feel that the salient aspects of TAA and the lessons we have learned from
it may be successfully transferred to a variety of learning contexts and formats, providing
that the following specific aspects of the program are retained: first, plograms must rigorously
insist upon problem selection þ students. Second, progmms benefit from anìnterdisciplinary
presenàtion of material, although we do not consider this essential; more important is that
ihe material have about it some characteristics of "real life" dilemmas. Third, evaluation
of the learning process by students must take place. Given these prerequisites, there is no
reason why u-piogtu- 1ii(e TAA could not be adapted to a variety of college, summer in-
stitute, and high school formats.
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PROBLEM GENERAIION AND PROBLEM SOLVING IN
INDUSTRY AND ACADEME
James W. Smith
one subcategory of the process of critical thinking is problem-solving which, combined with
decision-making, constitutes the major activity of many professional individuals in different
forms of employment. Decisions and solutions, if they are to have any meaning, will possess
certain characteristics. For example, they should be defensible against intelligent rational
scrutiny and, if not totally selÊconsistent, should at least represent a rational weighing of
numerous data inputs.
Whether there is a universally applicable methodology for problem-solving is an open ques-
tion. In times past it was fashionable to cite a process of reason called the scientific method
as a generally applicable æchnique. While this method has utility, particularly in dealing
with closed-ended problems, it tends to become less useful and somewhat awkward when
dealing with uncertainty.
The world of commerce and industry is a space in which problem-solving has been elevated
to a high art form. Indeed, young prospectivejob candidates about to emerge from the na-
tion's universities and colleges are counseled that, when asked by interviewers to explain
what drives them to answer, "I like to work with people and to solve problems." If that answer
sounds a bit contrived and shallow it should be remembered that a good deal of a degreed
professional employee's workday, particularly in industry, is spent doing just that, working
with people and solving problems. In academe problem-solving, too, is a valued skill although
it is often called by different names such as research, design, or study (the words are not
necessarily synonymous; one may be a component of the other).
The workday worlds of industry and academe are quite different as are the motivations of
the populations and the rewards systems to which they are subjected. So, it is no surprise
that the methods used for problem-solving by the two populations are often quite different.
Generalizations about the behavior or traits of specific populations are risky, at best. Never-
theless, within the two groups, cert¿in tendencies may be discerned. It is the premise of this
paper that each population demonstrates, in the aggregate, certain approaches to problem-
solving and that ttrese approaches are dictated by the particular professional culture which
is characteristic of that population. From these tendencies, stereotypical descriptions of the
two populations can be developed. The second premise is that each population has something
to teach the other.
Problem Origins
The methods used to solve problems are often markedly influenced by the nature and the
origin of the problem. For example, when an origin implies urgency, the method of solution
will, in general, be different than if no urgency is implied and what is considered to be an
acceptable solution will also be different. So differences in both the approach and the solu-
tion will exist, even in the extreme case where both problems are identical, simply because
of the time line difference.
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Academic Problems
The main difference between academic problems and commercial or industrial problems
is that academic problems are self or institutionally generated. Faculty members, in most
cases, have the luiury of influencing, if not downright choosing, the problems, to be worked
àn. Ã proOt"1,' arises because a faðulty member wa.nts to solve it. Motives for the choice
ãipioUi"tnr may vary. The solution of á certain problem, or the proposal to do so, may lead
to ä research giunt õr paper, may be useful as criterion for promotion or tenure or as an
exercise for stidenS, oiUe simpty a problem of interest to the individual' Problems generated
in such an environment tend to have certain characteristics:
They tend to be focused, defined. Someone once said that a well-defined 
problem is half
ansíered. Except at the most profound levels of study, what high-tech tyqel refer to as the
ãuiting eOg", acàdemic problerns that are generally chosen have a clear definition, are not
ambiguous and appear to be manageable'
They tend to be withín the context of a course tlt"Ay or research. This will affect both
the íature of the problem chosen aná its timing. The existence of a problem often becomes
uppui"nt during involvement with or study of a particular field of knowledge' In the com-
n'ôn 
"ur. 
of prãblems assigned as part of a normal course, the progression of the syllabus
ãi.tut , the timing of the pioblem. Problems at a more advanced level, for example, those
t'pi"¡ of iu*ltyiesearch most often are generated as an outcome of on-going or previous
faculty academic interests and involvement.
They tend to be within areas of expertise or competenc¿. It is rare that problems are selected
outíide of an individual's fielä of competence. Since in academe the solution to a problem,
if satisfactorily documented, is viable õurrency, the tendency is to select prob^lems for which
past experien;e and expertise suggest certainty of success. This is one reason for the develop-
ment ¡ã*l in individuãh and inãademic departments of in-depth knowledge, often at the
expense of breadth.
They tend to be monodiscíplinary. There are a number of components here.-o¡e is simply
thuíth" traditional .our."..qu"nces tend to be developed along traditional departmental
"rãir"ipii"*V 
lines. At the fräulty research level most õrganizational efforts and also fund
allotrnents areïithin, but not usualiy across, traditional boundaries' External funding agencies
such as NSF or the foundations are not struch¡red to judge, much less fund, multidisciplinary
proposals because, among other things, individual contract officers often do not have the
f."äOtn to assess them obJectively. Finally, the majority of scholarly journals, not to men-
tion the referees, are not inclineá or equipped to handle works which cross 
jurisdictional
boundaries to any significant extent.
They tend to be individuat ffiÍs. Even in cases where large research grants.are sought (here
i¡"'rirÀ"f". example of hþh-energy physics is discounted), they tend to be structured so
that rhJy can be bioken ¿oîn mtoînits which can be managed by one individual. This is
pi"t"Ufy because much of the university population, students, non-tenured faculty, and faculty
vying får promotion are in a mode wîère they are judged as individuals_. We do not have
góoõ*"ttroa, (or any particular motivation) in academe for assessing individual contribu-
iion, to team efforts.- The fact that an individual solved a problem is often more important
than the problem itself.
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They may or may not be real. Certainly, at the lower levels problems are by necessity con-
trived. It is just not feasible, for example, to ask a freshman to solve an original problem
in physics. What is not clear, however, is what effect dealing with non-real problems, that
is, their acceptance as both necessary and desirable in lowerJevel courses has on the mind-
set of the faculty when they choose their own problems.
There may or may not be time constraints. Certainly a student with a term paper deadline
has time constraints as does a scholar preparing a paper for a scheduled conference. The
scholar has the luxury of picking the conference and therefore selects his or her own time
constraints. This is not as true of individuals involved in contract research but even there,
an opportunity for time constraint management exists by judicious construction of the original
bid proposal.
There may be no real measure of success or failure. Does the acceptance of a paper in a
scholarly journal mean that indeed a problem was solved? Much in academe is judgmental
and success is often in the eye of the beholder (or referee). Journals accept and publish con-
tributions to the published literature of a field, not solutions to problems. Often the best
measure of the solution of a problem is the relief accorded or satisfaction given to those to
whom the problem affects most. If the problem is insignificant or contrived the satisfaction
can get lost in the noise level.
Industriøl Problems
Problems, far from being a currency in industry, are considered to be either deviations ÍÌom
the norm or as barriers to the orderly progression to\¡/ard some objective. Their characteristics
too are subject to generalizations such as:
They are seldom chosen. Industrial problems are not chosen, they occur. They are regarded
as a negative entity. Problem solving per se is not an executive's objective. Rather, it is regarded
as a regrettable but necessary talent in order to achieve an objective. While the ability to
solve problems is highly regarded, solved problems are generally not considered to be cur-
rency, except at a small number of firms such as A. D. Little. The solving of the problem
is secondary; the important thing is that the problem is solved.
They are not necessarily in the upertise of the responsible individual. This may be the greatest
difference between industrial/commercial and academic problems. Routinely, problems occur
which are outside the realm of expertise ( or sometimes even the comprehension) of the in-
dividual charged with solving the problem or more specifically, the individual responsible
for insuring that the problem is solved. The problem-solver and the responsible individual
are not necessarily one and the same.
Boundaries may/may not be apparení Realworld problems often appear open-ended. often
the extent of the problem is not known until the solution is well underway. Moreover the
real problem may be masked þ secondary features or misinterpreted symptoms. Definition
is often only by symptom.
Deadlines are often fixed. If a problem's extent is not necessarily known, the time alloted
for its completion generally is. Deadlines are sometimes arbitrarily or even capriciously set;
more often they are determined by the totality of circumstances involving the problem. An
order which will be cancelled if quality standards of shipments are not raised to acceptable
levels within a fixed period of time, a malfunctioning computer which shuts down an in-
ty
surance office or an unknown process variation which causes the yield in a sensitive chemical
process to decline precipitously are all examples of complex, not necessarily well-defined
problems which, nevertheless, have fixed non-negotiable deadlines dictated by the urgenry
of the situation.
They have real measures for success or failure. lndustrial/commercial problems are con-
sidered solved when (a) they vanish, which is to say their symptoms disappear or þ) the
individual or individuals whom the problem affects most declare it to be solved. Often the
symptoms of a problem disappear during the course of attempts to solve it. This_is particularly
true of industrial processing problems. Whether there was any cause-effect relationship bet-
ween the efforts expended and the disappearance ofthe symptoms is not necessarily clear.
Complex physical (or sociological for that matter) systems do not lend themselves to easy
analyìis. Iidividuals can declare a problem solved or, as is quite common, moot if they are
willíng to accept the consequences. An example might be a case where effective investiga-
tion eJtablisheJ that previously attained quality levels are not realistic o¡ sustainable and so
a customer agrees to grant relief by accepting a lower quality standard: In this latter exam-
ple, a solution was not attained in a classic sense, but those responsible for implementing
the solution saw their responsibility discharged.
The problem is real Problems in industry are considered problems when someone wants
them solved. Conversely, if someone in authority, a customer, a superior or a line foreman
perceives that there is aproblem then there is a problem. The point is that the responsible
individual is not necessaiily the one to declare that a problem exists nor are the manifesta-
tions of the problem necessarily clear to all involved.
Problem Solving
There are some factors which affect the approach individuals take when confronted with
a problem which are independent of the nature of the institution in which they occur. Ex-
pËrience is probably the most significant. Students of physics are dazzled by the ability of
à professor io start át the beginning of a problem and methodically work toward a solution.
When confronted with a new type of problem students tend to work backwards. They will
go immediately to a solution and then see if it works. Backward problem solving is not just
ã practice of the novice. The classical method of solving a partial differential equation is
to assume a solution and then show that it satisfies the boundary conditions. That is, you
guess and then see if you were right. In his book "The Double Helix" James Watson described
ih" p.o""r, used to decipher the X-ray patterns for DNA. Basically it involved guessing the
structure of the moleculé and then showing, þ laborious calculations, that the assumed struc-
ture could explain the data. Here expertise and backward problem solving_were combined
in an effective manner. This combinaiion is not limited to academic pursuits. Hewlett-Packard
runs a very interesting TV advertisement in which a young moler and shakeq probably a
technical sales support team member, emerges excitedly from his shower, enthusiastically
dials his partner ânO ,uyr "rilhat ifl" The implication is clear! Here is a company whose
employeeì are constantiy thinking of ways to solve their customers' problems, even in the
rtto*eit What is of inte;est is thcmethodology which is used. "What if?" is just another
form ofbackward problem solving. In it a solution is tentatively adopted and then substituæd
into the problem to see if it fits.
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Problem Solving in Academe
Just as the origin, even the definition of what constitutes a problem differs between the two
populations, so do the methods of and the approach to problem solving. Features of the
academic approach are:
Individual ffins. This stems from the individual effort orientation discussed previously which,
in tum, has its roots in the value of solved problems as currency redeemable in personal
rewards and gratification.
Break problems into constituent parts. Whether this is due to an ability or inclination to think
abstractl¡ the need for documentation which forces ordering, or because they were taught
to do it, academics are very good at breaking problems down into manageable parts. Good
scholarship demands well-ordered thinking.
Use ofhistorical precedent. Knowledge builds upon the base of work done previously. One
vital component of a scholarly work is the literature survey. Since scholars are (or should
be) knowledgeable in the literature of their field, new problems are analyzed in terms of
a reference base. Because this base is common to many workers in the field, objective assess-
ment of the work is facilitated.
Good documentation. Published papers are money in the bank. Moreover, a large and effec-
tive procedure for searching the published literature exists. The combination reduces the
reinvention of the wheel in the form of resolving of old problems, although it doesnt eliminate
it.
Minimal progress review. Whether working on an assigned problem, or on a self-generated
one, the rate at which a scholar proceeds toward the solution as well as the direction taken
toward the solution is generally considered nobody else's business. Scholars generally aren't
tracked unless they're doing contract research or they have a conscientious thesis supervisor.
The result is that, unless they purposely seek help, they're on their own.
Solution subject to authority. Solutions are documented and handed in to somebody, be it
a teacher or a reviewer for ajournal. There is a hierarchy for all scholarly work. so problem
solutions are reviewed by individuals who, at least in principle, are capable of assessing the
quality of a solution.
Great reliance on individual expertise. who solved the problem is important in academe,
not that the problem was solved. otherwise, contract thesis-writing and exam-taking would
be more than just a cottage industry. Moreover, problem-solving is considered to be a growth
experience. There is little in the academic world which conditions individuals for team
approaches.
serial approach common. Academics approach problems with one solution at a time. This
is because problem solving is regarded as a reasoned process which develops in an orderly
manner. This is not to say that more than one problem at a time is not being worked on,
just that for each problem there is usually only one path being taken. Another reason is that
the timeline is generally not very critical.
Sense of urgency deríved from commitment generalþ not príncipal driving force. A sense
of urgency from arbitrarily imposed deadlines may exist but it is generally not accompanied
t39
byanycommitmenttotheproblemitself.Conversely,whiletheremaybecommitmentto
ã'pãrii"utu, project, it n""å noi¿"nelop urgency. This may be due to some sense 
that if a
orlie.t t u, *"rit, it should not be performJd in a hasty environment but develop in a more
lraäul manner with less chance for error'
Problem Solving in Industry
The industrial world is different from academe. Problems áre annoying 
at b€st and, in ex-
;;;;;r;, can threaten thiiery existence of the institution. so the motivation for solving
theproutemisdifferentandsoaretheapproaches.Featuresoftheapproachesare:
Candoord'elegar¿'Individualsareresponsibleforensuringthatproblemsaresolved,not
for solving problems. pr"ùlãÁ, ãn¿ tnåir solutions have nocurrency 
value. The emphasis
is on minimizing problems and their effects'
Much collabomtion. Theleamapproach is commonly used. Individuals 
are valued fortheir
ãL'llry . *ãrt in teams. rrrìr 
-i.pìi"t 
certain personáliry traits and skills such as the ability
to communicate weu. esseÀ¡ting a æam is aïay of focussing expertise and 
experience on
;;;i;; ñ or tr," ptin"ipuiãJti", of u t"u. léader is to convince the 
team members that
irr" pì"ùîå* l, wofih;hile. ïhut b'ing' about a sense of urgency derived from commitment
to the Problem.
Useofparallelapproaches.Shortdeadlinesdonotpermitserialapproaches.Multiple,or
even shotgun upp.ou"n.rïr"-"àr"*á"ry used. cool, detached thinking 
is often difficult in
wtlat, in ã*tt".ä circumstances can take on a crisis atmosphere'
(Jse of multipte resources. The entire resources of the firm are at the disposal 
of the project
t"äL',ó. .ióincant problems. Departmental boundaries are not impediments 
to progress.
Gi"ut ur" is made of consultants, both internal and external'
IJse of advanced methods common. while various aspects of the industrial 
problem-solving
process may have u Oiro.O"r"ã uppearance good use is made of highly 
developed tools such
as rhe Kepner{r"go" upi.oã"t,,'Þãi"to univrir and other formal methodologies. 
Besides
;;;;iJJt"., .ätt of irt.." l"trtniqu"t tt""q.m: advantage of being widelv disseminated
and well documented .o"itruitft"y can be applied rapidly. Their use, 
in effect, imposes an
order which might not otherwise exist'
Tmcking.Individualsoreventeamsareperiodically,sometimesdaily,reviewed.Whilethis
-"V ."rî." " 
f.*f of stress it does ensurè that progress is made and that approaches to pro-
blerns are constântly subjected to peer review'
Brief or non-existent documentation. There is a certain "wing it" nature to industrial 
pro-
blem solving wt ich ao¿sîã"g."" "t 
disorder to the process and disorder is generally not
documented. Moreover, tt "r" 
iá notttlng in the reward structure which encoufages documen-
tation. The result of this is the common reoccurence of the 
same problem, perhaps in a slightþ
different form.
Problem not necessarily solved. Theemphasis is on the elimination, 
not the understanding
oftheproblem.Unfortunately,whentheSymptomsoftheproblemvanish,theproblemall
too often is assumed to beì"Ï.¿. iom.i"nt.ffott is all too infrequently given 
to understan-
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ding the underlying causes of problems. It is quite common for the same problem to reoccur
constantly and for the individual responsible for solving it before to be asked to do it again.
Summary and Conclusions
In the foregoing, rather stereotypical descriptions were developed for problems, their place,
origins and approaches to their solution in two different spaces, industry and academe. In
a broad sense, with the possible exception of areas such as sculpture and creative writing,
most scholarly works can be cast as solutions to problems. So academe is collectively an
institution which is intimately involved in the problem-solving business, as is industry but
flor far different reasons. Each institution has a defineable approach to problems and each
has its strengths and weaknesses. Each has something to teach the other.
Academe can learn from industry about the approach to multidisciplinary problems which
cut across traditional jurisdictional boundaries. Part of the industrial method utilizes a team
approach which lends itself to multidisciplinary work better than a single contributor for-
mat. Participation in a team is not easy for everyone. It becomes more appropriate in cir-
cumstances where the problem's solution is the principal driving force, not the benefits which
the individual accrues from solving the problem. So perhaps one lesson is that a shift away
from individual emphasis may allow more profound problems ûr be addressed. Another lesson
which is relevant is the importance of time.
Academe has much to teach industry too. The structured approach and formalized defini
tion of problems can be just as useful in the crisis atmosphere of industry. The solution of
a problem by first defining it in a formalized manner and then approaching it rationally would
seem far preferable to simply alleviating the symptoms. Problems which reoccur because
they weren't solved completely the first time or have to be redone because of incomplete
documentation are wasteful of scarce resources.
Other lessons may emerge from the text. One technique which is not commonly used but
is applicable to both spaces is the post mortem. This is a method of formalizing the concept
that we learn by our failures. When a project fails problem-solving techniques are used to
determine why it failed and the analysis is documented in a formal manner. The post mortem
becomes a learning experience which, hopefully, at once adds to problem-solving skills and
prevents the same problem from recurring.
James W Smith
Undergraduate Engineering, School of Applied Science
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COGNITION AND LEARNING IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION
Jo Anna Spruill
The discipline of special education has focused primarily on the acquisitionand 
generaliza-
tion of básic skills and concepts. Historically, ih" fi"ldof learning disabilities has sought
io i¿entif' and isolate the unåerlying pto."ti"t andbghaviors that empower or retard the
teaching-iearning process. This has l"eà at different times to a variety of recommendations
¡;;;-r;"* trainíng and skill remediation. Presently, the field is attempting to integrate pro-
."rJt.uìning *ith õehavioral modification through an elaboration of the metacognition con-
,tn 
"t 
un¿ tñ" developmentof cognitive training models. Metacognitio n, abuzz word in the
n-åiãtii""."i"g disabilities, caribe defined simply as "Knowing how to go about the pro-
cess of learning" (Lerner, 1986' p. 523)'
Researchers are attempting to alter the thinking skills of learning disabled students 
by train-
i"g ttr"- i" ."f regulate lårning and self-morrìtor their comprehension and accuracy (Paris
¡;-Ok"; 1986). Itîs believJ thãt learning disabled students must be trained in the use of
Çg|ifi¿ ,trar"gi", and convinced of their bãnefits as well. 
At the onset of training, the teacher
initiates and controls the use of learning stfategies through instructional design 
and then
facilitates, through a series of steps, the transfer of control from teacher 
to student (Palinscar'
õtüj. iti" issuí of transfei i, .'.uóiutty important because, not only must strategy control
¡!ìrán.r"rr"¿ from teacher ro studenricelzheizer, shepherd, &.wozniak, 1986), 
but also
i.- on" activity to another, situation ò situation, subject to subject. To rnake this transfer
;;;ù1", .oÁ" i"r"u."t rinãinls support the.need for intensive training, 
overlearning, and
àxtensive practice to promote u,.rion'uti.ity (Gelzheizer, Shepard, & Wozniak, 
1986; Torgesen'
1986).
At the Instituto for Research in Learning Disabilities at the university of Kansas, 
resear-
chers have developed un "*t"n.lu. 
modá for cognitive strategy training' It is believed by
these researchers, and tr,"y rruu" generated empiiical evidence to support 
their belief, that
tttãr" riÃt"gi"r, oí." 1"u.n'"d, areËffective, that^strategies can be.acquìred bylD^adolescents
;h;;Gñäriu. t.uininj, ãnã that generálization of learning strategies and their desirable
.ff".tî .u' be made froñi a controiled laboratory setting to classroom and outside use'
However, even Deschler ò;*N*, Schumaker,.& Lenz, 1984a), ttre Institute Director' is




uLifity in the use of appiopriate metâcognitive strategies does not 
guarantee
their use; 2) training,nut"riar and^taski tend to be artificial; 3) other 
student attributes,




to ¡e rittie uppìi"ution of -.tucognitive strategies to basic skill acquisition '
The experimental nature of cognitive strategy training is underscored by shepherd 
(1985)'
She believes that although the"logical .ur"1ó. strategy training is relativ.ely.strong, 
(after
ãä, *. "' 
r,*" acquiredãnd u." iuov skills) the empiri"al case i: ry"*Îlll :li]l very 
weak'
Su"t, ouining strouì¿ Ue considered eiperimántal and instructional time 
devoted to it should'
atpresent,bekepttoaminimum.shesuggeststhatwhilemoreexperimentalstudieswill
nronerlv be restricted to l-J"i"t".V conditiJns, the regular curriculum may be enhanced by
í,*i,iriffjr i"ri*"ii"" f".rri"g on a goal of indepenãent strategy use and the.employment
åi'#ffiä;;i'."u|ntrt ruJs Oss5l. There aie serious questions, then, that cognitive
;.;,;g*;, ;;;e t"urn"¿, îilt ¡"'ut"á and, perhaps more importantly' that thev can be
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ding the underlying causes of problems. It is quite common for the same problem to reoccur
constantly and for the individual responsible for solving it before to be asked to do it again.
Summary and Conclusions
In the foregoing, rather stereotypical descriptions were developed for problems, their place,
origins and approaches to their solution in two different spaces, industry and academe. In
a broad sense, with the possible exception of areas such as sculpture and creative writing,
most scholarly works can be cast as solutions to problems. So academe is collectively an
institution which is intimately involved in the problem-solving business, as is industry but
for far different reasons. Each institution has a defineable approach to problems and each
has its strengths and weaknesses. Each has something to teach the other.
Academe can learn from industry about the approach to multidisciplinary problems which
cut across traditional jurisdictional boundaries. Part of the industrial method utilizes a team
approach which lends itself to multidisciplinary work better than a single contributor for-
mat. Participation in a team is not easy for everyone. It becomes more appropriate in cir-
cumstances where the problem's solution is the principal driving force, not the benefits which
the individual accrues from solving the problem. So perhaps one lesson is that a shift away
from individual emphasis may allow more profound problems to be addressed. Another lesson
which is relevant is the importance of time.
Academe has much to teach industry too. The structured approach and formalized defini-
tion of problems can be just as useful in the crisis atmosphere of industry. The solution of
a problem by first defining it in a formalized manner and then approaching it rationally would
seem far preferable to simply alleviating the symptoms. Problems which reoccur because
they weren't solved completely the first time or have to be redone because of incomplete
documentation are wasteful of scarce resources.
Other lessons may emerge from the text. One technique which is not commonly used but
is applicable to both spaces is the post mortem. This is a method of formalizing the concept
that we learn by our failures. When a project fails problem-solving techniques are used to
determine why it failed and the analysis is documented in a formal manner. The post mortem
becomes a learning experience which, hopefully, at once adds to problem-solving skills and
prevents the same problem from recurring.
James W Smith
Undergraduate Engineering, School of Applied Science
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COGNITION AND LEARNING IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION
Jo Anna Spruill
The discipline of special education has focused primarily on the acquisition and generaliza-
tion of básic skilli and concepts. Historically, the field of learning disabilities has sought
to identify and isolate the underlying processes and behaviors that empower or retard the
teaching-iearning process. This has led at different times to a variety of recommendations
for proðess training and skill remediation. Presently, the field is attempting to integrate pro-
cesi training with behavioral modification through an elaboration of the metacognition con-
struct and tñe development of cognitive training models. Metacognition , abuzz word in the
field of learning disabilities, can be defined simply as "Knowing how to go about the pro-
cess of learning" (Lerner, 1986, p. 523).
Researchers are attempting to alter the thinking skills of learning disabled students by train-
ing them to self-regulate leãrning and self-monitor their comprehension and accurary @aris
Abka, 1986). It is believed that learning disabled students must be trained in the use of
specific strategies and convinced oftheir benefits as well. At the onset oftraining, the teacher
initiates and controls the use of learning strategies through instructional design and then
facilitates, through a series of steps, the transfer of control from teacher to student (Palinscar,
1986). The issuãof transfer is ciucially important because, not only must strategy control
be transferred from teacher to student (Gelzheizer, Shepherd, & wozniak, 1986), but also
from one activity to another, situation to situation, subject to subject. To make this transfer
possible, some iesearch findings support the need for intensive training, overlearning, and
àxtensive practice tc promote automaticity (Gelzheizer, Shepard, & Wozniak, 1986; Torgesen'
1986).
At the Institute for Research in Learning Disabilities at the University of Kansas, resear-
chers have developed an extensive model for cognitive strategy training. It is believed by
these researchers, and they have generated empirical evidence to support their belief, that
these strategies, once learned, are èffective, that strategies can be acquired by lD adolescents
through exiensive training, and that generalization of learning strategies and their desirable
effecti can be made from a controlled laboratory setting to classroom and outside use.
However, even Deschler (Deschler, Schumaker, &Lenz, 1984a), the Institute Director, is
notunqualifiedly supportive oflearning strategy instruction. He cautions that 1) knowledge
of and èvident uLlity l" the use of appropriate metacognitive strategies does. not guarantee
their use; 2) trainingmaterials and^tãski tend to be artificial; 3) other student attributes,
such as motivation añd frame of reference, may undermine the effectiveness of training; and,
4) there appears to be little application of metacognitive strategies to basic skill acquisition'
The experimental nature of cognitive strategy training is underscored by Shepherd (1985)'
She beiieves that although thelogical case for strategy training is relatively.strong, (after
all, we all have acquiredãnd u." rtudy skills) the empirical case is presently still very weak.
Such training should be considered experimental and instructional time devoted to it should,
at present, b--e kept to a minimum. Shè suggests that while more experimental studies will
ftåp".ty úe restricted to laboratory conditions, the regular curriculum may be enhanced 
by
.tuäy .titt. instruction focusing on a goal of independent strategy use and the_employment
ofmnemonics for learning facs 0SA5). There are serious questions, then, that cognitive
strategies, once learned, litt U. used and, perhaps more importantl¡ that they can be
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generalized to a riety of academic tasks. Deschler has suggesÞd ttrat the ability to generalize
itrategies is so important that the goal of generalizability should serve as, a framework for
the eritire strategy learning sequence (Deschler, Schumaker, &Lenz, 1984a, p. 115).
Graham (1985) suggests that the behaviors students bring into the classroom, especially in
the metacognitive areas of engagement and self-monitoring of resources, impact the ways
in which they approach tasks and process information, which in turn, influence their rate
of learning. Âftihãugtr adolescents with learning problems tend to plateau in their acquisi-
tion of acãdemic sÈills (Deschler, Schumaker, Lenz, & Ellis, 1984b), the quality of the
classroom social context and instructional program can influence the students' mastery of
basic skills. It is currently believed that the following instructional elements have a positive
effect on learning outcom;s: explicit instruction, probing, modeling, practice, feedback, self-
monitoring for õomprehension. Graham focuses on classroom interactions as a meâns to
produce positive learning results.
Presently, there is growing belief in the efhcacy of direct instruction of learning strategies
for studjns with leÀrning problems. Cognitive training, however, is at the experimental stage,
where it should remain, until empirical evidence validates this training as resulting in positive
educational gains. It appears that, at the present time, the most promising avenue for in-
creasing basiõ sklls acquìsition and developing thinking skills for mildly handicapped students
is throrigh investigation of and improvement in the classroom-based teaching-learning pro-
cess. Añ examinaìion of the literature on teaching and learning within the social context of
the classroom follows.
A Review ol the LiÍerøture on Clnssroom-bøsed Leørning
Teaching and learning are inextricably woven in the minds of educators and laymen alike,
Uui ttre ireclse relatiõnship of the ¡pó has long been a source of interest and 
uncertâinty.
Àt th" pì"r.nt time, æaching is thought to precede learning, but little more is considered
certain. It is acknowledged that teaching does not always precede learning, nor does learn-
ing always follow teaching. There is also thought to be close connection between behavior
un? l"u.ning. It is str¡dentiehavior that results in learning. As Philip Schlechty (1976' p. 29)
hu, *.itt"nl "It is the business of teaching to induce those behaviors which are assumed
to be antecedent to learning, learning being the desired consequence of the behavior."
,,Whether students do, in faci, behave the way the teacher attempts to induce them to behave,
is a question for empirical study" (p' 26).
Student behavior, which can be characterized as "involved," is believed essential for learn-
ing to be achieved. Philip Jackson (1968), in his naturalistic study ofclassroom life, has pointed
oüi that early research focused on the visual manifestations of attentiveness, but later research
exposed the fallacy of equating perceived attentiveness with achievement' Although atten-
tiveness remains an impórtant côncern for both students and teachers, he considers involve-
ment a more significant educational goal. Edwards and Furlong (1q/8, p. 116) lave this to
say about the ñecessity of student involvement, "...teachers can never actually transmit
knowledge, for they are still dependent on the pupil_undertaking his own interpretive work
and maklng the neòessary links for himself." "...(T)he æacher can only restate the task, ex-
fticaæ lt, ñake the instructions clearer, and hope that the pupil makes the 
necessary links"
(p. 113).
Once the desirability of involved behavior has been established the question arises, 'Involve-
ment in what tasks?; In reporting their study of a middle school classroom, smith and GeoÊ
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frey(968'p.239)maketheobservationthat..Somewherebetweentheovertbehaviorof
the teacher and the growtn ài füiir, ;"" needs a set of intermediary variables," which they
have labeled '.activity-struct"d." i is exactly this notion of activity stmctures that Walter
D.d¡lrtìt .*pluin. in nno pioporltiont *'hi"h are basic to his work on classroom task
structures:
1. Students, academic work in school is define.d by the academic tasks 
that are embedded
in the content they encounter on a daily basis'
2. Students will learn what a task leads them to do, i.e., they will acquire 
information and
ãp".ution, which are n..".*ry to accomplish the tasks they encounter (p' 6)'





inïogniú". p.ychology tn.óãil.uining and mental development. Jean Piaget 
had the mosl
ñ;î;i;fil¿""" "ñir'" 
iJå ãi.ãÀnitií" pw.hology. He pioposed that the mental develop-
ment of children occurs r"ã r".i", o:r r"quentlat stafés of increasing complexity' 
The stages
are hierarchical, witfr eactr succeeãhg stage aependãnt on a satisfactory 
development ofthose
that precede it. The stages "..-""."Ãñtitftä 
urihitdt n 
"*plore 
their environment and slowly
develop mental represedi'-o;;;f ti.objects and-evenis they experience' 
These mental
representations u." ,"r,nJ,"n"ma, a seriËs of which form the schemata or 
cognitive struc-
tures of the individual's n'lnã. fu*t" events or objects encountered in the environment 
are
;;;;;;ñ *t." *¿úJ"ats asslmitate them into forms 
that are consistent with their
cognitive structures, or wtrenìn¿iuiduals' existing structures 
are altered to accommodate
iñ,ipË..ãi"áJ"r"uníng ofnã* "^periences. 
The most valuable school tasks are thought to
be tlhose that promote accommodation'
optimally,studentswhoareinvolvedinclassroomtaskswilllearn;inreality'thereare
countless variables whictr piÀmote or retard classroom learning. 
Doyle describes classrooms
". 
ä""gt , *i tt ambiguitie! and inconsistencies, discontinuity and incompleteness' "" 'a mass
;;;:i;;,yr,"* ,rì'", ir'rr'"¡"uy, ,"lpo*iu".to individual needs" 
(Doyle, 197'7, p. 1'18).
Because there is little "pp"*tii' 
iát stuåens to interrupt the system for clarification' students
;Ñ;ü.;*i" "Uiliii"r'"t"äore 
successtul in negòtiating the classroom terrain' Those
who can exercise p..."prï1"i.",ìvity, those with a-good sense of timing, and 
those bless-
ed with patience 
"r" 
bJ;;;ä;-i;p"Jío monitor th. ñid" band of information sources and
to interpret conflicting feedback'
Sometimeslittlelearningseemstotakeplace.lndiscussingclassroomactivitieswhichare
meant to resutr in """"d,;;il;;;;t;;."p 
of lower clãss youngsters,.smith and Geof-
ffey srated, 
,.. 
. . (we) *.i" td;;;;;J ttt.orfinout ttt" semester with the limited learning that
occurred and was retaineá."irimi"ti"g "¡"it 
this' the key i¡sy9 to Y!i"!:." always returned
concerned the uppropriuãnÃ, of tnir õurriculum for these children" 
(p. 191) ' Doyle theorizes
that for learning t" t"t" pi""" tt " 
,tu¿"nt', information processing l,"rpol.. 1^îr: 
be activated,
and the level of cognitive pro.".ti"g that is activated determines the 
nature of what is learn-
ed. Teacher behaviors unãìn.i*"ti"nal materials influence learning only 
to the extent that
they activate students' information processing responses'
Academic learning is influenced by the nature of the tasks 
assigned t'o the students' because
these tasks dictate the level of iniormation-processing activities 
engaged in by the class
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members. Naturally, students vary in their ability to identify and adapt to the required level
of cognitive processing. They also differ in their dependence on explicit cues and prompts,
which may or may not be provided by the teacher. From this point of view, the sum of the
classroom task structures and the support structure provided by the teacher can ultimately
predict for the students what is learned. If the task demands exceed the special needs students'
capabilities, there are a number of possible outcomes: failure and alienation, polite passing,
or intervention to bring about a kind of tognitive matching.' Conversely, if a special needs
student remains throughout his/her school career on a memory or pre-memory level, learn-
ing may be limited to that level.
The Socinl Context of Leørning and CogniÍive Development
Although cognitive psychology has been instructive in conceptualizing student processing
of academic tasks, some theorists hold that it is inadequate as an explanatory structure for
analyzing classroom teaching and learning. Barbara Rogoff (1984) in her introduction lo Every-
day Cognition, argues that cognitive pqychologists spend too much time describing the develop-
ment of mental structures within the individual and too little attention to the social context
of learning. She criticizes the assumption that the mental structures of the individual allow
generalized cognitive problem solving across situational contexts. She believes that individuals'
skills are limited by the context of the problem, e.g., the physical and conceptual structure,
the activity's purpose, and the social milieu. She bases her argument on the work of Vygot-
sky (1Ø8) who proposed a crucial role for social context in human cognitive development.
Vygotsky suggested that the social context affecs cognitive activity on two levels: 1) social
cultural history provides tools and practices that influence learning; and 2) adults and other
knowledgeable people transmit information about the tools and practices to children. These
social interactions assist in structuring cognitive activity. In other words, the interpersonal
activities are slowly transformed into intrapersonal mental abilities.
Vygotsky (1978) did not see a clear distinction between development and learning; in fact,
he saw cognitive development as resulting from the interaction of maturation and learning.
Because he stressed the contribution of learning under the tutelage of adults to the child's
development, he gave importance to the period of pre-independent problem solving which
he termed the "zone of proximal development." This phrase describes the mental activity
that an individual is capable of, but only with the guidance of a more knowledgeable per-
son; for example, those activities children can imitate but not complete independently are
within their zone of proximal development. It is clear that there are many activities with
which, regardless of the amount of modeling available, children can not have success. These
activities are outside the zone and consequently have little or no pedagogical usefulness.
One deduction that Vygotsky's theory led him to was that curriculum for rctarded learners
should not be mediated solely through concrete activities. Not only is concreteness inade-
quate in moving any student toward higher cognitive functioning, it can reinforce handicaps.
According to Vygotsky concreteness should be thought ofas a stepping stone for developing
abstract thinking. As reported above, learning disability specialists are currently attempting
to train students in the use of strategies to promote comprehension and accuracy in ac-
complishing academic tasks. These cognitive strategies are the stepping stones that can lead
students to processing.on a comprehension level. The role of the teacher as initiator and
change agent in developing cognition in learning disabled students is considerable. Some
teaching strategies have more affrnity for this concept of cognitive development than do others.
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A teaching strategy that takes advantage of the zone of proximal development is known as
"scaffolding." This term was coined by Wood, Bruner and Ross (1976) as a metaphor to
describe a pedagogical strategy that bridges the gap between task requirements and the learner's
skill level. The scaffold in the building construction trades has the following characteristics:
1) support, 2) tool, 3) range extension, 4) extension oftask completion ability, 5) selectivity
of use. Scaffolding is meant to allow task accomplishment without error or failure through
teacher intervention as needed. Learning tasks, mediated through the scaffolding technique
contribute to the students' independent skill development, and as these capabilities increase,
the zone of proximal development shifts. The crucial difference between building construc-
tion scaffolding and instructional scaffolding is that one is a physical support and the other
is an interactive relationship. Scaffolding as an instructional strategy can be illustrative of
one means by which social interactions play a crucial role in the growth of human cogni-
tion. It was pointed out by Greenfield (1984) that scaffolding is more commonly employed
in informal learning situations than in formal school settings. This may be because school
teachers are more inclined to let students fail in their tasks and learn from their failures.
Scaffolding as a teaching strategy is probably underutilized in the school situation.
It appears that human interactions in the classroom have signifrcant and substantial i¡fluence
on learning outcomes. In addition to the social, contextual foundation for cognitive develop-
ment, students and teachers alike develop a variety of interactive strategies for controlling
the classroom environment, achieving goals, and making the school experience personally
meaningful. It is possible that for students with learning problems, human interactions are
even more important than for their average classmates. Certainly, strategy training initially
presumes an intensive union of teacher and student, as does the technique of scaffolding.
It is possible that the behavioral model for designing instructional sequences has tended to
obscure the crucial role of relationships in the learning process. An examination of the ex-
periences and relationships of learning handicapped students within the natural milieu of
mainstream classrooms may provide insight about practices that advance or retard learning.
Some of the findings from a qualitative, classroom-based study of special needs students
in mainstream secondary classrooms follow.
W::r#f#rStudy 
of Special Needs Students in Mainstream
This qualitative study was based in the regular classrooms of a public secondary school where
the researcher worked for the previous five years in the special education department. The
school had 550 students and was homogeneous vis a vis socio-economic status (upper-middle),
race (white), religion (protestant), and values (conservative). Classrooms were chosen to
provide the opportunity to observe some of the students in more than one setting. The ma-
jority of mildly handicapped students were mainstreamed into non-college preparatory courses
in this high school. Twenty-three identified special needs students were observed interact-
ing with teachers, non-special needs students and other handicapped students, while pro-
cessing the curriculum, responding to performance demands, and engaging in social interac-
tions. A total of six freshmen were observed in four different settings; one freshman and
one sophomore were observed in three settings; eight students (two freshmen, four
sophomores, onejunior, and one senior) were seen in two settings; and seven (one freshman,
one sophomore, four juniors, one senior) were observed in one setting'
The study examined and weighed the significance of major frctors of classroom life for special
needs students. Arrangements were made to spend several weeks in each of six different
mainstream classes, as \¡/ell as to interview teachers (or teams of teachers) and special needs
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students about their views of classroom experiences. The data werc accumulated in field
notes, tapes of interviews, and taped classroom interactions. Significant information about
the teaching learning process was discovered and documented thiough a qualitative examina-
tion of routine classroom activities. A report follows of the hndings ihat impact on our
þowlgdee oftheteaching learning process as experienced by a group ofspecial needs students
in mainstream classes.
I. Special needs students shared some behaviors with their disabled and non-disabled
classmates, but each presented an individual learning profile. Many ofthe students, learn-
ing characteristics have been enumerated in the literature. For example, some demonstrated
limited receptive and/or expressive verbal abilities; they had difficulty with multi-step pro-
cesses; problems extracting and resynthesizing embedded information; and, deficits in tem-
poral, sequential operations. In general, they displayed a tendency to confusion in the realm
of concepts, word meanings, naming, sequencing, and logical conclusions. The picture of
student learning characteristics that emerged suggested that students with impaired learning
abilities are a heterogeneous group with individual learning profiles and overlappin!
characteristics.
II. Student learning characteristics tended to drive their academic task preferences. Students
who go into classrooms with significant learning disabilities, especially verbal and memory
deficits, are often concerned about surviving academically and at the same time about present-
ing themselves in a positive light for their classmates. They preferred discussions to lec-
tures, but felt comfortable only when discussing topics for which they had a developmental
or emotional interest and a conceptual base. Preferred activities that emerged durìng this
study included competitive games, independent, individualized projects, anã activitiei that
were infused with social relations, either as part of the task structure (oral reading of plays)
or which were routine enough to permit on-going socialization.
III. The students demonstrated strategies for influencing the classroom task structure. Students
had numerous strategies for getting the kinds of assignments they wanted. They sought to
reduce the challenge margin of assignments and to increase socialization by seeking non-
threatening class activities with a social component. They minimized unwanted assigriments
by sølling, getting the teacher off the subject, packing up earl¡ subtly encouraging acting
out by classmates, and generally giving negative feedback for unwanted tasks. They workeã
to hold down their teachers' expectations for productiveness by carefully monitoring time
on task to delimit the work production rate. Time on task was reduced úy lengtheniig the
transition periods at the beginning and end of each period and by taking regulaibreaks dur-
ing independent seatwork. Students were also observed to give tacit áccãptance and mild
encouragement to strategic deviant behavior by some of their classmates which had the ef-
fect of delaying or interrupting the academic business. In a proactive manner students pro-
vided reinforcement to teachers who assigned desired tasks through expressions of enthusiâsm,
listening attentively, praise, and a show ofbusyness. In these waysitudents exercised con-
siderable control over the classroom proceedings.
IV. The teachers were also observed ûo devise and execute strategies for achieving goals.
The teachers attempted a varietSr of means for coping with and alleviating the effecs of leam-
ing deficits displayed by their lower level students. A major strategy was ior teachers to create
a classroom ambiance that neutralized the academic evaluative process. An important in-
structional strategy was for the teacher to build a meaningful knowledge base from whole
class activities, such as discussions, oral reading, and routine tasks, while continually act-
ing as a scaffold for the students' performances. Another teaching strategy was to break more
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complex tasks into small units. Each portion was treated as discrete and was structured and
monitored in much the same way that a total project might be for higher functioning classes.
In this way, many students were able to handle work that was beyond their level of cognitive
development.
Teachers accurately discerned that the concepts underlying certain curricula were beyond
the comprehension of many of their students. They responded by concretizing the language
and formularizing the activities of the academic task structure. Thus, the teachers instructed
students in equation solving with "get rid of this" or "move this over here." So, too, they
substituted critical thinking skills with common road map directions, 'Tust follow the for-
mula on the board," and "Go dor¡¿n one side and up the other." Both of these strategies (com-
ponentization and formularization) made it possible for non-college preparatory students
io process information and ideas and produce work at a higher level than they would be able
to in a less structured situation.
V. A behavioral analysis of learning tends to obscure the complex, social nature of the learn-
ing process. The teachers who served as subjects for this study tended to analyze the teaching
learning process in behavioral terms and to focus on the independentbehaviors ofthe students.
They have been trained that learning occurs in a logical, sequential mode and_ that if they
breãk the curriculum into small enough units, students will make progress. That students
often do not make progress, according to this theory can be traced to student behaviors,
usually in the form of non-application. Consequently, teachers put their efforts into minimizing
the brêadth and depth of the tasks, structuring and supporting the activities, and influencing
the students to diligently follow a prescribed sequence of learning activities. To the extent
that they failed to design an academic task structure that was within the students' conceptual
.ung" oi connected to their shared knowledge base, the resulting approximations ofclassical
high school curricula were reduced in meaning for the students and lacked an essential precon-
dition of learning.
VI. The students' social agendas often dominated the classroom business and frequently were
at odds with the teacher designed learning sequences. Secondary students are developmen-
tally at a stage when both their external and internal lives are dominated by peer interaction.
It was observed during the study that most, if not all, of the students maintained a strong
social agenda during school time that only occasionally intersected with their teachers' and
their own academic agendas. The studens attempted to influence academic activities to
enhance their social agendas: they promoted and supported activities that either created time
for socialization (e.g., loosely supervised independent seat work) or activities whose struc-
ture was inherently social in nature (e.g', games or play reading).
VIL Tþachers' views ofthe teaching/learning process did not adequately incorporate the social
nature of their students. It appeared that most of the adolescents observed filtered the academic
tasks through social relationships. Studenc with impaired learning abilities seemed especially
dependent on relationships of a supportive nature to function academically. Although there
were many examples of effective use of social inûeraction to support the curriculum, it ap-
peared that the teachers underestimated the social component of learning. They relied too^heavily 
on a behavioral, positivist view of learning as an individual venture, properl¡ although
only occasionally pursued through interaction of the self with the environment. The instruc-
tional strategies chosen to accommodate special needs students tended toward individualization
of assignments and concretization of ideas. The math and science teachers had some suc-
cess with these strategies, but their success was limiæd by the particular learning characteristics
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(weaknesses in memor¡ sequencing, and organization) oftheir students and the failure of
the task structure to lead to a comprehension level.
The humanities teachers, on the other hand, demonstrated a commitment to relationships
as mediators of the task structure, but their interpretations fell far short of what was needed.
In social studies, the teacher displayed a special sensitivity to the students' need for an emo-
tional hook to process ideas effectively and to their responsiveness to her personal involve-
ment in the writing process. The English teacher successfully exploited the teacher/student
relationship to engender good student involvement in a shared creation of knowledge at a
fairly high cognitive level through his use of scaffolding as a teaching technique. Both of
these teachers ultimately drew back from a logical extension of their interactionist perspec-
tive on teaching and failed to maximize their successes. In social studies, the individualiza-
tion of assignments discouraged content-related communication and allowed the students
to exploit the loosely structured class time for social communication. In English class, there
was no discernible effort on the part of the teacher to withdraw the "scaffolding effect" in
order to move students toward unstructured, generalizable learning.
Cognitive psychology learning theory drives present day educational efforts for low-achieving
students. These efforts are manifested by attempts to train students in the area of cognitive
strategies and by the use of a direct instruction teaching approach in classrooms. There is
a growing awareness that the quality of classroom social contexts and instructional programs
can influence the learning outcomes of adolescents. A qualitative approach was chosen to
examine classroom-based teaching/leaming processes. The findings suggested that a behavioral
analysis of learning may be promoting practices which often lead to a breakdown in the
teaching/learning process. It was also suggested that viewing learning as an interactive social
process would engender a perspective on learning that more accurately incorporates the social
component. This could lead to recommendations for instructional strategies that exploit
classroom relationships and channel students' social drives to the achievement of academic
goals.
Jo Anna Spruill
Professional Education Department: Graduate Dívision, College of Education
REFERENCES
Deshler, D., Schumaker, J. &Lenz, B. K. (1984). Academic and cognitive interventions for L.D.
adolescents: Parl l. Journal of Learníng Disabilíties, nQ), 108-11'1.
Deshler, D., Schumaker, L, Lenz, B.K. & Ellis, E. (1984). Academic and cognitive interventions
for L.D. adolescents: Paftn. Journal of Learning Disabilities, 17(3), 170-179.
Dcyle, W (1977). Paradigms for research on teacher effectiveness. In L.S. Shulman (Ed.), Revíew
in Education 5. Itasca, IL: FE. Peacock.
Dcyle, W. (199). Classroom tasks and students' abilities. In P. L. Peterson & H.J. Waiberg (Eds.),
Research on Teaching. Berkeley, CA: McCutcheon.
Doyle, W. (1980). Student mediating responses in teaching effectiveness, (final rcport NIE-
Gt6-0099). Denton, Texas: North Texas Saæ University.
149
Dcyle, W. (1982). Academic work. National Commission on Excellence in Education, (NIE-
P-S2-0051). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education.
Edwa¡ds, A.D. & Furlong, V.J. (lql8). The Ittnguage of Teaching. London: Heinemann Educa-
tional Books.
Gelzheiser, L., Sheperd, M. & Wozniak, R. (1986). The development of instruction to induce skill
transfer. Erceptional Children, 53(2), 125 -129'
Graham, S. (1985). Teaching basic academic skills to leaming disabled students: A model of the teaching-
learning process. Joumal ofLearníng Disabilíties, l8(9), 528-534.
Greenfield, P.M. (1984). A Theory of the teacher in the learning activities of everyday life. In Rogoff,
B. & Lave, J. (Eds.), Everyday cognition: Its development in social contexr. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Jackson, PJV. 0968). Life in Classroorns. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Lemer, J. (1968). karníng Disabilities: Theory Diagnosis, andTeaching Strategies. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co.
Palincsar, A. (1986). Meøcognitive strategy instruct\on' Exceptional Children, 53Q), 118-124'
Paris,S.&Oka,E.(1986).SelÊregulatedlearningamongexceptionalchildren. ErceptionalChildren,
s3(2), lo3-108.
Piaget, J. (1963). The Origin of Intelligence in Children' N'Y.: WW. Norton.
Rogoff, B. & Lave, J. (Eds.) (1984). Everyday cognition: Its Development in social context. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schlechty, P.C. (1976). Teaching and Social Behavior. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Shepard, M.J. (1985). Teaching memory and learning strategies. Presentation made at Learning
Disorders Conference, Cambridge, MA.
Smith, L.M. & Geoffrey, W. (1968). The Complexitíes of an IJrban Clnssroom. New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston.
Torgesen, J. (1986). Computers and cognition in reading: A focus on decoding fliency Exceptional
Children, 53(2), 157 -162.
Vygotsky, L. (19/8). Mind is society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press'
wood, D., Brune¡ J. & Ross, G. (196). The role of tutoring in problem solving. Journal of child
Psychology, Psychiatry, and AIIied Disciplines, 17, 89-100'
150
-THINKING ABOUT HUMAN RELATIONSHIP: WHAI
CHILDREN KNOW
Susan Cook
I am going to talk about a theorist whose ideas about how children think have been embrac-
ed widely by American psychologiss and þ educators. The theorist trc whom I make reference
is the swiss psychologist Jean Piaget. My claim is (and the data that I'll present suggest)
that Piaget and others who followed him have made some inaccurate generalizations about
the co_ntribution of logical thinking to children's grasp and knowledgi of human relation-
ship. One consequence ofthese generalizations is that psychologiss have seen young children
as having a knowledge of human relationship that is compromised. Data fróm two studies
will be presented: a small longitudinal study of 10 boys and girls (7{0 years old) and a larger
study of 59 first, second and third grade boys and girls (6J0 years old) in which they wãre
interviewed at length about their conception of family relationship. Two areas of children's
knowledge of family relationship that I'll talk about are: l) children's recognition of con-
tinuity in family relationship; the unconditional membership of every human-being in fami-
ly; and 2) children's recognition of perspective in family, that is, pórspective as ipossible
location of self and other in responding, receiving and sharing human kinãness and sometimes
malice.
Thesedata and my explicationof them will clarify aspects of awareness that piaget's depic-
tion of children's knowledge of human relationship fails to capture. Piaget has ðontribúted
immeasurably to what we understand about the growth of the chitd's abil-ity to reason about
the physical world: to use logic to demonstrate intelligence. This broad appiication of logical
thought to the social realm may lead theorists to a narrowed vision of t^he contribution of
the experience of relationship to human development. Carol Gilligan (1982) has described
the ways in which this narrowed vision of human relationship haJbeen repeatedly evoked
in psychological theory. Piagetian theory applied to children's knowledge of human rela-
tionship may be yet another domain of theory in which paradoxically the iision is narrowed
and the centrality of relationship overlooked.
A number of American psychologists have applied piaget's theory about the growth of the
child's ability to- Take sense-of the events of the physicd world to the growthãf the ability
to make sense of the events of the social world: the world of people and relationships @orké,
1975; chandler, 193; Flavell et. al., 1968; Selman, 1980). Thebody of literature which has
emerged examining the application of logical thought to the child's social knowledge is col-
lectively called, "social cognition." This area of psychology looks at how we make sense
of human relationship: how we reason, how the twists and tuins of our activities with others
are represented in thought.
This application of Piaget's theory of the growth;f children's logic to the social world has
led to two confusions in our understanding and study of how chilãren know and grasp rela-
tionship. These two confusions suggest that piaget's theory incompletely capture-s the com-
plexity children bring to thinking about human relationship.
The first confusion that Piaget's work has fostered is a confusion between the idea of rela-
tionship and the fact of relationship. The second confusion that Piaget's work has fostered
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is a confusion between the idea of perspective or point of view in relationship and the fact
of perspective in the experience of relationship. These two different confusions have a com-
mon thread: the common problem of losing the distinction between the child's ability to grasp
an idea through logic and the child's ability to grasp a fact, through observation of relational
experience.
An early Piagetian study demonstrates the hrst confusion between the child's ability to know
the idea and the fact of relationship. In 1928, Piaget published , in Judgment and Reasoning
of the Child, the results of a small study of 30 boys aged 7 to 10 in which he asked his sub-
jects to dehne the meaning of family. Piaget's study of the growth of logic centers on the
quality of the child's idea. Growth of the idea is reflected in the emergence of ability to hold
two ideas about something in mind at the same time and recognize that two ideas seen together
are different than either idea held separately. The most familiar example of this ability is
the conservation ofliquid task which Piaget used to show that the thought ofthe young child
focuses on only one dimension or idea about an observation. The single idea is represented
in the notion that only one characteristic dictates how much water the container holds. Young
children say a tall and thin beaker holds more water than a short wide beaker because it's
taller and do not recognize how "thin" enters into the problem. The more mature reasoner
sees that two ideas taken into account at the same time create a different idea. The older
child sees that tall and thin are not necessarily more than wide and short, because the two
ideas taken together compensate for each other. They create a different idea-the idea of
compensation. This dynamic of logic is taken for granted among older children. Logical
development occurs through this weaving of ideas and the child's inclusion of the conse-
quences of this weaving in understanding of how the world works.
In the 1928 study, Piaget set out to see how children apply logic to their thoughts about fami-
ly relationship. His study of 30 boys revealed that reasoning about the concept of family
can be placed at three different stages. Focus on the single "idea," Piaget says, leads children
at the first stage to have a limited idea of family conditioned on the premise of physical
presence. Boys at the first stage say a family is people who live together. Seeing the "single
idea" of "living together" generated by the immediate perception, they use the immediate
perception to define åmily. At the second stage, Piaget says, the idea of relationship intervenes
but does not yet supplant the fact of living together. Family relationships, therefore a¡e "not
yet thought of, by the child, as independent oftime and place" (p. ll8). It is nor until late
childhood that children go beyond the immediate observation that families are physically
together and entertain a representation or idea of family that is independent of time and place.
It is only at the end of childhood, Piaget says, that children have an idea of family as blood
relationship, an idea that means that a family can be physically apart and still be a family
by virtue of their blood tie to each other. Thus, according to Piaget, the child cannot enter-
tain an idea of family as continuous and on-going, despite physical separation, until late
childhood.
Piaget's observation about what children know about the continuity of family contradicts
a readily made observation about the conditions under which children live. Children belong
to families. Belonging ûo a family is an experience of membership, ttrat, for most children,
is unconditional and for all children is continuous and irreversible by virtue of biological
relationship. Did Piaget mean to suggest that children do not recognize this connection be-
tween people until the end of childhood? Did he believe that it is the growth of logic that
brings this awareness to children? That the idea of family relationship overrides the fact of
relationship in children's lives? Or that children's inability to represent family as an idea
undoes the fact of family tie? This contradiction between what children know by virtue of
logical ability and what children know by virtue of experience presents the first confusion.
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In 1980, I began to study the question that Piaget had addressed in 1928: do children see
Íàmily relationship as continuous? I will describe how my family data and Piaget's data conflict.
The technique used in studying children's conceptions of family is somewhat different than
Piaget's although his "methode-clinique," in which the interviewer follows the line of thought
suggested by the child, was used in interviewing subjects. Rather than asking children to
define a family, I asked them many different questions about how family relationship works
and I asked very directly about whether family is "independent of time and place," whether
they could see the continuity of family membership.
Here is a 9 year old girl, the daughter of divorced parents, who participated in the first
longitudinal study. She was asked,
..DOES A FAMILY EVER STOP BEING A FAMILY?"
"No, it always stays a family."
..WHEN YOU'RE 50 AND YOUR SISTER IS 53, WILL YOU STILL BE A FAMILY?''
"Yes."
..WHY?"
"Because you're their daughters, and you can never break a family. Once you're a farnily,
you're always going to be a family."
..WHY IS THAT?''
"Because you were once children, what belonged to them, well, half-belonged because you
don't really belong to anybody."
A second grader asked the same question:
..DOES A FAMILY EVER STOP BEING A EAMILY?''
"Never."
..HOV/ COME IT NEVER STOPS?''
"Because they will always be together in their heart."
..WHY WILL THEY ALWAYS BE TOGETHER'IN THEIR HEART'?''
"See, you can only remember people from your heart. Like when your grandfather dies,
you'll always remember him, right? So that's why."
A first grader who was interviewed in the second larger study was asked:
..DOES A FAMILY EVER STOP BEING A FAMILY?''
"No."
"HOV/ COME?"
"Because the mother keeps on having a baby and the baby keeps on growing up to have another
baby and the family keeps on going on and on and on.".ANY OTHER REASONS THAÎ A FAMILY DOESN'T STOP BEING A FAMILY?''
"Not that I know of."
And another second grade girl:
..DOES A FAMILY EVER STOP BEING A FAMILY?''
"I don't think they would."
..WHY NOT? WHY DOES A EAMILY ALWAYS STAY A EAMILY?''
"Because once you have children, it's hard to put them back. You've got your . . you've got one."
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And finally, we hear Sam, a seven year old boy:
..WHEN YOU'RE 50 AND YOUR SISTER IS 53, WILL YOU STILL BE A EAMILY?''
"No."
"HOW COME?"
,,Because I think when you're 20 you sort of go out a lot and you sort of don't come home
very often and you, like, stay out late and then finally one day you get married and then that's
when you really dont see your family very much'"
..SO, IF YOU DON'T SEE YOUR FAMILY VERY MUCH DOES THAT MAKE IT NOT
A FAMILY?''
"Well, no. We're still a family, but we're still not broken up."
Remembering Piaget's contention that logic is the art of proof, I asked Sam to prove his point:
..YOU'RE STILL A FAMILY, BUT YOU'RE STILL NOT BROKEN UP' HOV/ COME
YOU'RE STILL A FAMILY?"
..Because ... that's a hard one ... Because you're still a family. Like your Mom and Dad
still remember you and they have pictures of you when you're young and stuff and you'll
always be a frmily and even when Mom and Dad die, we ll still be a frmily because I'll always
remember them."
What we see in the responses of young children is a portrait of their awareness of the con-
tinuity in human relationship very different from that which Piaget presented. In these data,
the fiiation on the immediate reality, the groundedness of the child in the present that Piaget
said precludes recognition of family relationship as independent of time and place brings
themto see their family membership as a relationship that will always exist. The immaturity
of logic, the representation of their experience in ideas, leads to a naivete that has precisely
the oþposite meaning of ttrat which Piaget offered. What the children cannot see is that åmilies
can be broken.
The daughter of divorced parents who, aT age 9, said that children belonging Ûo parents is
part of w-hat keeps a family a family, sees at age 12 that other things maintain the continuity,
äespite life eveni, despitè all the ways in which human relationship is transformed' She is
asked at 72 years,5 months:
..DOES A EAMILY EVER STOP BEING A FAMILY?''
"They're always a family, but not, they don't always have to be a close family"'
..WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A CLOSE FAMILY?''
"To live under the same roof."
..IS IT ONLY LIVING UNDER THE SAME ROOF?''
"No, close by actually caring about their problems."
..WHAI DOES THAT DO FOR PEOPLE?''
.'It lets them know that there is a person who cares about them and lets them talk about their
feelings and maybe they can find a solution."
Her older sister knows that there are many ways to sustain relationship despite divorce, death
or separation. At 11, her older sister had said:
..DOES A FAMILY EVER STOP BEING A FAMILY?"
"I guess sort of and not really. Not really because you'llalways be a family. You would always
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be, let's say, your daughter or your brother. As long as you live, but I guess you could run
away or sort of disown your parents or disown your ..."..CAN YOU DO THAI?''
"sort of I guess you could. Just say I hate you. Get out of here. you know. But you'd still
be your mother or daughter."
"wHY?"
"Because they still had you and you had something in you. you know. A piece of you."
Why did Piaget suggest that children's ideas of family do not incorporâte continuiry until
late childhood? Why did he confuse the child's ability to know the idea of relationshþ with
the child's ability to know the fact of relationship? If we believe that logical thoughi seen
in its representation in children's ideas creates awareness of the continuity of relationship,
then we also must believe that young children cannot represent in their ideas a central reali-
ty of their lives. Children are accompanied unconditionally-þ human relationship. Biological
relationship and kinship do not keep Þmily together, but children remain accompanied because
their instrumental dependence requires human response. They can't do withòut us. Family
relationship is a fact of their lives-despite Piaget's confusion that logic-its representation
in ideas-is the telling marker of human knowledge.
The second confusion of idea and fact that social cognitive psychologists have fostered lies
in the study ofperspective in relationship. One characteristic ofchildren's thinking rhat Piaget
described is the egocentricity ofthought. Egocentricity, Piaget suggested, implies that young
children are fixed on their own perspective. They have difficulty distinguishing wtrat ttrey
think from what others think. Perspective, in Piaget's view, has a very narrow meaning. Hè
defines perspective in relationship as a point of view or idea. In studying social awareness,
researchers focus on how the perspectives interact: the other person's idea-what he or she
is thinking, and the child's idea-what the child is thinking.
The egocentric child, limited to his or her own perspective, according to this piagetian ap-
proach, brings a very insular and self-absorbed understanding of what people do to and for
each other in relationship. This is the interpretation social psychologists make based on Piaget's
conception of perspective as the child's ability to take the other's idea or attitude. In social
experience children are conceived as primarily concemed with the self and as not very skilled
in understanding others' wants, needs, and wishes.
I return to the family data to demonstrate how this narrow definition of perspective as the
taking of the point of view of the other person has compromised what we think children know
about relationship. In analyzing the conceptions of family data, I have defined perspective
as a possible location of self and other in the activity of relationship: in the giving, reõeiving
and sharing between self and other that is relationship. Using ttris definition of perspective,
there are at least six possible perspectives or locations of self and other: self givlng to other,
self including other in subjective awareness, othei giving to self, other and self shãring, self
focusing on self in relationship, and self excluding self to focus only on others. In the fãmily
interview data, children see all six perspectives.
Here are some examples of the perspectives of human relationship that I have observed.
A first grader is asked:
..WHAT SHOULD PEOPLE DO FOR THEIR EAMILIES?''
"They should be nice to each other."
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..WHY IS THAT IMPORIANT?''
"Because they love each other and they should not hurt each other, because someone could
die."
..WHEN YOU SAY'LOVE', WHAT DO YOU MEAN?''
"It means that you can hug them or kiss them, or something like that."
Another first grader seeing another perspective of self and other says:
..WHAT SHOULD EAMILIES DO FOR THE PEOPLE IN THEM?''
"On Valentine's day they give presents to people they love. Presents, birthdays come up too.
They should spend a lot of time with them. Because they like each other. They love people.
They really care for their auntie or their sisters, for their mom and cousins."
A second grade boy
..WHAT SHOULD FAMILIES DO FOR THE PEOPLE IN THEM?''
"Be nice and care for one another."
..WHY IS THAÏ?''
"Because one might get hurt and if you don't care for them, then they might, it might in-
crease and go all over."
..IT MIGHT INCREASE AND GO ALL OVER?''
"Yeah, like yesterday I fell in the sandpit and I got shaky because I was getting all sorts of
sand going down my shirt. And then my mom came running down to help me. I had to take
off my jacket and get all that sand off."
..SO WHAT'S THE MOST IMPORTANT THING?''
"Care for everyone and care for everybody."
..WHY SHOULD THEY DO THAI?''
"Because if you don't care for anybody, they won't like you and then if you get hurt, they'll
just leave you right there, if you get hurt, and you might even have a broken leg."
And finally a first grader taking one of several possible perspectives of self and other in giv-
ing, receiving and sharing:
..WHAT SHOULD EAMILIES DO FOR THE PEOPLE IN THEM?"
"They should love them, take good care or help the babies go to sleep."
..WHY TAKE CARE OF THEM?"
"Because then they won't ...I don't think they might have anybody to take care of them."
..WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN?''
"They don't survive."
..IF YOU WERE TO PICK THE MOST IMPOKTANT THING?''
"I'd pick that they come along when the person calls them or something. And like when
somebody falls down and they call them real bad, they should come."
"HOV/ COME?"
"To see what's wrong and call the doctor if it's bad bad."
These are representative examples of how children know the six perspectives of relationship.
The perspectives children take in describing the experience ofrelationship vary. These perspec-
tives are not mutually exclusive. The fact of perspective as a possible location of self and
other in the giving, receiving and sharing of relationship is known to them. The perspective
can be that of "me giving to you," "you giving to me," "us sharing" or one can take an
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insular, me-contained perspective. This last perspective, that of the insular "what's in it for
me" approach, is the view Piaget suggested children take in their egocentricity. In fact, young
children in,the activity of relationship take many different perspectives of self and ãthel
locations of self and other. Perspective, narrowly defined as the .bther's point of view," does
not capture children's recognition of this fact of the interplay of the perspectives of self and
othe¡ jn giving, receiving and sharing. when we define peispectivè as ã location or place
ofselfand other, young children do not appear to be insulaior selÊabsorbed in relation-
shrp. Rather. they are participants-in the activity of relationship-they know they can res-
pond, receive and sha¡e. These experiences are represented in conc¡ete wåys in their ideas-but
children know they can assume each perspective, that each perspective iõ a fact offamily life.
A second grade boy describes an incident ofhis response and his kindness to another person:
"Like me once in our class_ I made two presents for my mommy and my dad and then my
mom felt happy when I gave her the two wooden things out ofclothãspins. I gave her a reindeer
and a chair and my mom took them and hung thern up on a mirior. I {ave them both an
o¡nament with a little snowman on it."
A little girl says,
"I get my mother tea and toast when she wants it. saturday she was feeling sick and so I
went down stairs and got her some food.,'..HOV/ DOES THAT HELP A EAMILY?''
"Well, just to be nice to each other by helping.',..WHAT PART DOES IT HELP?''
"The heart."
..THE HEART OF THE EAMILY OR THE HEART OF EACH OF THE PEOPLE?''
"The_ heart of the people. It helps to be happy in the family. so everyone would be happy
and there wouldn't be any fights, and nobody would be angry."
To focus on the jdea of perspective and not the fact of perspective, is to overlook the capaci-
ty of young children to be full participants in the peispeôtives of response, receiving and
sharing. children's ideas about what another person thinis are rudimenlry, just as the words
they use to define family are simple and conirete. This deprivation of cómplexity in ideas
does not necessarily lead to.a. deprivation in experience or an impaired .upu"ìty to recognize
the experience of relationship.
If we believe that Piaget was studying the growth of all intelligence and that logical thought
is the best and fullest representation of knowledge, what chilãren know abouihuman rela-
tionshþ: the continuity of family, and perspectives of self and other in the activity of rela-
tionship, appears impoverished.
The capacity to think logically does not 
"r"ut" "*p"ri"nce. 
The acquisition of ideas about
human relationship does not create the unconditional place of human relationship in the life
cycle. Perspective as an idea about the other does noireplace perspective as an experience
ofactive exchange. The centrality ofhuman relationshipìs a fact ofhuman dependence that
children, who represent their experience in the .on.."t", notice and know, dãspite the im-
maturity of their logic, despite the rudimentary way in which they represent ihe point of ui"*
of another person.
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carol Gilligan (1982) points out that the study of human development by psychologists has
been premised on the notion that it is the self that is the constant in the life cycle and human
relationship comes and goes. Piaget was very much part of this tradition of seeing the self
as the constant, his interpretation of his family data being an example of this. The current
data suggest that, from the child's vantage point ofdependence, the accompaniment ofother
peoplb persists as a fact and is a source of sense of belonging that, Piaget notwithstanding,
engenders a profound knowledge ofhuman relationship, premised on experience, not logical
ability.
Perhaps psychologists need to expand their view of intellectual ability and narrow their vi-
sion of the acquisition of logical ability as the cognitive ability from which all else follows.
Perhaps Piaget, contrary to his own beliefs, was not describing the growth of a cognitive
ability that explains all that children know. Howard Gardner, in his book, Frames of Mind:
The Theory of Multiple Intelligencøs (1983), makes this point. The broad application of Piaget-
ian theory to all domains of understanding, may be inaccurate. He says, "Piaget has painted
a brilliant portrait of development in one domain-that of logical-mathematical thought-
but from there has erroneously assumed that it pertains to other areas, ranging from musical
intelligence to the interpersonal domain" (p. ßa). The interpersonal realm may be one area
where, as Gardner suggests, logical thought may be ill-suited to explain competence.
children's knowledge of human relationship presents a challenge to psychologists and
educators. The challenge is to recognize that what children know about relationship may
be richer and more profound than theory and measurement techniques have allowed us to
see. We are obliged to understand better the abilities children have that al1ow them to see
the tie between people that keeps us bound to each other, despite physical separation, despite
time and place, despite unseemly human events.
Susan Cook
Department of Human Resource Development, College of Erlucation
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